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1Introduction
Law takes a very dim view of love .1
They say that the world was built for two
Only worth living if somebody is loving you2
The aim of this book is to test the (in)visibility of romantic love in the legal 
discourse of modern Australian marriage. Romantic love has become a core part 
of modernity and, unsurprisingly, a dominant part of the western marriage 
discourse,3 but to what extent is this view replicated in the legal meaning of 
marriage? This question is important for two reasons. If love has become the 
reason people marry, then it is important that this is reflected in the law’s content 
and application. This is self-evidently important for the legitimacy of law. Just 
as important is the question of how we understand law. Is law engaged with 
emotions, or separate from them? This forms part of a long-standing theoretical 
debate in the history of ideas.
To understand law’s relationship with love is no easy task. While law names 
emotions, it deals with them only obliquely.4 Emotions are not considered 
‘fit’ for the study of law, and love even less so, with its ‘stigma of association 
with women’s magazines or frivolous trivia’.5 Law is not alone in its scorn of 
emotions. The history of ideas has been dominated by a seemingly impenetrable 
distinction between reason and emotion, which not only distinguishes between 
the two, but values the former over the latter.6 In this discourse, emotion is 
1 ABC Television ‘R v Dana’ episode three Rake 18/11/2010.
2 Lana del Rey, Video Games, Polydor 2012.
3 Increasingly this is true also in non-western cultures. See, for example, the portrayal of ‘love marriages’ 
in Indian Bollywood films. 
4 R F Moran, ‘Law and Emotion, Love and Hate’ (2000–2001) 11 Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues 783.
5 C Smart, Personal Life (Polity Press, Cambridge 2007) 58.
6 The opposition of reason and emotion has a long tradition dating back to the ancient Greek philosophers. 
Plato saw emotions as obstructions to the attainment of our true rational selves while Aristotle believed that 
a true understanding of the world around us could not be achieved without reference to our emotions. This 
debate has remained prominent in the history of ideas ever since. Underlying Aristotle’s and Plato’s difference 
is the view that they have of emotions themselves. A diverse number of conclusions have been reached about 
emotions. Emotions have been seen as bodily physical sensations, but also as expressions of our knowledge, 
ethics and value systems. Darwin saw them as vestiges of our evolutionary past, while others have argued 
that they are learned cultural phenomena. Anthropologists have reached different conclusions as to whether 
they are culturally specific or universal to all humans. Emotions are seen as phenomena that distract our 
purposes and lead us astray, but also as instruments that fine tune our thinking and help us to make ‘rational’ 
choices. If we see our emotions as devoid of meaning, as physical urges that can lead us into over-reactions, 
as blind passions, then one is more readily attracted to a view that emotions should be exorcised from any 
role in public life. On the other hand, if we accept a more ‘cognitive’ view of emotions, as purposeful aids to 
making ethical and rational choices, then we are not threatened by an idea that emotions are, and should be 
an integral part of public decision making. The important and positive role that emotions can play in public 
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relegated away from the important sphere of public discourse on the grounds 
that it is chaotic, unpredictable and therefore can too easily lead us into error.7 A 
discourse of law that is inclusive of emotions in general, and love in particular, 
needs to overcome this hurdle. 
This book will show that a careful study of love is neither frivolous nor trivial. 
In societies such as Australia, love is exalted, and is often presented as one 
of humanity’s most powerful emotions. It is hailed as radical, liberating and 
equalising; as a progressive force capable of breaking down entrenched social 
barriers, delivering happiness and satisfaction; and of being at the forefront of 
a new humanism. The message that love is the most important thing in life is 
found all around us. It is not surprising, therefore, that love has permeated the 
institution of marriage. 
The social discourse of marriage has changed radically during the last century 
or so, and yet it is still steeped in many traditional ideas. When considering the 
laws of marriage, the institution embodies a number of tensions. These tensions 
can be expressed as a variety of contests: Christianity versus secularism; 
patriarchal versus feminist; hierarchy versus equality; heterosexual versus 
queer; procreation versus love; traditional versus liberal; church versus state; 
status versus contract; duty versus agency. The tensions will be evident in the 
discussion and analysis of the book. 
The substantive discussion of the law in this book is clustered around three main 
legal events that have explicitly challenged traditional legal understandings 
of marriage. The case of Re Kevin (Validity of Marriage of Transsexual),8 the 
case of Garcia v National Australia Bank9, and the passing and subsequent 
overriding of the Australian Capital Territory’s Civil Union Act (2006) by the 
life has to some extent been accepted in some of the disciplines, however it remains persistent in law. For 
some studies in thinking about emotions see the following: J M Barbalet, Emotion, Social Theory, and Social 
Structure: A Macrosociological Approach (Cambridge University Press, UK 1998); C Calhoun and R Solomon, 
What is an Emotion?: Classical Readings in Philosophical Psychology (Oxford University Press, New York 1984); 
K Oatley and J M Jenkins, Understanding Emotions (Blackwell Publishers, Oxford 1996); K Oatley, Best Laid 
Schemes: The Psychology of Emotions (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1992); R Solomon (ed), Thinking 
About Emotions: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2004); P A French 
& H K Wettstein, The Philosophy of Emotion, Midwest Studies in Philosophy XXII (University of Notre Dame, 
Indiana 1998).
7 See D Evans, Emotions: The Science of Sentiment (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2001); Oatley & Jenkins, 
Understanding Emotions; Calhoun & Solomon, What is an Emotion?
8 There are two cases here: Re Kevin (Validity of Marriage of Transsexual) (2001) 28 Fam LR 158 (Re Kevin 
No1) and Attorney-General for the Commonwealth v Kevin and Others (2003) 30 Fam LR 1 (Re Kevin No2).
9 There are three Garcia cases in total: Garcia v National Australia Bank Ltd BC 9301944 Supreme Court of 
NSW Equity Division 1993; National Australia Bank v Garcia [1996] NSWSC 253; Garcia v National Australia 
Bank Ltd [1998] CLR 395.
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federal government on the ground that the civil unions it legislated into being 
too closely resembled marriage.10 Each of these episodes will be analysed with a 
view to answering these questions: 
What meaning of marriage emerges from these episodes?
Do these episodes displace traditional meanings of marriage? 
Is romantic love a part of the discourse and, if so, what is the meaning of the 
love that emerges from them?
Before turning to that substantive analysis, there are two important background 
discussions which frame the central questions of the book. The first is how this 
book is informed by the development of the law and emotion scholarship, and 
the second is how the discussion is informed by the understanding of romantic 
love that dominates contemporary society. 
Framing the Questions of the Book
The Importance of Law and Emotion Scholarship
This book constitutes an example of how an emotional discourse (love) of a legal 
institution (marriage) enriches our understanding of that institution, helps us to 
understand how legal disputes are influenced by that understanding, and helps 
us to frame its regulation and reform (law). The importance of the question, 
however, goes beyond these important practical questions. At its heart, its aim 
is to challenge the exclusion of emotion from law and to challenge the dominant 
rhetoric of law that emerges from positivism. 
Early positivists, such as Jeremy Bentham and John Austin, aimed to develop 
an intellectual framework in which law could be seen as rational, modern, and 
scientific. To achieve this, they disputed that law should be linked to morality 
and rights (natural law), and challenged the claim that law could consist in 
10 These cases are not in family law. It could be argued that a book that examines the meaning of modern 
marriage should begin with an analysis of the Family Law Act (FLA). However, the legal episodes that this 
book relies upon exist for the most part outside of this revolutionary piece of legislation. This needs some 
explanation. My brief analysis of family law cases around those issues shows an unwillingness on the part 
of the newly established Family Law Court to engage in discussion, either explicit or implicit, about the 
question of marriage and its meaning since the repeal of the Matrimonial Causes Act. Presumably a return to 
such questions raised the spectre of the old law, which was to be avoided at all costs. To engage with Family 
Law Cases on the meaning of marriage, let alone its relationship to love, is therefore a difficult exercise. Courts 
circumscribe their reasoning to narrow points of law and go to great lengths to avoid any statements that can 
be read as being in any way normative. Because of this, despite the FLA appearing as a logical place to begin 
and end a discussion on marriage and love, the FLA is part of the back-story rather than the central story in 
this book. For more information on the impact of the FLA on marriage see chapter one. 
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unwritten and immemorial custom found in communities by the judge (common 
law theory). Instead, they wanted law to be associated with objectivity, certainty 
and neutrality.11 Modern positivism continues to operate inside this paradigm, 
unified under two central assertions: that law is law as long as it is created 
in the approved political way, and that law and morality are and ought to be 
separate from one another. One of the many consequences of this framework is 
the exclusion of emotion from law. 
Critical jurisprudence12 has challenged this view of law and has contributed to an 
emotional discourse both generally and specifically. To begin with the general, 
critical jurisprudence, as part of the post-modern tradition, challenges meta-
narratives. In so doing, it aims to liberate ‘suppressed narratives’ and ‘subvert 
dominant paradigm[s]’,13 and in the process make room for alternative ways to 
understand law. Such an approach necessarily includes emotion. Furthermore, a 
central argument common to all strands of critical jurisprudence is its challenge 
to the idea of objectivity. For positivists, the claim that law can be objective 
(no matter how that is understood)14 is central to the legitimacy of law. Critical 
jurisprudence challenges this claim from four distinct perspectives: critical legal 
studies (CLS) asserts that law is political, feminism that it is gendered, critical 
race theory (CRT) that it is racial, and queer theory that it is heteronormative.15 
In mounting these challenges, critical jurisprudence also undermines positivist 
claims that the law is value-neutral and rational.
As well as these general arguments, critical jurisprudence has developed a 
body of scholarship that has explicitly demanded an emotional engagement. 
This scholarship centralises the subject of law and the importance of identity 
based on sex, gender, race and sexuality.16 Related to this, is the use of the 
methodology of storytelling,17 a method that demands that law engages with 
11 See K Lee, The Positivist Science of Law (Avebury, Aldershot 1989) and M Davis, Asking the Law Question: 
The Dissolution of Legal Theory, second edition (LawBook Co, NSW 2002).
12 Critical jurisprudence refers primarily to the schools of critical legal studies (CLS), feminisms, critical 
race theory (CRT) and queer theory, all of which can to some extent be characterised as post-modern. Critical 
jurisprudence can also include more general approaches to the study of law, such as law and society, law and 
literature and, of course, law and emotion.
13 A E Cook, ‘Reflections on Post-Modernism’ (1991–92) 26 New England University Law Review 751, 754.
14 J L Coleman, ‘Truth and Objectivity in Law’ (1995) 1 Legal Theory 33–68.
15 I feature queer theory in this book in order to show how it has advanced critical scholarship, challenged 
the objectivity of law, and exposed and critiqued the heteronormativity of marriage and of romantic love.
16 J M Balkin, ‘Understanding Legal Understanding: The Legal Subject and the Problem of Legal Coherence’ 
(1993) 103 Yale Law Journal 105–176. See also discussion of identity and emotion in Barbalet, Emotion Social 
Theory and Social Structure 11–12.
17 Storytelling is a method adopted in order to ‘make arguments vivid’ and ‘to bring the raw experience 
of life as forcefully as possible into conceptual debates around law’, Cotterrell, R Politics of Jurisprudence: 
A Critical Introduction to Legal Philosophy, second edition (Lexis Nexis, UK 2003). Tony Massaro describes 
storytelling in law as both a ‘call to context’ and a demand for more individualised justice, a method that 
implies that all voices are equal, and that diversity of voices is of ‘paramount’ political importance. The 
method, he says, embodies a number of demands that resonate throughout the legal system. He argues that 
this is evident in the lawyer-client relationship, where lawyers are now encouraged to let their clients tell 
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the way its processes impact upon real individuals rather than abstract entities 
or categories. It demands that law take into account ‘existing social and legal 
arrangements and actual human behaviour’.18 Furthermore, feminism’s general 
project of making women’s experiences central, rather than marginal to the way 
law thinks and acts has been central to the development of an emotional point 
of view in law, if nothing else by the long association of women with emotion.19 
This has been further assisted by the feminist project of exposing the private 
sphere, laden with emotional content, into public focus.20
According to Terry Moroney, the legitimation of emotion also owes something 
to the American Legal Realists of the 1920s and 1930s, who focussed the 
meaning of law on the practice of law and in particular on the role of the 
judge.21 Maroney argues that the Realists should be understood as being among 
the first to argue that emotion is and ought to be understood as a part of the 
legal process. Accepting and demanding a judge’s use of discretion entails 
an understanding of who the judge is that includes her sociological, political 
ideological and psychological aspects, none of which, Maroney claims, can be 
thought of independently of emotion.22 
But the legitimacy of emotion in law has received its greatest boost from the 
recent development of a specific law and emotion scholarship. During the last 
few decades, a small group of legal scholars have begun to probe the scope of 
emotions in law. This scholarship has made substantial contributions to the way 
we think about the law. First and foremost, the scholarship has challenged the 
exclusion of emotions from law, arguing that law must recognise and include the 
rich normative depth of emotions.23 The scholarship has developed to include 
their story; in law teaching, where stories are being used to illustrate legal arguments, and in the work of 
judges and courts, where decision-makers are being asked to consider the uniqueness of the life experiences 
that litigants represent. All this promotes a variety of ends. Stories provide connections between people and 
experiences, they explore ways of thinking, and they heal and destroy experiences. For Massaro, storytelling 
is inextricably entwined with empathy, however it is difficult to extricate storytelling from emotion generally. 
T M Massaro, ‘Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and the Rule of Law: New Words, Old Wounds’ (1988–89) 87 
Michigan Law Review 2106.
18 T M Massaro, ‘Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and the Rule of Law: New Words, Old Wounds’ (1988–89) 87 
Michigan Law Review 2125.
19 S Mendus, Feminism and Emotion: Readings in Moral and Political Philosophy (Macmillan Press, GB 2000).
20 I have drawn upon feminist literatures to show the ways in which feminist legal theories have challenged 
the objectivity of law by arguing that law is gendered; the association between the feminine and emotion; 
the arguments that feminists have made against marriage, against love and against sex; and the impact that 
feminist ideas have had upon the same-sex marriage debate. Throughout the book I repeatedly use the term 
feminisms in order to indicate the broad movement and philosophy generally associated with the term. This 
is not to downplay the rich diversity of the views that the term embodies.
21 In particular, see Oliver Wendell Homes Jr, John Chipman Gray, Karl Llewellyn and Jerome Frank. 
22 T Maroney, ‘The Persistent Cultural Script of Judicial Dispassion’ (2011) California Law Review 629–294.
23 H Peterson, ‘Informal Law and/of Love in the European Community’ in H Peterson (ed), Home Knitted 
Law Norms and Values in Gendered Rule Making (Ashgate, Dartmouth 1996) 114–155 and H Peterson (ed), Love 
and Law in Europe: Complex Interrelations (Ashgate, Dartmouth 1998) and P Goodrich, ‘Law in the Courts of 
Love: Andreas Capellanus and the Judgements of Love’ (1996) 48 Stanford Law Review 633–675.
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more detailed work which has illuminated the role of emotions on different 
legal actors — judges,24 juries,25 lawyers,26 witnesses and victims27 — and in 
different legal contexts — criminal law,28 family law,29 domestic violence,30 
sexual harassment law,31 and contract law.32 The scholarship has also isolated the 
existence of specific emotions in law, for example, fear,33 disgust,34 shaming,35 
empathy,36 mercy,37 love,38 and hope.39 
Alongside and in partnership with this scholarship, practical approaches have 
developed in different jurisdictions which have accepted the important role 
that emotions play in the thinking and practices of law (comprehensive law 
movement). Practices such as problem solving courts and circle sentencing 
24 N R Feigenson, ‘Sympathy and Legal Judgement: A Psychological Analysis’ (1997) 65 Tennessee Law 
Review 1–78; L Little, 2002 ‘Adjudication and Emotion’ (2002) 3 Florida Coastal Law Journal 205–218; M C 
Nussbaum, ‘Emotion in the Language of Judging’ (1996) 70 St John’s Law Review 23–30.
25 K S Douglas, D R Lyon & J R Ogloff, ‘The Impact of Graphic Photographic Evidence on Mock Jurors’ 
Decisions in a Murder Trial: Probative or Prejudicial?’(1997) 21 Law and Human Behaviour 489–509; B Myers, 
S Jay Lynn & J Arbuthnot, ‘Victim Impact Testimony and Juror Judgements: The Effects of Harm Information 
and Witness Demeanour’ (2002) 32 Journal of Applied Social Psychology 2393–2412.
26 S Bandes, ‘Repression and Denial in Criminal Lawyering’ (2006) 9 Buffalo Criminal Law Review 339–390.
27 S Bandes, ‘Empathy, Narrative and Victim Impact Statements’ (1996) 63 University of Chicago Law Review 
361–412.
28 M C Nussbaum and D Kahan, ‘Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law’ (1996) 96 Columbia Law 
Review 269–374.
29 C Huntington, ‘Repairing Family Law’ (2008) 57 Duke Law Journal 1244–131.
30 N Seuffert, ‘Domestic Violence, Discourses of Romantic Love, and Complex Personhood in the Law’ (1999) 
23 Melbourne University Law Review 211–240.
31 P Goodrich, ‘The Laws of Love: Literature, History and the Governance of Kissing’ (1998) 24 New York 
University Review of Law & Social Change 183–234.
32 H Keren, ‘Considering Affective Consideration’(2009–10) 40 Golden Gate University Law Review 165–234; 
M A Eisenberg, ‘The World of Contract and the World of Gift’ (1997) 85 California Law Review 821– 866.
33 S Bandes, ‘Fear Factor: The Role of Media in Covering and Shaping the Death Penalty’ (2003–04) 1 Ohio 
State Journal of Criminal Law 585–598.
34 D M Kahan, (1999) ‘The Progressive Appropriation of Disgust’ in S Bandes (ed), The Passions of Law (New 
York University Press, New York 1999). M Nussbaum, ‘“Secret Sewers of Vice”: Disgust, Bodies and the Law’ 
in S Bandes (ed), The Passions of Law (New York University Press, New York 1999).
35 T M Massaro, ‘Shame Culture and American Criminal Law’ (1991) 89 Michigan Law Review 1880–1944.
36 L Henderson, ‘Legality and Empathy’ (1986–87) 85 Michigan Law Review 1574–1654.
37 J G Murphy & J Hampton, Forgiveness and Mercy (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1998); M C 
Nussbaum, ‘Equity and Mercy’ (1993) 22 Philosophy and Public Affairs 83–125.
38 P Goodrich, ‘Law in the Courts of Love: Andreas Capellanus and the Judgements of Love’ (1996) 48 
Stanford Law Review 633–675; ‘The Laws of Love: Literature, History and the Governance of Kissing’ 
(1998) 24 New York University Review of Law & Social Change 183–234; ‘Erotic Melancholia: Law Literature, 
and Love’ (2002) 14 Law & Literature 103–129; The Laws of Love: A Brief Historical and Practical Manual 
(Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2006); Seuffert, ‘Domestic Violence, Discourses of Romantic Love, and Complex 
Personhood in the Law; H Peterson, ‘Informal Law and/of Love in the European Community’ in Peterson (ed), 
Home Knitted Law Norms and Values in Gendered Rule Making (Ashgate, Dartmouth 1996) 114–155, and Love 
and Law in Europe (Ashgate, Dartmouth 1998).
39 K Abrams and H Keren, (2007) ‘Law in the Cultivation of Hope’ 95 California Law Review 319–382.
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encompass therapeutic and restorative justice theories and practices,40 and these 
consider ‘extra-legal’ factors such as emotions as essential to their operation and 
effectiveness.41 
Law and emotion scholarship has developed to an extent where we can discern 
a variety of approaches within it. Maroney42 identifies six commonly combined 
approaches: the emotion-centred approach (how an emotion is and should be 
reflected in law); the emotional phenomenon approach (how an emotion has been 
and should be experienced in law); the emotion theory approach (how emotion 
and theories of emotion are reflected in law); the legal doctrine approach (how 
emotions are reflected or should be reflected in legal doctrines); the theory of 
law approach (how emotions and their theories are reflected in theories of law); 
and the legal actor approach (how legal actors are influenced by emotions).
Kathryn Abrams has characterised the scholarship as embodying three different 
but not necessarily exclusive phases which she has labelled recognition, 
reconnaissance and regulation.43 The recognition work is the general critical 
scholarship’s challenge to the objectivity of law as discussed above, but also 
includes the scholarship which acknowledges the role that emotions have on 
the work of legal actors. Reconnaissance scholarship involved the importation 
of emotion scholarship from other disciplines into legal processes in an 
attempt to illuminate aspects of law which were not previously visible. The 
third phase, regulation, involves using the ‘emotional’ intelligence gained in 
law and emotion scholarship to influence the direction of law. As Abrams puts 
it, law and emotion scholarship has developed so that the question is not so 
much ‘should or shouldn’t a particular emotion be recognized through law but 
how, when, and — perhaps, most importantly — through what kinds of legal 
interventions’, can the law affect emotions (express, reflect, channel, script, 
cultivate or destroy them).44 
Above I have surveyed the discourse that has occurred between law and emotions 
in general. Much of this scholarship has involved the study of negative emotions 
and much of it has occurred in the field of criminal law. This book, however, is 
concerned with the emotion of love, and with laws outside of the criminal law 
40 H Strang & J Braithwaite (eds), Restorative Justice and Civil Society (Cambridge University Press, New 
York 2001).
41 S Daicoff, Law as Healing Profession: The ‘Comprehensive Law Movement’ (New York Law School 
Clinical Research Institute Research paper series 05/06#12 http://cdn.law.ucla.edu/SiteCollectionDocuments/
workshops%20and%20colloquia/clinical%20programs/susan%20daicoff.pdf accessed 17/07/10).
42 T Maroney, ‘Law and Human Emotion: A Proposed Taxonomy of an Emerging Field’(2006) 30 Law and 
Human Behaviour, special issue on ‘Emotion in Legal Judgement’ 119–142.
43 K Abrams, ‘Barriers and Boundaries: Exploring Emotion in the Law of the Family’ Virginia Journal of 
Social Policy and the Law (2009) 16, 301–321.
44 Abrams, ‘Barriers and Boundaries’ 304.
Looking for Love in the Legal Discourse of Marriage
8
context. The pioneer of the field of law and love is Peter Goodrich.45 Goodrich’s 
work crosses over a number of legal approaches. It can be classified as falling 
within the Critical Legal Studies school, the Post-modern school and the Law 
and Literature school. However we conceptualise his work, it contributes to 
the meaning of law and the meaning of love, and provides an example of a 
methodology that can be used in law and love scholarship.
In keeping with early law and emotion scholarship, a key element of Goodrich’s 
work is a call to reject the exclusion of emotion in legal thought. The exclusion 
of emotion from law, he argues, reinforces the private and public distinction, 
and the male foundations of the legal system.46 Moreover, the prohibition of 
eros from law leads to either a repressed or a deviant sexuality.47 Goodrich’s 
work goes one step further: he attempts to extract from predominately literary 
sources, the actual rules that govern, or should govern, love.48
My approach is different to Goodrich’s in that I am engaged with an analysis 
of traditional legal sources, however, the importance of his work for this book 
lies in his pioneering and legitimation of the study of the relationship between 
love and law, and in his pioneering and legitimation of a critical approach to the 
study of law. 
Returning to the broader law and emotion scholarship, in general we can say 
that it is seen as either marginal and irrelevant to the ‘real’ task of law or, 
alternatively, that it is received with suspicion and caution. For example, in 
relation to storytelling, both Paul Gewitz49 and Tony Massaro50 have warned 
against ‘excessive emotion’ and ‘unguided emotion’. In relation to judging, 
Martha Nussbaum has stated that, to be useful, emotion must be tethered to 
evidence.51 Restorative justice has been criticised for demanding ‘compulsory 
compassion’ in cases where it is not only inappropriate, but downright harmful.52 
In relation to the scholarship as a whole, Carol Sanger has described ‘legislating 
45 N Seuffert and H Peterson have explicitly named Goodrich as sparking their interest in the area of law 
and love. P Goodrich, ‘Law in the Courts of Love: Andreas Capellanus and the Judgements of Love’ (1996) 48 
Stanford Law Review 633–675; Law in the Courts of Love: Literature and Other Minor Jurisprudences (Routledge, 
London 1996); ‘Epistolary Justice: The Love Letter as Law’ (1997) 9 Yale Journal of Law & Humanities 245–295; 
‘The Laws of Love: Literature, History and the Governance of Kissing’ (1998) 24 New York University Review 
of Law & Social Change 183–234; ‘Erotic Melancholia: Law Literature, and Love’ (2002) 14 Law & Literature 
103–129; ‘Amatory Jurisprudence and the Querelles des Lois’ (2000) 76 Chicago-Kent Law Review 751–778; 
The Laws of Love: A Brief Historical and Practical Manual (Palgrave Macmillan, London 2006).
46 Goodrich, ‘The Laws of Love‘ 201.
47 Goodrich, ‘The Laws of Love‘ 199.
48 See Goodrich, Law in the Courts of Love; ‘Erotic Melancholia’ 114.
49 P Gerwitz, ‘On “I Know it When I See it”’ (1996) 105 Yale Law Journal 1023–104.
50 T M Massaro, ‘Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and the Rule of Law: New Words, Old Wounds’ (1988–89) 87 
Michigan Law Review 2099–2127.
51 M C Nussbaum, ‘Emotion in the Language of Judging’ (1996) 70 St John’s Law Review 30.
52 A Acorn, Compulsory Compassion: A Critique of Restorative Justice (University of British Columbia Press, 
Vancouver 2004).
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with affect’ as a cheap crowd pleaser with the potential to be misused. She 
has warned that it constitutes a general tendency in society of an ‘increasing 
socialization into having or at least displaying appropriate emotional responses 
in situations once unconnected to emotional involvement’.53 Sanger has called 
for more caution and deliberation when we consider the legitimacy of law’s role 
as a means of ‘cultivating specific emotions’.54
These comments are to be considered carefully when evaluating the substantive 
issues that law and emotion scholarship gives rise to, however, we must be 
careful that they don’t stifle the importance the scholarship has in legitimating 
emotion (and with it women and the private sphere), and the challenge it makes 
to positivism (and the view of law that is rooted in objectivity and a rational and 
scientific point of view). 
The Meaning of Love
A book that asks whether law reflects love must engage with how we 
understand the concept of love itself, how it has developed and what it means 
in contemporary society.  
The earliest discussion of love in western culture can be found in Plato’s 
Symposium.55 Here Simon May claims we find two lasting ideas of love.56 In the 
speech of Aristophanes, we hear that love is a longing to find a part of ourselves 
and that, when we find it, it constitutes a unification, a merging of both our 
bodies and our souls which ‘heal the human sore’.57 From the speech of Socrates 
delivered as the ideas of Diotima (priestess and expert on love), we learn that 
love is the quest for the attainment of beauty, wisdom and the good. Love is 
represented as a ladder with the erotic at the lowest rung and ending with an 
abstract love at the highest. Love is aroused by beauty of a person’s looks as 
well as their soul, character and deeds; it begins with sexual attraction but it is 
more than that; it raises us to higher things. Love has stages. In the first stage, 
a young lover will apply himself to the contemplation of physical beauty. A 
young lover will move from one lover to another, realising that beauty is not 
limited to one type. In the second stage, a lover will become a lover of beauty 
in a more general sense and will relax his passion for one person, as this will be 
considered beneath him. In the third stage, a lover will come to realise that the 
soul is more valuable than the body, and he will therefore come to appreciate 
53 C Sanger, ‘The Role and Reality of Emotions in Law’ (2001–2002) 8 William & Mary Journal Women & 
Law 109.
54 C Sanger, ‘Legislating with Affect: Emotion and Legislative Law Making’, in J M Fleming (ed), Passions 
and Emotions (New York University Press, New York 2013) 63–64.
55 Plato, Symposium trans W R M Lamb, Loeb Classical Library (Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1975).
56 S May, Love: A History (Yale University Press, New Haven 2011) 40.
57 The Speech of Aristophanes in Plato, Symposium 141.
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that beauty on the inside is more valuable than outward signs of beauty. The 
fourth stage consists of the realisation that the concept of beauty can encompass 
social and moral beauty. This will lead to a desire to acquire knowledge. The 
fifth stage is the realisation of absolute and pure beauty.58
Aristotle’s Philia adds another, more ethical dimension to love. For Aristotle, 
friendship, love and justice are all linked. Friendship is the model for love, and 
justice is the model for friendship. A moral community needs both justice and 
friendship. The type of friendship that provides this model for love and justice 
is that which is based upon a sense of being good and doing good. 
Christianity began the exaltation of love to the ultimate ideal it has become by 
asserting that there is nothing better than to love and be loved.59 This message 
is found most strongly in the works of St Paul and St John the Evangelist. In 
the book of the Corinthians, St Paul says that love is greater than all knowledge, 
wealth, power and even faith: 
Love is patient; love is kind; love is not envious or boastful or arrogant or 
rude … It bears all things, believes all things, hopes all things, endures 
all things … And now faith, hope, and love abide, these three; and the 
greatest of these is love.60 
St John the Evangelist preached that love brings us as close as possible to God: 
‘God is love, and those who abide in love abide in God, and God abides in 
them.’61 This idealisation of love enabled the progression of western thinking 
about love to the courtly and romantic tradition. However, these largely positive 
developments came at a great cost. As will be attested to later, Christianity was 
brutal to sexual love.
The term courtly love was not used till the nineteenth century, but it refers to 
the idea of love that emerged in the twelfth century among a small section of the 
aristocracy, predominantly French. Its ideas were proselytised by troubadours 
who performed highly stylised poems whose themes were commonly embedded 
in a story of a poet or knight’s love for an inaccessible aristocratic lady. The 
stories often depicted a struggle between love, desire and duty.62
58 Socrates’ speech in Plato, Symposium 173–211.
59 For more discussion on love and Christianity see D’Arcy, The Mind and Heart of Love: Lion and Unicorn 
a Study in Eros and Agape; E Leites, ‘The Duty to Desire: Love, Friendship, and Sexuality in Some Puritan 
Theories of Marriage’ (1982) 15 Journal of Social History 383–408. See also A Nygren, Agape and Eros: A Study 
of the Christian Idea of Love trans A G Hebert (SPCK, London 1932–1939) and May, Love: A History.
60 1 Corinthians 13:1,2,4,7,13.
61 1 John 4:7–11 and 16.
62  See F R P Akehurst and J M Davis (eds), A Handbook of the Troubadours (University of California Press, 
Berkeley 1995). Tristan and Iseult tells a typical story of courtly love. Sir Tristan is a knight who is sent by 
his King to negotiate for the hand of a neighbouring princess and bring her home to him to be his queen. On 
the return journey they fall in love. The rest of the story is about their affair and how they try to keep their 
love and fulfil their respective duties to the King. Tristan & Iseult a Twelfth Century Poem trans J H Caulkins 
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Irving Singer characterises courtly love around five central features: that love 
between men and women is something splendid and is an ideal worth striving 
for; that it is ennobling for both the lover and the beloved; that sexual love is 
more than libido or a physical impulse but is something ethical and aesthetic; 
that love has rituals within it but it is not necessarily related to marriage; and 
that love is an intense and passionate relationship that establishes a oneness 
between the lovers. These developments paved the way for romantic love.63
Like courtly love, romantic love cherishes and idealises the love between men 
and women. It too ennobles lovers and sees love as ritualistic and spiritual, and 
as a means by which a oneness between lovers is created. It also sees sex as both 
pleasurable and good. It would be a mistake, however, to see romantic love 
purely as a restatement of the courtly tradition. Romantic love expresses many 
changes that occurred following the middle ages, and can be seen as reflecting 
a new kind of humanism which embodies ideas of liberty and equality, and, 
importantly, extends those ideas to the whole of society: 
By the nineteenth century every scullery maid could dream of dancing 
her way into some Prince Charming’s heart, and every young aristocrat 
could yearn for the vampish woman of the streets who would elicit his 
true virility.64 
Solomon echoes this, arguing that one of the features of romantic love is that it is 
appropriate only between equals. Like Singer, he relies upon the Cinderella story 
to argue that romantic love is a ‘great levelling device’ in society, a force that not 
only requires equals but is capable of creating them. It is for this reason that he 
claims that romantic love ‘now finds its greatest popularity in self-consciously 
egalitarian societies’.65 Hendrick and Hendrick claim that love must primarily 
accord individuals a certain freedom and autonomy, and love must itself be 
liberated from considerations of economy and politics.66 These presuppositions 
& G R Mermier (H Champion, Paris 1967). (For a quirky modern version of this story see the movie Shrek by 
Dreamworks 2001.) Another is the story of Lancelot and Guinevere, E Vinaver, Lancelot and Guinevere: New 
Edition of the Romance of Lancelot and Guinevere (The Folio Society, London 1953). Andreas Capellanus is often 
described as the prince of courtly love. See A Capellanus, The Art of Courtly Love trans J J Parry (Frederick 
Ungar Publishing, New York 1941). Capellanus states that everyone of sound mind can fall in love, but there 
is an age barrier. Men cannot be in love under the age of 14 (although true love for men really needs to wait 
till 18 as, before that, boys are too easily embarrassed) and over the age of 60. Women can only fall in love 
between the ages of 12 and 50. There are three avenues to true love: beauty, wit and excellent character. Great 
wealth and generosity of wealth can lead to love, but Capellanus is scathing of such love and says it should not 
be acknowledged by the courts of love. While beauty is important, men and women who adorn themselves 
excessively are not worthy subjects of love. To retain love, Capellanus advises secrecy, generosity and keeping 
good company. To increase love, he advises lovers to see each other rarely, to dream of one’s lover and to feel 
jealousy. A Capellanus, The Art of Courtly Love book one 32–36 and book two 151–153.
63 I Singer, The Nature of Love vol 2: Courtly and Romantic (Chicago University Press, Chicago 1984) chapter one.
64 I Singer, The Nature of Love vol 3: The Modern World (Chicago University Press, Chicago 1987) 18.
65 R C Solomon, About Love: Reinventing Romance for Our Times (Little Field Quality Paperbacks, Lanham 
MD 1994) 45.
66 S Hendrick & C Hendrick, Romantic Love (Sage Publications, Newbury Park 1992) 39.
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depend upon a modern western industrial society. In this way, romantic love 
becomes connected not only with individual freedom, but also modernity and 
progress. As Solomon argues:
In essence, romantic love came of age only when newly industrialized 
and increasingly anonymous societies fostered the economically 
independent and socially shrunken (‘nuclear’) family, when women 
as well as men were permitted considerable personal choice in their 
marriage partners, when romantic love novels spread the gospel to the 
multitude of women in the middle class (whereas courtly love had been 
the privilege of a few aristocratic heroines) and, philosophically most 
important, when centuries-old contrast between sacred and profane 
love had broken down and been synthesized in a secular mode (like so 
many ideas of the Enlightenment).67
The idea that romantic love is radical, liberating and modern has spread 
beyond western societies. It finds expression for example in challenges to 
common (mis)perceptions of arranged marriages in India.68 In the ‘Red Love’ 
context, it is equated with the shattering of capitalism.69 
Contemporary love has developed many of the features of love that were begun 
during the romantic period. If love was extended to the masses during that 
time, the message has now reached saturation point in our culture. Beck and 
Beck-Gernsheim claim that love is now considered the major existential goal 
of our times, capable of providing all of us with a sense of worth and a way of 
being in the world.70 Illouz claims that love has become the ‘cultural core of 
modernity’,71 a supreme value capable of delivering happiness — a ‘collective 
utopia’.72 Bruckner has described it as the general ideology of the West,73 and 
May, as the ‘undeclared religion of the west’, ‘the ultimate source of meaning 
67 Solomon, About Love 60.
68 Reuters, Just Woman@asiaOne 21/12/2007. http://www.asiaone.com/Just%2BWoman/News/
Women%2BIn%2BThe%2BNews/Story/A1Story20071221-42037.html   accessed 19/05/10. It is a common 
theme in Bollywood films to show the tussle between a couple’s romantic love and the interests of their joint 
families. See R Majumbar, Marriage and Modernity: Family Values in Colonial Bengal (Duke University Press, 
Durham London 2009).
69 The concept of ‘Red Love’ originated from the novel of the same name by Alexandra Kollontai. Red love 
appears to be used to signify the coincidence of romantic love with Marxism and, at least for some, implies free 
love. See http://www.solidarity-us.org/node/1724 accessed18/05/10. For another look at the revolutionary 
nature of romantic love, especially its connection with free love outside of the ‘western context’, see E Tipton, 
‘Sex in the City: Chastity vs Free Love in Interwar Japan’ (2005) 11 Intersections: Gender and Sexuality in Asia 
and the Pacificintersections.anu.edu.au/issue11_contents.html accessed 11/05/2010.
70 Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, The Normal Chaos of Love trans M Ritter and J Wiebel (Polity Press, Cambridge 
1995) 193–194.
71 E Illouz, Why Love Hurts: A Sociological Explanation (Polity, Cambridge 2012) 120.
72 Illouz, Consuming the Romantic Utopia: Love and the Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism (University of 
California Press, Berkeley 1997) 2.
73 P Bruckner, The Paradox of Lovetrans S Randall (Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ 2012).
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and happiness’.74 According to these writers, the key messages in contemporary 
society are that love is a selfless, unconditional ‘gift’, that affirms the loved one, 
that transforms us to a higher state of being, is eternal, benevolent, harmonious 
and redeems us from our suffering.75 Love gives us a feeling of ‘living in high 
altitude’,76 and represents a ‘Dionysian affirmation of life’.77 We seek love 
because it makes us feel at home, it roots our life, it validates and solidifies our 
existence, it ‘deepens our sense of being’, it enables us to ‘experience the reality 
of our life as indestructible’, it offers us a promise of ‘ontological rootedness’.78 
We crave this because we are born with an ‘intense feeling of vulnerability’.79 
It achieves this because it is the ‘central link – in the long chain of interaction 
rituals’.80 Its prominence is assisted by the fact that it is a common theme in 
mass culture, especially film and advertising, and has become associated with 
mass consumption and the ethics of consumerism.81
Contemporary love also continues the themes of liberty and freedom. Beck and 
Beck-Gernsheim assert that love requires individuals who are free, active and 
accountable agents,82 and a context free of any external rules and pressures: love 
is a blank form whose actual content is a ‘subjective and mutual invention’.83 
It is these features of contemporary love that, for Anthony Giddens, make it a 
potential for significant social transformation. Giddens claims that the rise of 
romantic love today has led to the democratisation of the private sphere. It has 
given rise to the ‘pure relationship’ which is a durable emotional tie that can 
be established according to another person on the basis of the tie itself rather 
than to anything extrinsic to it.84 He says that the pure relationship is ‘part of 
a generic restructuring of intimacy’ which can emerge in contexts other than 
heterosexual marriage.85 Essential to the emergence of the ‘pure relationship’ is 
the emergence of ‘plastic sexuality’, a sexuality which ‘functions as a malleable 
feature of self, a prime connecting point between body, self-identity and social 
norms’.86 Romantic love has given way to ‘confluent love’, an ideal of love that 
gives everyone a chance to become sexually accomplished that is not necessarily 
74 May, Love: A History 1.
75 May, Love: A History 2.
76 Bruckner, The Paradox of Love 75.
77 Bruckner, The Paradox of Love 128.
78 May, Love: A History 6.
79 May, Love: A History 10.
80 Illouz, Why Love Hurts 120.
81 Illouz, Consuming the Romantic Utopia 28. Hsu-Ming Teo has argued that love in twentieth century 
Australia has undergone a change that brings it closer to an American, white, middle-class, consumerist 
model. Hsu-Ming Teo ‘The Americanisation of Romantic Love in Australia’ in A Curthoys and M Lake (eds), 
Connected Worlds: History in Transnational Perspective (ANU E Press, Canberra 2005).
82 Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, The Normal Chaos of Love 193–94.
83 Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, The Normal Chaos of Love 193.
84 A Giddens, The Transformation of Intimacy: Sexuality Love and Eroticism in Modern Societies (Polity Press, 
Cambridge 1992) 2.
85 Giddens, The Transformation of Intimacy 58.
86 Giddens, The Transformation of Intimacy 15.
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heterosexual or monogamous. In the model of the pure relationship and confluent 
love, the relationship holds only while each partner is gaining sufficient benefit 
from it. Importantly for same-sex love, confluent love differs from romantic love 
because ‘while not necessarily androgynous, and still perhaps structured around 
difference, [it] presumes a model of the pure relationship in which knowing the 
traits of the other is central’.87 As such, sexuality is only one of the factors to 
be negotiated as part of the relationship. While Giddens’ formulation of love in 
modern society has been criticised for not reflecting reality,88 its importance is 
in its formulation of a democratic way of understanding love. For Giddens, ‘pure 
relationship’, ‘plastic sexuality’ and ‘confluent love’ are all ‘part of a generic 
restructuring of intimacy’89 representing a formulation of love that is more 
democratic and inclusive than any in the past. 
To round off this discussion on love, something must also be said about sex. 
Indeed, it is often the case that the two are discussed as if they were the same 
thing. This slippage is understandable. The relationship between sex and love 
throughout the ages cannot be easily separated. As Zygmunt Bauman claims, 
‘sex eroticism and love are linked yet separate. They can hardly exist without 
each other, and yet their existence is pent in the ongoing war of independence, 
the boundaries between them are hotly contested — alternatively, but often 
simultaneously, the sites of defensive battles and of invasions.’90
In the classical Greek tradition, sexual intercourse was not necessarily a part of 
love. Sex could be an expression of love but, as we saw above, love itself was 
primarily seen as an ideal for the attainment of something else.91 Christianity’s 
view of sex was largely negative. Christian love was chaste, pious, dutiful and 
stable, tied to ‘an eternal being, a pure love’,92 barely tolerated even within 
marriage.93 St Augustine describes sexual impulse and orgasm as ‘an almost 
87 Giddens, The Transformation of Intimacy 63.
88 L Jamieson, ‘Intimacy Transformed? A Critical Look at the Pure Relationship’ (1993) 33 Sociology 477–494.
89 Giddens, The Transformation of Intimacy 58.
90 Z Bauman, ‘On Post Modern Uses of Sex’ (1995) 15 Theory Culture and Society 19.
91 Sexual intercourse was also disconnected from heterosexuality. Stephen Garton says that sex in classical 
times was understood as an act between an active and a passive partner. He argues that the ‘central trope of 
Greco-Roman sexual culture was activity/passivity not homosexuality/heterosexuality. S Garton, Histories of 
Sexualities (Equinox Publishing, London 2004) 32.
92 Goodrich, Law in the Courts of Love 31. In a discussion on the view of sex in western civilisation mention 
needs to be made of the Victorian period. One reading of Victorianism is that it represented sexual repression 
and prudery of all kinds. Foucault, however, has argued that the opposite was actually true, that it produced 
the discourse of sex because it spoke about it relentlessly in a variety of contexts. M Foucault The History of 
Sexuality trans R Hurley (Pantheon Books, New York 1987).
93 Solomon, About Love 57–58. Christianity still has a strict view on what constitutes legitimate sexual acts 
even within marriage. See G Grisez, The Way of the Lord Jesus vol 2: Living a Christian Life (Franciscan Press, 
Quincy University 1993) 639. However it is important not to overstate this, David West says that over two 
millennia of Christianity a wide variety of views about sexuality have been accommodated. D West, Reason 
and Sexuality in Western Thought (Polity Press, Cambridge 2005) 26.
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total eclipse of acumen and, as it were, sentinel alertness’.94 Christianity turns 
sex and sexuality into something more important than personal desire or even 
personal moral choices. They become important issues that determine a person’s 
relationship with God and consequently influence their afterlife.
A more positive view of sex emerged with courtly love and was continued by 
romantic love. Romantic love centralises sex, and is often wrongly equated 
with free love,95 but in fact it does not equate love with sex. While sex can 
represent the intensity associated with love, it is not the same as love. They are 
different pursuits.96 Zygmunt Bauman claims that to seek sexual delights for 
their own sake has now become a cultural norm of modernity. Illouz agrees, 
claiming that in modern western society sex and love form separate and parallel 
life narratives.97 And yet it is still the case that love and sex are difficult to 
separate. Neil Delaney says that any plausible understanding of contemporary 
love needs to acknowledge its sexual nature. Love necessarily includes ‘mutual 
longings for sexual intimacy together with a more sweeping delight in each 
other’s physicality’.98 Paul Johnson argues that sex is still always in the service 
of love. Ultimately, he claims, ‘love exerts a normative force over sex that cannot 
be easily escaped.’99 
Outline of the Book
Chapter one documents the changing legal discourse of marriage by outlining 
major reforms during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This history 
shows the ways in which marriage has become disconnected from traditional 
94 St Augustine, ‘The City of God extract’ in Solomon & Higgins (eds), The Philosophy of (Erotic) Love 
45. From this emerges a general view, prominent in Christianity, that to have a body is a trial to be borne. 
According to D P Verene, personal morality is therefore ‘largely body-denying morality based upon a set 
of restrictions on bodily activities. Classical Christian morality directs me to relate to activities that heavily 
involve the passions of my body only in certain ways (only through marriage, etc.) and not in others. This is 
done in order that I can relate properly to my soul and relate my soul properly to God.’ D P Verene (ed), Sexual 
Love and Western Morality: A Philosophical Anthology (Jones & Bartlett, Boston c1995) 45.
95 This is especially so in the ‘red love’ context. Tipton, ‘Sex in the City’.
96 Singer, The Nature of Love vol 3 10.
97 Illouz argues that this is both a good thing and a bad thing: on the one hand, it can be seen as bringing 
about equality between the sexes, but, on the other, it has also led to a loss. She says ‘[b]ecause sexuality 
need not be sublimated in a spiritual ideal of love, and because “self realization” is perceived to depend on 
experimentation with a variety of partners, the absoluteness conveyed by the experience of love at first sight 
has faded away into the cool hedonism of leisure consumption and the rationalized search for the most suitable 
partner.’ Illouz, Consuming the Romantic Utopia 289.
98 N Delaney, ‘Love and Loving Commitment: Articulating a Modern Ideal’ (1996) 33 American Philosophical 
Quarterly 339–347.
99 P Johnson, Love, Heterosexuality and Society (Routledge, London 2005) 223. See also Wouters, who argues 
that sex in contemporary society is being seen once again as an element of an intimate relationship, rather 
than a goal in its own right. Wouters C, ‘Balancing Sex and Love Since the 1960s Sexual Revolution’ (1998) 15 
Theory Culture and Society 201.
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meanings and more closely connected to ideas of romantic love. Having 
established this connection, the book considers the extent to which romantic 
love forms part of the legal discourse of marriage via an examination of a number 
of established meanings of marriage derived from its traditional connections 
with sex (embracing both sexual intercourse and sexual identity), economic 
considerations and sexuality.
Chapter two analyses the connection between sex (sexual intercourse) and 
marriage and evaluate its importance. The analysis shows a shifting narrative 
where sex moves from being inseparable from marriage, and a ‘right’ for 
the husband, to being the subject of negotiation between equal partners in 
the pursuit of mutual pleasure. This shifting narrative makes room for the 
insinuation of love into the relationship.
Chapter three documents and analyses another shifting narrative - the one 
between marriage and economic considerations. 
Chapter four turns to the connection in marriage between sexual intercourse, 
sexual identity, and sexuality, and considers the same-sex marriage debate in 
Australia. In this context, I document how love has come to be considered 
the most important defining characteristic of the marriage relationship and 
demonstrate how it has thereby been able to disrupt the traditional requirements 
of heterosexuality. 
This analysis undermines the positivist hold on the understanding of law, as 
well as the meanings traditionally associated with marriage. In doing so, it 
opens the discussion on what romantic love means in contemporary society. 
17
1. Love and Marriage
Cuz if you liked it then you should have put a ring on it
If you liked it then you shoulda put a ring on it .1
Introduction
William Eskridge argues that ‘marriage is an institution that is constructed, not 
discovered by societies’.2 The history of marriage seen through its laws certainly 
bears this out. Marriage has meant different things at different times. It has 
transmogrified from being a religious sacred institution to a contractual legal 
one, from a patriarchal institution to a more equal partnership based on freedom 
and equality. Over time, marriage has been understood in many different ways. 
It has been considered central to sexual expression and the procreation of 
children, the formation of community and of social and political alliances. It 
has been considered as an important way to regulate property, citizenship and 
the giving and receiving of care. While many of these functions are not denied 
by a contemporary understanding of the institution, a significant argument 
now exists that marriage in contemporary society is, and should be understood 
primarily as an institution that gives expression to love. It is the aim of this 
book to test the visibility of this view in the legal discourse and to assess the 
consequence of this for the meaning of both marriage and love.
This chapter will briefly outline the development of the law of marriage in 
England and Australia, from old common law principles, to reforms in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, before turning to a discussion on how we 
can best now understand the institution and the extent to which we can consider 
it a love institution. Finally, the chapter will turn to consider the consequences 
of connecting marriage with love, particularly in the light of feminist critiques 
of both marriage and love. 
The Common Law of Marriage
A good place to begin a discussion on the common law of marriage is with Sir 
William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England, first published in 
1 Beyonce Knowles, ‘Single Ladies’ (written by T L Harrell, B Knowles, T Nash & C Stewart) c2009. http://
www.metrolyrics.com/single-ladies-lyrics-beyonce-knowles.html#ixzz0s85Xep6J accessed 28/06/10.
2 W N Eskridge jnr, ‘A History of Same-Sex Marriage’ (1993) 79(9) Virginia Law Review 1485.
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1765–1769. The influence of this work and its author cannot be underestimated; 
it has been described by some as being the second most important text after 
the Bible.3 
Blackstone makes the distinction between marriage as a civil contract and 
marriage as a spiritual union. As a civil contract, marriage must satisfy certain 
preconditions: the parties must be free and willing to enter into the contract, as 
well as meeting the conditions for being capable of entering into the contract 
(age or parental consent, mental competency, consanguinity and affinity). Apart 
from death, the only other way to end a marriage was to get a divorce. A divorce 
(vincula matrimonii) could be granted if the marriage was prohibited under 
canonical laws (consanguinity of the parties, consummation) or because the 
marriage had become ‘improper or impossible’ due to one of the parties having 
an ill temper or committing adultery (divorce a mensa toro).
The consequences of marriage were significant, especially for women. Blackstone 
sets out in the following paragraphs a regime of marriage which dogged married 
women for centuries: 
[B]y marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the 
very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the 
marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the 
husband: under whose wing, protection, and cover, she performs every 
thing: and is therefore called in our law-french a feme covert … her 
condition during marriage is called her coverture.4
But, though our law in general considers man and wife as one person, 
yet there are some instances in which she is separately considered; as 
inferior to him, and as acting by his compulsion. And therefore all deeds 
executed, and acts done, by her, during her coverture, are void; except 
it be a fine, or the like matter of record, in which case she must be solely 
and secretly examined, to learn if her act be voluntary.
[T]he husband also (by the old law) might give his wife moderate 
correction. For, as he is to answer for misbehaviour, the law thought it 
reasonable to intrust him with this power of refraining her, by domestic 
chastisement, in the same moderation that a man is allowed to correct 
his apprentices or children; for whom the master or parent is also liable 
in some cases to answer.5
3 S B Presser, ‘Marriage and the Law: Time for a Divorce?’ in J A Nichols (ed), Marriage and Divorce in 
a Multicultural Context: Multi-Tiered Marriage and the Boundaries of Civil Law and Religion (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 2012) 81.
4 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England in Four Volumes, vol 1 (Garland Publishing 
Inc, New York 1978) 442.
5 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 444.
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From this beginning, Susan Blake argues that marriage in the common law 
tradition can be understood via an analysis of the three inter-related concepts 
of unity, consortium and support.6 The concept of unity is traced to the Bible 
and the creation of Eve from Adam’s rib. She claims that it is this concept of 
unity that justifies the idea that upon marriage the couple became one person, 
and that person is the husband. This justifies the appropriation of the wife’s 
property by the husband, and the almost total prohibition that the law placed 
upon a married woman’s right to participate separately in any economic activity.
Consortium7 is a very broad concept that can be understood around the idea of 
‘a sharing of two lives’ and ‘implies a companionship between each of them, 
entertainment of mutual friends, [and] sexual intercourse’.8 The concept has in 
the past been used to justify legal principles such as: that a husband and wife 
should live together;9 that each spouse has a duty to provide reasonable services 
to the other; and that a married couple has a right to privacy.10 Finally, Blake 
claims financial support as another of marriage’s central ideas. At common law a 
husband had an obligation to support his wife. So much so that the wife could 
evoke the common law agency of necessity and pledge her husband’s credit if 
he was not providing essentials for her and her children. This would include 
the provision of food, clothing and housing. But the payback for this support 
was great. 
Alongside these ideas of marriage, arguably the most decisive of the institution’s 
meanings comes from the fact that it entrenched the dominance of the male/
husband, and the complete subordination of the female/wife. This was so 
complete in the legal definition of marriage that it led many to have argued that 
historically, marriage was in fact a ‘civil death’ for women, who were treated 
like children, idiots, criminals and even slaves.11 Lawrence Stone claims that the 
only thing that saved women from the hell that marriage could legally be was 
the ‘skilful resistance of many wives and the compassion and goodwill of many 
6 S H Blake, Law of Marriage (Barry Rose Publishers Ltd, Chichester 1982) 7–12.
7 For an argument as to the injustices that this concept had in Australia, see M Thornton, ‘Loss of 
Consortium: Inequality Before the Law’ (1984) 10 The Sydney Law Review 259–276.
8 Crabtree v Crabtree (No 2) [1964] ALR 820 quoted in Thornton ‘Loss of Consortium’ 265.
9 See Dunn v Dunn [1948] 2 All ER 822 and Munro v Munro [1950] 1 All ER 832.
10 Blake, Law of Marriage 8–11.
11 M Lindon Shanley, Feminism, Marriage and the Law in England, 1850–1895 (Princeton University Press, 
Princeton New Jersey 1989) 10–11. The fact that children had more legal capacity is a point well recognised 
in an eighteenth century book on the laws of marriage. J Walthoe, Baron and Feme or, the Law of Husbands 
and Wives reprint of the 1700 edition, (Garland Publishing Inc, New York 1978). See this argument in D Post, 
‘Why Marriage Should Be Abolished’ (1996–97) 18 Women’s Rts L Rep 283–313. See also J S Mill & H Taylor 
(1869) ‘The Subjection of Women’ http://archive.org/details/subjectionofwome00millrich accessed 21/06/13.
Looking for Love in the Legal Discourse of Marriage
20
husbands’.12 It is worth noting here that feminists have been instrumental in 
the reforms that have taken place to marriage and continue to be careful and 
watchful over the institution.13
The common law tradition teaches us that a marriage is a unity between two 
people, but the relationship between them is not equal. The man is the superior 
of the two. In fact, the woman is not only inferior, but her existence is legally 
‘suspended’ during marriage. This translates into a husband being entitled to 
act for her and any children of the marriage. Therefore, married women could 
not sue, could not be sued, could not sign a contract and could not make a valid 
will. Upon marriage her personal property became her husband’s.14 A husband 
had authority over domicile decisions and all matters relating to the upbringing 
and education of their children. The rights of the husband extended to his 
right to ‘moderately correct’ her if she misbehaved. This was emphasised by 
Lord Hale’s much repeated maxim that a husband could beat his wife ‘although 
not in a violent or cruel manner – not with a stick thicker than his thumb’.15 
Ultimately (as will be discussed in more detail in chapter two) the husband also 
had unlimited sexual access to his wife. Sir Matthew Hale in History of the Pleas 
of the Crown (1736) stated that a husband cannot be guilty of ‘a rape committed 
by himself upon his lawful wife, for by their mutual matrimonial consent and 
contract the wife hath given herself in this kind unto her husband which she 
cannot retract’.16 
To complete the picture, something must be said of the role of equity. At least in 
relation to the ownership and control of property, some married women could 
find some protection from some of these harsh laws from the courts of equity.17 
12 L Stone, Broken Lives (Oxford University Press, Oxford 1993) 26.
13 See, for example, M A Fineman, ‘The Meaning of Marriage’ in A Bernstein (ed), Marriage Proposals: 
Questioning Legal Status (New York University Press, New York 2006); C Smart, The Ties that Bind: Law, 
Marriage and the Reproduction of Patriarchal Relations (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London 1984).
14 A husband could not alienate this property but he could dispose of any income that came from it as he pleased.
15 Lord Hale quoted in Lee Holcombe, Wives and Property: Reform of the Married Women’s Property Law in 
Nineteenth Century England (Martin Robertson, Oxford 1983) 30. The impact that these laws had on married 
women was clearly harsh. Many accounts of horror stories can be found. For example, see Francis Cobbe’s 
essay ‘Wife Torture in England’ in The Contemporary Review April 1878 http://www.keele.ac.uk/history/
currentundergraduates/tltp/WOMEN/HANNAM/TEXT/HAN19IIA.HTM accessed 17/01/2013, and W Moore, 
Wedlock (Weidenfeld, London 2009).
16 Sir Matthew Hale, History of the Pleas of the Crown 1736 vol 1 P R Glazebrook (ed), (Professional Books 
Ltd, London 1971) 629. This will be discussed further in chapter two.
17 This protection from Equity was realistically only available to the wealthy and therefore of limited 
protection for women in general. Leaving aside the expense of the courts themselves, the whole concept of the 
trust was really only workable in very wealthy families where it was possible to tie up property and capital. 
Furthermore, it was arguable as to whether the protection was for the benefit of the married woman,or rather 
for the protection of the assets of the family of origin against an interloping husband. A trust could, in fact, 
place a married woman in the power of multiple men, as she was then controlled not only by her husband, 
but also male trustees and solicitors. R Auchmuty, ‘The Fiction of Equity’ in Susan Scott-Hunt and Hilary 
Lim (eds), Feminist Perspectives on Equity and Trusts (Cavendish, London 2001). See also M Conway, ‘Equity’s 
Darling?’ in S Scott-Hunt & H Lim (eds), Feminist Perspectives on Equity and Trusts 43.
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Along with infants and lunatics, wives were considered a special group requiring 
protection from the equity courts. On some level this protection was given for 
all of the above injustices. In the case of ownership and control of property, 
women could have control over property by the use of trusts. Once a trust was 
created for her, this property was regarded as separate property over which she 
and her trustee had control. This trust would also enable her to have contractual 
capacity in relation to that separate property. Equity also recognised as her 
property, rather than her husband’s, gifts given from friends and lovers and, on 
the question of custody of children, equity courts were willing to deny a father 
custody of his children if the welfare of the children justified it. Equity did 
nothing, however, to protect married women from physical and sexual abuse.
Nineteenth-Century Reform
The nineteenth century saw a number of significant reforms that began the 
erosion of some of the worst aspects of marriage. The Married Women’s Property 
Act of 1870, despite being described as a legislative abortion,18 was the beginning 
of some recognition that married women had some rights over property. In 
very simple terms, the Act gave women the right to own and control property 
acquired through inheritance, and retain as their own property money earned 
through employment and investments. The Married Women’s Property Act of 
1882 carried through the legislative aims of the 1870 Act and passed into law 
the principle that married women had the same rights in respect to property as 
unmarried ones. It established that women could acquire, hold and dispose of 
all property, could enter contracts, sue and be sued (civil and criminal actions) 
and could carry out any business separate to their husbands. Subsequent Acts 
were passed to fill gaps in the equality principle as they arose. The Married 
Women’s Property Act of 1893, for example, bound women’s separate property 
to any contract regardless of when it was acquired, and the Law Reform 
(Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act removed the idea of separate property 
and replaced it with the idea of married woman’s property. This change removed 
the idea from equity that married women only had the right to own property as 
a special and separate right. Lee Holcombe argues that this reform constituted 
the abolishment of the wife as a ‘feme covert’.19 
At the same time as reforms to women’s right to own property were taking 
place, further change was coming to marriage with the erosion of the idea 
that marriage was an institution entered into for life. Notwithstanding the 
significance of the Reformation, divorce was difficult to obtain during the 
18 Arthur Arnold quoted in Holcombe, Wives and Property 179. These outcomes were far short of what the 
original framers of the Act had sought.
19 Holcombe, Wives and Property 224.
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eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. England’s traditional divorce laws largely 
rested with the ecclesiastical courts and were thus rarely granted. Parliament 
could grant a divorce via a private act, but this was complex and expensive. 
Between 1670 and 1857, only 325 people obtained a divorce, and only four 
in total were obtained by female petitioners.20 So difficult was the process of 
obtaining a divorce, Leonie Star asserts that for many, bigamy, murder and for a 
short time, wife sale, were the only alternatives.21
In 1857, the parliament of the UK passed the Matrimonial Causes Act. This Act 
created a civil court that was empowered to grant divorces without any reference 
to ecclesiastical courts. It created a new Court for Divorce and Matrimonial 
Causes. The grounds upon which divorce could be granted were different for 
men and women (the infamous divorce double standard). A husband only 
needed proof of his wife’s adultery, whereas for a wife, a divorce could only 
be granted if her husband’s adultery was accompanied by other offences such 
as incest, bigamy, sodomy, bestiality, cruelty or desertion. This view was in 
keeping with the general double standard that existed in society that tolerated 
male infidelity while simultaneously punishing women severely for it. 
Early colonial Australia provided an interesting context for these laws. The States 
were encouraged to pass their own version of the 1857 Act, and did so. South 
Australia was the first in 1857 and New South Wales the last in 1873. Conditions 
in early Australia were not ideal for permanent and monogamous relationships. 
Many convicts had left families behind with little hope of ever seeing them 
again, there was a high mobility rate ,with many moving frequently in search 
of ‘better conditions and greater wealth’, and there was a general shortage of 
women. These conditions made for a greater need for a clear-cut divorce law. As 
Henry Finlay argues:
There was a major need for the availability of a law of divorce that would 
allow a deserted wife an independent existence without a husband, 
where the latter absconded. In a colony where there was a scarcity 
of women, it also made her free to contract another marriage with a 
provider for her children, in preference to the greater uncertainty of de 
facto habitation.22
20 L Star, Counsel of Perfection: The Family Court of Australia (Oxford University Press, Australia 1996) 25.
21 Star, Counsel of Perfection 26–27. See also L Stone, Road to Divorce: England 1530–1987 (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford 1990).
22 H Finlay, ‘Divorce and the Status of Women: Beginnings in Nineteenth Century Australia’ Australian 
Institute of Family Studies seminar paper http://www.aifs.gov.au/institute/seminars/finlay.html accessed 
21/03/2013.
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As a result, bigamy based on the presumption of death was much more wide-
spread in Australia than in England. Despite the different conditions and 
attempts to pass laws that were more in keeping with the social conditions in 
Australia, the laws followed more or less the same pattern as they did in England.
By the end of the nineteenth century, married women had won a number of 
important rights in relation to the ownership of property and the right to leave 
a marriage. There were other significant reforms in relation to the custody of 
children. The Infant Custody Act 1839 allowed the Court of Chancery to award 
mothers custody of their children under the age of 16. Some protection was 
also won in relation to domestic violence. The Matrimonial Causes Act of 1878 
allowed women who had been beaten by their husbands to get a separation 
order from a local magistrate, putting an end to the idea that he could chastise 
her physically. Such an order would thereafter prevent her husband from 
seeking a restitution of conjugal rights, an action that was otherwise not 
abolished till the late twentieth century.23 Another victory came in 1891 in the 
case of Regina v Jackson when the Court held that a husband does not have the 
right to make a prisoner of his wife in the home.24 These changes in the law 
did not change the fact that women had the right only to apply to a court to 
be able to leave an abusive and brutal husband, they did not have the right to 
leave per se. As Shanley points out, to do so would leave a wife open to being 
guilty of desertion, receiving an order for restitution of conjugal rights, lose 
her right to claim maintenance, and affect her claim to her property (before 
1882).25 Furthermore, as it is still the case, there is a significant gap between 
the law as written and the law as practiced. Francis Cobbe’s essay ‘Wife-torture 
in England’ documents a shocking tolerance by the courts towards domestic 
violence during this period.26 The economic realities also meant that it was 
difficult for women to leave an unhappy marriage and support themselves and 
their children. Nevertheless, significant reform did take place in the nineteenth 
century and continued into the twentieth century. 
Twentieth-Century Reform 
Reform to marriage during the twentieth century was substantial. The 
introduction of no fault divorce, the removal of some old common law vestiges of 
patriarchy and the general development of a rights and equality based discourse 
had significant impact. 
23 Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act 1970 UK; Family Law Act 1974 AUS.
24 R v Jackson [1891] 1 QB 671.
25 Shanley, Feminism, Marriage, and the Law in England, 1850–1895 174.
26 Cobbe, ‘Wife Torture in England’.
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The federal jurisdiction for marriage was exercised for the first time in Australia 
by the passing of the Matrimonial Causes Act of 1959. This Act legislated 
14 grounds for divorce. The grounds mirrored some already existing state 
legislation. Some of these grounds were adultery, desertion, wilfull refusal 
to consummate the marriage, cruelty, rape, sodomy, bestiality and habitual 
drunkenness and habitual intoxication as a result of drug use. These causes were 
applied equally to men and women thus removing the infamous divorce double 
standard.27 This Act also removed the inability to consummate a marriage as a 
ground for the making of a declaration of nullity, another significant departure 
from the religious meaning of marriage. The importance of consummation, 
however, remained ambiguous given that a possible ground for divorce was 
to wilfully refuse to consummate a marriage. The Act was predicated on the 
idea that divorce would be granted if one of the parties was at fault, the only 
provision which would allow parties to divorce without this requirement was 
if the parties had been separated for five years. Out of 24,500 divorces granted 
under this Act, the most popular of the grounds were desertion (9,000), adultery 
(8,000), separation and cruelty.28 
No-fault divorce was introduced with the passing of the Family Law Act (FLA) 
in 1975 (Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 in the UK). This Act can be seen as both 
a reaction to, and a scaffolding of the many social changes that had occurred in 
the previous decades. Nonetheless it remains one of the most contentious pieces 
of legislation ever passed in Australia.29 The FLA removed from the process 
the attribution of blame and the need to provide clear and graphic evidence of 
that blame, and instead replaced all 14 grounds with a single one, ‘irretrievable 
breakdown’,30 evidenced simply by a 12-month separation.31 The granting of 
a divorce thus became an administrative rather than an adversarial process, it 
provided a marriage that was no longer working with ‘a decent burial with the 
minimum of embarrassment, humiliation and bitterness’.32 
27 For a discussion of the divorce double standard see A S Holmes, ‘The Double Standard in the English 
Divorce Laws, 1857–1923’ (1995) 20(2) Law and Social Inquiry 601–620.
28 Starr, Counsel of Perfection 57. The ‘fault’ scheme under the Matrimonial Causes Act has been described 
as creating incentives to commit abuses, encouraging collusion and perjury, and blackmail. L Young & G 
Monahan, Family Law in Australia seventh edition (Lexis Nexis Butterworths Australia 2009) 189. The 
process required for divorce under this legislation has been described as sordid and highly adversarial. 
See E Cox in ABC Radio National ‘Finding Fault’ Hindsight 15/08/10 http://www.abc.net.au/rn/hindsight/
stories/2010/2977277.htm accessed 02/09/2010. See also S Swain, Born in Hope: The Early Years of the Family 
Court of Australia (UNSW Press, NSW 2012) 51.
29 Star Counsel of Perfection 51.
30 The FLA however also empowered the newly established Family Law Court to make determinations on 
spousal maintenance; child maintenance; child custody and contact, and property distributions. All of these 
are ancillary to the granting of a divorce. The Act also abolished the right for damages for adultery, enticement 
and criminal conversation.
31 FLA s 48(2).
32 Great Britain Law Commission, ‘Reform of the Grounds of Divorce: The Field of Choice’ report no 6 in 
Star, Counsel of Perfection 55.
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The FLA makes a number of other important provisions. In regard to the 
custody of children, it legislated the principle that custody decisions must be 
made according to the principle of what is ‘in the best interest of the child’, and 
a rebuttable presumption exists that parental responsibility be equally shared 
between fathers and mothers.33 In regard to property distribution, the court has 
wide discretion to make orders according to the parties’ contribution (financial 
and non-financial) and their future needs. There no longer exists any assumption 
that property obtained during a marriage belongs to the husband alone. In 
regards to financial support, both parents are now considered responsible for the 
maintenance of the children of a marriage and spousal maintenance is regarded 
in gender neutral terms, it is no longer automatically assumed, and it is usually 
granted for only limited and short term circumstances.34
Furthermore, in keeping with a more individualistic view of marriage, the FLA 
encourages parties to come to their own agreements in relation to their financial 
settlement, maintenance payments and custody arrangements, giving courts 
power in these areas only when the parties themselves cannot reach agreement 
or when the agreements reached are considered unjust or inequitable.35
There were other legal changes that had significant impact upon the institution 
of marriage. In 1991, (much later than one would have believed) the common 
law finally removed the marital immunity against rape. In R v L the High Court 
of Australia said that the notion ‘was out of keeping with the view society 
now takes of the relationship between the parties to a marriage’.36 Justice 
Brennan went so far as to question the validity of the common law principle 
itself arguing that sex in marriage, according to ecclesiastical law, was always 
subject to consent.37 Other legal reforms such as the recognition of de-facto 
relationships38 and civil unions,39 as well as reforms that removed the distinction 
between children born in wedlock and outside of it,40 further challenged the 
centrality of marriage in organising intimacy, family and procreation. 
33 See sections 60CA, 60CC, 61C, 61DA.
34 See Part VII.
35 See sections 63AA, 63B and 85–89.
36 R v L (1991) 174 CLR 390 (Mason CJ, Deane & Toohey JJ). In England the immunity was also removed in 
the same year in the case of R v R [1991] 2 WLR 1065.
37 R v L (1991) 174 CLR 396 (Brennan J). This case will be discussed further in chapter two.
38 State legislation recognising de-facto relationships began to be passed in the 1980s. See M Harrison, ‘The 
Legal System and De Facto Relationships’ (1991) 30 Family Matters 30–33. See R Probert, The Changing Legal 
Regulation of Cohabitation: From Fornicators to Family 1600–2010 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2012).
39 Civil Union legislation currently exists in Victoria the ACT and Tasmania. Tasmania was the first state to 
pass legislation in 2004. 
40 In the mid-nineteen seventies most states passed legislation to remove disadvantages for ex-nuptial 
children. See Law Reform commission of NSW Issues Paper 1 (1981) — De Facto Relationships http://www.
lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lrc.nsf/pages/ip1chp3 accessed 16/01/2013.
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Finally, mention must be made of international and national human rights 
discourse. The signing of international treaties against the discrimination 
of women (Convention for the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 
1979), and the subsequent passing of anti-discrimination laws such as The Sex 
Discrimination Act (1984), outlawed both explicit and implicit discrimination 
based on sex and gender. These international and domestic laws catapulted 
society into a discourse of rights which has led to a general rethinking of how 
men and women were and are treated in the workplace and in the home, and has 
further added to the erosion of marriage as a patriarchal institution. 
The Meanings of Marriage: Holy Estate, 
Oppressive Patriarchy, Equal Love
This brief legislative history shows considerable changes to the meaning of 
marriage in the past 300 or so years. There are now a plurality of meanings to 
marriage.41 Some have described marriage as an institution at a crossroad.42 In 
the introduction I expressed this as marriage embodying a number of contests. 
Returning to Blake’s three concepts of unity, consortium and support, we can 
say that in many ways the institution still reflects these principles, but the way 
that we understand the principles themselves has now changed. 
Marriage is no longer overwhelmingly seen as a religious, life-long or patriarchal 
institution. Despite the fact that churches continue to take a very active interest 
in marriage, as evidenced by the public discourse around same-sex marriage, 
statistics show that, for many, marriage is more secular and contractual than 
religious. In 2007, 63 per cent of marriages were conducted in a civil ceremony 
alone;43 this reflects a radical departure from the idea of marriage as ‘a state of 
existence ordained by the Creator’, ‘a holy estate’ and a ‘sacred obligation’.44 
Similarly, marriage is no longer a life-long institution. In Australia, a third of 
all marriages end in divorce.45 The other significant change that has occurred to 
marriage is the slow removal of men’s total power and control over their wives. 
Reforms during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries slowly eroded the idea 
that husbands own their wives and can use, and abuse, them as they see fit. 
41 As Martha Fineman says, the reasons for marrying are as ‘diverse as the inhabitants of our contemporary, 
secular state’. ‘The Meaning of Marriage’ 33.
42 See M Garrison and E S Scott (eds), Marriage at the Crossroads: Law, Policy and the Brave New World 
of Twenty-First-Century Families (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2012). See also Martha Fineman, 
The Autonomy Myth: Theory of Dependency (New York Press, New York 2004) and ‘The Meaning of Marriage’.
43 C Frew, ‘The Social Construction of Marriage in Australia’ (2011) 28 Law in Context 81.
44 J Witte jnr, From Sacrament to Contract: Marriage, Religion and Law in the Western Tradition (Westminster 
John Knox Press, Louisville Kentucky 1997) 194.
45 http://www.mydivorce.com.au/divorceadvice/divorce-statistics-australia.htm accessed 10/01/2013.
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Even though much has changed, marriage still remains a problematic institution 
for feminists. Dianne Post,46 for example, has described marriage as an enterprise 
that has a 50 per cent failure rate, which results in domestic violence in 63 per 
cent of cases, and which results in child abuse in up to 80 per cent of cases. 
She says that if this was any other enterprise it would be abolished, instead, 
‘politicians extol it, courts ruminate over its value to society, and business, 
religious and cultural leaders pander to its mystique’.47 This view leads many to 
question the worthiness of the existence of the institution in toto. 
Martha Fineman, for example, has consistently argued that the state should not 
support and privilege the family unit as defined via marriage. Marriage, Fineman 
argues, has become a largely irrelevant institution, whose primary and important 
functions and goals can and are being met elsewhere.48 She argues that the state 
should, in fact, abandon civil marriage as an institution and instead support 
relationships which ensure that human needs are met humanely and justly.49 
Abolishing marriage would take gender equality seriously by letting individuals 
themselves bargain for the content of their agreements.50 Disputes arising from 
such agreements would be dealt with according to general principles of equity 
and common law rather than specialised principles of family law. This would 
ensure ‘that a lot more regulation (protection) would occur once interactions 
between individuals within families were removed from behind the veil of 
privacy that now shields them’.51 By abolishing marriage, the state would be 
removing protection for such behaviour and exposing women and children to the 
same protections that the law offers all citizens. In fact, Fineman says, ‘we would 
even begin to develop theories of tort to compensate sexual affiliates for conduct 
endemic to family interactions but considered unacceptable among strangers’.52
46 D Post, ‘Why Marriage Should be Abolished’ (1996–97) 18 Women’s Rights Law Reporter 283–313.
47 Post, ‘Why Marriage Should be Abolished’ 283. How Post arrives at these figures is not clear, but her 
point is valid, there are many unhappy and failed marriages and much domestic violence and child abuse by 
any measure of the statistics.
48 Fineman argues that the functions that are currently fulfilled by marriage can be and are being fulfilled by 
other relationships. She claims that marriage is expected to do a lot of essential work in our society, ‘children 
must be cared for and nurtured, dependency must be addressed, and individual happiness is of general concern’, 
but all of these tasks can be met by transferring the legal status and the social and economic subsidies to the 
relationship of caretaker and dependent. This change would not only be fair but it would also be more reflective 
of current realities. Fineman quotes US data which shows that less than a quarter of households are made up of 
married couples and their children. Fineman, ‘The Meaning of Marriage’ 30, 39, 42.
49 M Fineman, The Autonomy Myth. See also N D Polikoff, ‘Why Lesbians and Gay Men Should Read Martha 
Fineman’ (2000) 8 American University Journal of Gender Social Policy and Law 167–176. However this is not to 
say that marriage is universally condemned by feminists. See, for example, Pat Maniardi who said, ‘I believe 
women — and men — would like love, security, companionship, respect and long term commitment to each 
other. Women rarely get much of this, in marriage or out, but we want it.’ P Maniardi, ‘The Marriage Question 
in the Feminist Revolution’ cited in C A Douglas, Love and Politics: Radical Feminist and Lesbian Theories (Ism 
Press, San Francisco 1990) 169.
50 Fineman, ‘Meaning of Marriage’ 58.
51 Fineman, ‘Meaning of Marriage’ 58.
52 Fineman, ‘Meaning of Marriage’ 59. Furthermore, abolishing marriage would be of benefit to same-sex 
couples whose relationships currently do not enjoy the same status of marriage. If the state does not prefer 
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While many are calling for the abolition of the institution altogether, it is 
important to acknowledge that, for many, marriage still retains importance 
through its traditional meanings. Churches still see the institution primarily in 
religious terms. Empirical studies also show that religious believers are more 
likely to marry than non-religious believers,53 and that, at least at the time of 
entering into marriage, people intend it to be a life-long relationship.54 And 
many still argue that the institution is largely constructed around patriarchy.55 
Every now and then we are reminded of some of these meanings of marriage. For 
example, take the case in 2008 of Italian bishop Lorenzo Chiarinelli, who refused 
to allow a young paraplegic man to marry in the Catholic Church on the grounds 
that he would be unable to consummate the marriage.56 Consider also the fact 
that, in 2012, the Anglican Sydney diocese approved a new form of words for 
marriage vows that includes a promise by the wife to submit to her husband.57
For those who reject traditional meanings, a number of different theories to 
understand modern marriage have been postulated. Witte claims that by the 
turn of the twenty-first century marriage is viewed as ‘a private bilateral 
contract to be formed, maintained, and dissolved as the couple sees fit’.58 This 
would imply that marriage is now to be understood by the same forces that 
underlie all contracts, freedom, equality and intention. This is undeniably so, 
but it ignores other important aspects of the relationship associated with for 
example happiness, satisfaction, care and altruism. In other words, a contractual 
understanding of marriage does not make room for an understanding of its 
emotional underpinnings. 
Wilcox and Dew argue that marriage today has become an expressive ‘super 
relationship’ for soulmates, whose primary focus is the emotional fulfillment of 
a form of sexual affiliation then ‘none would be prohibited’, and if ‘substantial economic and other societal 
benefits currently afforded to certain heterosexual units would no longer be justified’, then ‘punishments of 
“deviant” sexual connections would no longer be permitted’. Fineman, ‘Meaning of Marriage’ 59.
53 See B Hewitt and J Baxter, ‘Who Gets Married in Australia?: The Characteristics Associated with a 
Transition Into First Marriage 2001–6’ (2012) 48 Journal of Sociology 43–61.
54 Empirical studies show that a major reason given for getting married is the desire to make a life-long 
commitment to another person. See Relationships Australia, ‘Relationships Indicator Survey’ http://www.
relationships.org.au/what-we-do/research/australian-relationships-indicators accessed 16/02/2013.
55 See also Martha Fineman, The Autonomy Myth and ‘The Meaning of Marriage’. See also Post, ‘Why 
Marriage Should Be Abolished’.
56 Discussion of this case on a blog featuring the story brought this telling comment from a reader, again 
reminding us of the importance that is attached to marriage as procreation. The blogger said, ‘apparently the 
secular media decided to present this unremarkable and perennial fact as “news”, as part of the evil campaign 
to convince people that “marriage” can be redefined to mean simply a public declaration that two people 
love each other’. ‘No Church Wedding for Impotent Man’ Cath News 12/06/2008 http://www.cathnews.com/
article.aspx?aeid+7581 accessed 07/13/2009. 
57 This new form of words requires the minister to ask the bride: ‘Will you honour and submit to him, 
as the church submits to Christ?’ and the bride is required to pledge ‘to love and to submit’. K Burke ‘To 
Love and to Submit: A Marriage Made in 2012’ Sydney Morning Herald, 25/09/2012 http://www.smh.com.au/
action/printArticle?id=3581935 accessed 1/06/2013.
58 Witte, From Sacrament to Contract 195.
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each of the spouses in the marriage. This is in contrast to the traditional model 
of marriage that has focussed on the norms of permanency, fidelity, mutual aid, 
parenthood and gender complimentarity.59 It is the emotional content of the 
relationship, therefore, that one must look to for its definition. The lens that 
best provides this is romantic love. One of the motifs, if not the central motif 
of marriage in the west in the twenty-first century is romantic love. Empirical 
studies bear this out. The longitudinal study conducted by Relationships 
Australia consistently reports that love is either the top reason, or one of the 
top reasons people give for marrying. (Other factors include companionship 
and wanting to signify a life-long commitment.) In 2008, a staggering 91 per 
cent of respondents said it was the reason they married.60 Alison Diduck and 
Felicity Kaganas argue that, when all is said and done, marriage is still seen as 
‘the ultimate commitment one can make to a sexual or emotional partner’,61 and 
while it is undeniable that there may be many motivations for marriage, Bix 
claims, they are almost always framed within the language of love.62 
The coming together of love and marriage has been documented by Stephanie 
Coontz in her book Marriage, a History: How Love Conquered Marriage.63 Coontz 
shows that the idea of marrying for love was a highly radical idea, which came 
to be accepted in the west by the end of the seventeenth century. Before this 
time, marriage served a variety of social, economic and political purposes. As 
Coontz puts it, it did much of the work of markets and governments and it 
‘orchestrated people’s personal rights and obligations in everything from sexual 
relations to the inheritance of property’.64
However, she says that by the end of the seventeenth century marriage came 
to be seen as a private affair, and its success was based upon how well it met 
the emotional needs of its members. This developed in the eighteenth century, 
when marriage was elevated to new sentimental heights:
The Victorians were the first people in history to try to make marriage 
the pivotal experience in people’s lives and married love the principal 
focus of their emotions, obligations and satisfactions … Victorian 
59 Wilcox & Dew, ‘Is Love a Flimsy Foundation?: Soulmate Versus Institutional Models of Marriage’ (2010) 
39 Social Science Research 687–699.
60 See Relationships Australia, ‘Relationships Indicator Survey’ http://www.relationships.org.au/what-we-
do/research/australian-relationships-indicators acessed 16/01/2013. See also A Diduck & F Kaganas, Family 
Law Gender and the State: Text, Cases and Materials (Hart, Oxford 2006) 35–36; P R Amato, ‘Institutional, 
Companionate, and Individualistic Marriages: Change Over Time and Implications for Marital Quality’ in 
Garrison & Scott (eds), Marriage at the Crossroads 107–125.
61 Diduck & Kaganas, Family Law, Gender and the State 36.
62 B Bix, ‘Bargaining in the Shadow of Love: The Enforcement of Premarital Agreements and How We Think 
About Marriage’ (1998–1999) 40 William & Mary Law Review 145–208.
63 S Coontz, Marriage: A History — How Love Conquered Marriage (Penguin Books, New York 2005).
64 Coontz, Marriage: A History 9.
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marriage harboured all the hopes of romantic love, intimacy, personal 
fulfilment, and mutual happiness that were to be expressed more openly 
and urgently during the twentieth century.65
Coontz argues that by the middle of the nineteenth century there was unanimity 
in the middle and upper classes in Europe and North America that ‘the love-
based marriage, in which the wife stayed at home protected and supported by 
her husband, was a recipe for heaven on earth’.66
According to Marilyn Yaloum, there is now a consensus that ‘love has become 
synonymous with marriage in the western world’.67 In her book, A History 
of the Wife, Yaloum documents a letter to a ‘Dear Abby’ advice column in 
which the writer seeks advice regarding whether she should marry a man 
who would be ‘a wonderful husband and father’ but whom she does not love. 
The letter-writer asks: ‘he is all a woman could ask for in a husband, but is 
that enough to replace love?’ The answer comes back decidedly from Abby: 
‘If you marry this man, knowing in your heart you do not love him, you 
will be doing yourself and him a great disservice.’68 This view is widespread. 
Lawrence Stone, for example, argues that there is a clear distinction in modern 
western societies between a marriage of interest and a marriage of love, with 
the former considered ‘morally reprehensible’.69
Even among the aristocracy, where there is still an understanding that marriages 
are dynastic rather than love unions, the rhetoric cannot be escaped. When the 
engagement between Prince Charles and Diana Spencer was announced in 1981, 
it was well understood that Charles had to marry, and that considerable work had 
been done to find him a wife who would fulfil all of the necessary requirements 
of being a princess and future queen. In a pre-wedding television interview, 
Prince Charles was asked whether he loved Diana. There was a moment of visible 
discomfort before he replied that it is hard to know what love is.70 As Mary Evans 
explains, he could not answer truthfully that the marriage had been a result of 
‘dynastic pressures’ and the best he hoped from the marriage was an ‘amicable 
relationship’.71 As Evans claims, ‘To admit openly that it is possible to enter a 
marriage and not be in love is tantamount to a refusal of Western culture and 
a distancing from one of the crucial tenets of popular culture.’72 It must also be 
65 Coontz, Marriage: A History 177–78.
66 Coontz, Marriage: A History 162.
67 M Yaloum, A History of the Wife (Perennial, New York 2001) xv.
68 ‘Dear Abby Advice Column’ July 3 1998 San Francisco Chronicle in Yaloum History of the Wife xi.
69 Stone ,The Family, Sex and Marriage in England 1500–1800 86.
70 A Carthew, interview with Prince Charles and Lady Diana ITN 24 Feb 1981 http://news.bbc.co.uk/
onthisday/hi/dates/stories/february/24/newsid_2516000/2516759.stm accessed 1/12/2010.
71 M Evans, ‘Falling in Love is Falling for Make Believe: Ideologies of Romance in Post-Enlightenment 
Culture’ (1998) 15 Theory Culture and Society 269.
72 Evans, ‘Falling in Love is Falling for Make Believe’ 269.
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noted here that the idea of love based marriages has spread beyond western and 
English-speaking societies.73 Furthermore, as will be shown in chapter four, the 
popularity of same-sex marriage doesn’t make much sense unless we understand 
marriage as an institution grounded in romantic love. 
Consequences of the Love Marriage (The 
Feminist Critique of Love) 
The connection of love and marriage is not without its problems. Romantic love, 
from the very beginning, was considered a dangerous idea. Its connection with 
liberty and freedom, its disconnection from family, class, social and religious 
duty, make it an obvious target for criticism. Its association, no matter how 
misconceived, with free love and sexual freedom made it a threat to traditional 
family structures and to life-long monogamous marriage. This point has some 
weight. The association of love with marriage has been shown to make the 
institution of marriage a less stable and more fickle one.74 Many point to the 
casualties of romantic love. These casualties are said to be high divorce rates, 
loneliness, poverty and social instability. As Solomon puts it: 
Most of the world looks upon our romantic fantasies as a source of social chaos 
and irresponsibility … [o]ur emphasis on romance encourages vanity instead 
of camaraderie, seclusion instead of community, whimsicality instead of 
responsibility, emotional excitement instead of social stability. The result seems 
to be a culture that is fragmented, frustrated and lonely just as much as (and 
because) it is romantic.75 
Beck and Beck-Gersheim, echoing some of the feminist’s arguments we will see 
below, claim that modern love can turn into a destructive force. The meaning of 
love, they suggest, is always open for negotiation and always at risk. Love can 
73 See R Goodwin, Personal Relationships Across Cultures (Routledge, USA 1999).
74 Empirical studies do show that marriages based on love are flimsy and much more likely to end in conflict 
and divorce than those based on values of permanency embedded in religious institutions. See W B Wilcox 
& J Dew, ‘Is Love a Flimsy Foundation?: Soulmate Versus Institutional Models of Marriage’ Social Science 
Research 39 (2010) 687–699. 
75 Solomon, About Love 54. Even more than this, romantic love, along with romanticism in general, is seen 
as containing within it a deathly streak because it portrays true love as something that must be not only 
indifferent to, but even welcoming to death. Passionate love is not only the basis for a meaningful life but can 
also form the basis for a meaningful death. As West puts it, ‘[i]n reality the relationship of lovers is always 
vulnerable to frustration either by a hostile society or as a result of the waywardness of human emotion. 
Romantic extremism responds by showing its willingness to sacrifice reason, social order and, if necessary, life 
itself for the sake of its absolute commitment to love “even unto death”. The impossibility of love in this world 
becomes the reason for its pursuit in another. A preoccupation with death was, indeed a recurrent feature 
of romantic thought.’ D West, Reason and Sexuality in Western Thought (Polity Press, Cambridge 2005) 112.
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end on one person’s say-so at any time; there is no right of appeal. Love is the 
opposite of instrumental and rational behaviour, it makes its own rules ‘out of 
sexual desire unhampered by moral or legal obligations’.76 They argue:
For individuals who have to invent their own social settings, love 
becomes the central pivot giving meaning to their lives. In this world 
where no one demands obedience or respect for old habits, love is 
exclusively in the first person singular, and so are truth, morality, 
salvation, transcendence and authenticity … Growing out of itself and 
its own subjective views, it easily turns totalitarian; rejecting any outside 
authority, and agreeing to take over responsibility, to compromise and 
be fair only for emotional reasons.77
However, the most sustained critique of romantic love (not just marriage) comes 
from feminism. While both Solomon and Giddens have argued that the connection 
of love with freedom and equality can be liberating and empowering for women,78 
this assertion has been hotly contested by some feminists. Shulamith Firestone 
described romantic love as the pivot of oppression for women, describing love 
as a holocaust, a hell and a sacrifice.79 In this, she echoed Simone de Beauvoir, 
who argued that given the unequal position of men and women, love becomes 
‘a curse that lies heavily upon a woman confined in the feminine universe, 
woman mutilated, insufficient unto herself. The innumerable martyrs to love 
bear witness against the injustice of a fate that offers a sterile hell as ultimate 
salvation.’80 These views have been reiterated by later feminists. As Carol Smart 
puts it, feminists have identified love as an aspect of ‘patriarchy’s ideological 
armament through which women became hooked into dependent relationships 
with men, entered into an unfavourable legal contract (namely marriage) and 
ultimately ended up with care of the children’.81 Here Smart points to one of 
76 Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, The Normal Chaos of Love 194.
77 Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, The Normal Chaos of Love 171.
78 See R C Solomon, ‘Love and Feminism’ in R B Baker K J Wininger & F A Elliston (eds), Philosophy and Sex, 
third edition (Prometheus Books, New York 1998) and A Giddens, The Transformation of Intimacy: Sexuality 
Love and Eroticism in Modern Societies (Polity Press, Cambridge 1992).
79 S Firestone, The Dialectic of Sex: The Case for Feminist Revolution (Bantam Books, New York 1970).
80 S de Beauvoir, The Second Sex trans H M Parshley (Alfred A Knopf, New York 1953) 669. See also Mary 
Woolstencraft and Harriet Taylor as discussed in S Mendus, Feminism and Emotion: Readings in Moral and 
Political Philosophy (MacMillan Press Ltd, GB 2000).
81 Smart, Personal Life (Polity Press, Cambridge 2007) 60.
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the central underpinnings of the feminist critiques. Love is not itself oppressive 
but becomes so because of the social context in which it is conducted, namely 
patriarchy82 and the public and private divide.83
This feminist critique of love, sex (and marriage) is developed by Eva Illouz in 
her latest book, Why Love Hurts. Illouz remains committed to love as a central 
idea of modernity and champions its egalitarian optimism and its ability to 
subvert patriarchy.84 However, she also recognises that love is also the source of 
much misery, stemming from the ‘institutional arrangements’ around it. Love is 
played out in ‘the marketplace of unequal competing actors’ where some people, 
mostly men, are able to ‘command a greater capacity to define the terms in which 
they are loved by others’.85 Control is exercised by the ways in which choice, 
freedom, autonomy and commitment are differently played out between men 
and women. Within all of these structures, Illouz argues, there is a mismatch of 
goals and expectations, and ‘a set of conundrums’.86 In relation to commitment, 
for example, men are less likely to want marriage and a family because these 
are no longer sites of control and domination, men now measure success not 
according to a successful commitment, but rather, success on the sexual market. 
As such, men wish to remain uncommitted for as long as possible. Women on 
the other hand, see the sexual market as a marriage market and are in it for a 
shorter period of time because of career goals, and because of the prevalence of 
the categories of sexiness and beauty closely tied to age.87 
These feminist critiques are rooted in the social and cultural context that marriage 
is practiced in. However, feminists have also found love’s internal ideology to be 
problematic. While acknowledging the power of patriarchy and the division of 
spheres as problematic, Marilyn Freidman considers the central problem of love 
to stem from its long association with the idea of merger.88 Friedman argues that 
the features of merger experienced within romantic love are that: the needs and 
82 Mary Evans has described love as a ‘plot by men to sugar the evil pill of patriarchal domesticity’. ‘Falling 
in Love is Falling for Make Believe: Ideologies of Romance in Post-Enlightenment Culture’ (1998) 15 Theory 
Culture and Society 273. For Stevi Jackson, the feminist critique of love is epitomised by the popular saying, 
‘it starts when you sink into his arms and ends with your arms into his sink’. S Jackson, ‘Even Sociologists 
Fall in Love: An Exploration in the Sociology of Emotions’ (1993) 27(2) Sociology 204.
83 Elena Pulcini has argued the main prism through which love oppresses is the private sphere. Love she 
argues not only ties women to the private sphere but reduces them to being guardians of sentiments and 
privacy. It is true that this embodies some power but it is a hidden power which not only creates inequality 
but also masks it. E Pulcini, ‘Modernity, Love and Hidden Inequality’ trans L Fraser in Love and Law in 
Europe: Complex Interrelations (EUI Working papers, European University Institute 2000/2) 41–42.
84 Illouz, Why Love Hurts 5.
85 Illouz, Why Love Hurts 6.
86 Illouz, Why Love Hurts 241–44.
87 See Illouz,  Why Love Hurts: A Sociological Explanation (Polity, Cambridge 2012) chapter three. See also 
A Jonasdottir’s ideas around love power in ‘What Kind of Power is Love Power?’ in A Jonasdottir et al (eds), 
Sexuality, Gender and Power (Routledge, London 2011).
88 Aristophanes, followed by courtly and romantic love, make the idea of unification between two bodies 
and souls central to romantic love.
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interests of each person become entwined or pooled together; couples feel each 
other’s highs and lows; there is mutual consideration and awareness; couples care 
for and protect each other; couples can communicate with each other efficiently; 
couples make joint decisions and long term plans; there is a division of labour; 
couples desire to be seen as good by each other, and want to be valued by their 
partners in a way that they value themselves.89 Friedman does not necessarily 
see these features as negative in themselves, but they can represent a significant 
reduction in personal autonomy, and this is more dangerous for women than for 
men for a number of reasons. First, she argues, when seen in a social context, 
love ‘is guided by norms and stereotypes. Foremost among these are gender 
norms and ideals of romantic heterosexual love.’90 One such ideal, for example, 
is that women should marry ‘up’; that a woman should marry someone who is 
‘taller, stronger, older, richer, smarter and higher up on the social scale’91 than 
she is. The result of this is that women will always be seen as bringing less to 
the relationship than the men, and it is this, Freedman claims, which makes the 
romantic merger of identities more risky for women than for men.92 But even 
overall, she argues that the concept of merger is risky:
Lovers may be very different from each other in their resources, 
capacities, and commitments they bring to their love. These differences 
can create imbalances of power, authority, and status within a romantic 
relationship. When two lovers become one, the one they become may 
very well be more than the other. Or the merger might take place within 
one lover alone, so to speak.93
Wendy Langford also disputes the ideology of love itself as being positive. Love 
is not the great ideal that it is claimed to be. She argues that while the idea that 
love has spread principles of justice and fairness widely is an attractive and 
optimistic view, it is empirically unsustainable and conceptually misguided. 
Along with others,94 Langord is a strong critic of Giddens’ view of contemporary 
love as outlined above. Langford says that, while our society has come to 
‘venerate deliverance’ through love, with promises of ‘liberty, equality and 
togetherness’, romantic love is in fact a ‘process by which restrictions, inequality 
and dissatisfaction are merely obscured’.95 She argues that the rhetoric that 
love takes us higher and allows us to develop is wrong, rather, ‘[l]ove does 
not merely fail to give us what we desire but in so doing compounds painful 
89 Friedman, ‘Romantic Love and Personal Autonomy’ 169. See also M Friedman, Autonomy, Gender, Politics 
(Oxford University Press, New York 2003) 167–68.
90 Friedman, ‘Romantic Love and Personal Autonomy’ 173.
91 Friedman, ‘Romantic Love and Personal Autonomy’ 173.
92 Friedman, ‘Romantic Love and Personal Autonomy’ 178.
93 Friedman, ‘Romantic Love and Personal Autonomy’ 169.
94 See also Jamieson, ‘Intimacy Transformed?’.
95 Langford, Revolutions of the Heart: Gender, Power and the Delusions of Love (Routledge, London 1999) 21.
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feelings of dissatisfaction and low self-esteem’.96 Its effects are not positive, not 
even neutral, they are largely negative.97 While love promises happiness and 
freedom from social constraint, it in fact delivers the opposite.98 Echoing some 
of Friedman’s arguments, the problem according to Langford is that the success 
of romantic love depends upon a particular abstract individual type and model 
of rational behaviour that is seldom found in reality. The individual required is 
‘self aware and operates on the basis of reason’. Not only is this individual rarely 
found in society at large, she is rarely found among women, and even more 
rarely found in the context of love.99
What emerges from the above critique is that love, far from being the liberating 
and egalitarian idea which many claim it is, is instead oppressive and degrading 
to women. This critique is further strengthened when we consider it alongside 
the feminist critiques of sex  (as we must, given the earlier discussed slippage 
that occurs between sex and love). 
Illouz has argued that the contemporary sexual market is dominated by ideas 
of freedom and choice, and is motivated by a desire to accumulate as much 
sexual capital as possible. This model of sexual behaviour, ‘promoted by modern 
masculinity and too often endorsed and imitated by women’,100 does not meet 
any larger social and ethical goals, nor does it ‘build ethical and emotional 
models congruent with the social experience of women’.101 Feminists have 
long argued about sex and its impact on the position of women in society.102 
Two of the strongest voices in the feminist debate over the oppressive nature 
of heterosexual sex have been Catherine McKinnon and Andrea Dworkin. The 
view that sex (meaning heterosexual sex) is the ‘linchpin of gender inequality’, 
and that heterosexuality institutionalises ‘male sexual dominance and female 
submission’, is central to MacKinnon’s arguments against sex.103 She argues that 
women are defined by male dominance and female subordination. Women’s 
sexuality is defined according to male desire and as such it is not possible to 
speak of women’s pleasure or agency in a sexual relationship with a man.104 
Similarly, according to Dworkin, ‘because women are exploited as a sex class 
96 Langford, Revolutions of the Heart 50.
97 Langford, Revolutions of the Heart 50.
98 Langford, Revolutions of the Heart 4. Echoing this, Mary Evans argues that ‘accumulated evidence of the 
last centuries suggest that people in the West have suffered more in their personal lives from ‘love’ than any 
other single ideology.’ Evans links romantic love with rape and violence against women, claiming that those 
‘cultures which condone romance are also beset with the misreadings of it’. Evans ‘Falling in Love with Love 
is Falling for Make Believe’ 273.
99 Langford, Revolutions of the Heart 152.
100 Illouz, Why Love Hurts 247.
101 Illouz, Why Love Hurts 247.
102 See S Seidman, Embattled Eros: Sexual Politics and Ethics in Contemporary America (Routledge, New 
York 1992) chapter 3 ‘Defining the Moral Boundaries of Eros: The Feminist Sexuality Debates’.
103 C MacKinnon, ‘Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: An Agenda for Theory’ (1982) 7 Signs 533.
104 MacKinnnon, Feminism Unmodified 135.
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for sex, it is impossible to talk about women’s sexuality outside the context of 
forced sex’.105 Women cannot be equal to men if they are used as a tool for men’s 
desires: ‘What is lost by the woman when she becomes a sexual object, and 
when she is confirmed in that status by being fucked, is not recoverable.’106 This 
is a contentious view. Simone de Beauvoir, for example, said that women needed 
to invent new ‘non-oppressive’ ways of understanding heterosexual sex, and not 
just accept established ideas.107 Carole Vance claims that ‘[f]eminism must increase 
women’s pleasure and joy, not just decrease our misery’.108 Amber Hollibaugh 
points out that ‘sex is not the same for all of us’, and that by denying these 
differences feminism risks alienating many women. She asks, ‘are we creating a 
political movement that we can no longer belong to if we don’t feel our desires fit 
a model of proper feminist sex?’.109 Camille Paglia and Naomi Wolf have argued 
that to reduce female sexual existence to sexual oppression completely obscures 
female sexual pleasure and agency.110 Furthermore, some feminists have argued 
that to deny pleasure and agency is to risk a new era of puritanism.111 
The discussion so far has shown that love has been and continues to be a 
problematic concept for many feminists. We must be careful not to overstate this. 
Some feminists dismiss the idea of romance as a site of women’s oppression and 
complicity in patriarchal structures and instead see love as a site of resistance, 
transformation and agency. As already stated, Illouz sees love as egalitarian and 
subversive, and she is not alone in this regard. Pearce and Stacey, like Radway 
before them, argue that love retains its ability to liberate women from patriarchy 
because of its ‘narrativity’. They argue that an engagement with the narrative 
of romance enables women to facilitate the ‘rescripting of other areas of life’.112 
Langhamer has also shown how in everyday courtship behaviour young women 
in twentieth century Britain have been able to act as ‘architects of their own 
lives and as active agents of social change’.113
105 A Dworkin, ‘Renouncing Sexual Equality’ cited in C A Douglas, Love and Politics 180.
106 A Dworkin, Intercourse (The Free Press, New York 1987) 16.
107 A Schwarzer, After the Second Sex: Conversations with Simone De Beauvoir (Pathenon Books, New York 
1984) 36.
108 C Vance, ‘Pleasure and Danger: Towards a Politics of Sexuality’ in C Vance (ed), Pleasure and Danger: 
Exploring Female Sexuality (Routledge Kegan Paul, Boston 1984) 24.
109 A Hollibaugh, ‘Desire for the Future: Radical Hope’ in Vance (ed), Pleasure and Danger 403–04.
110 See C Paglia, Sex, Art, American Culture (Vintage Books, New York 1992); N Wolf, Fire with Fire: The 
New Female Power and How it Will Change the 21st Century (Random House, New York 1993); N Wolf, ‘The 
Porn Myth’ New York News and Features http://nymag.com/nymetro/news/trends/n_9437/ accessed 29/06/10.
111 K Abrams, ‘Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal Theory’ (1995) 95 Columbia Law 
Review 311.
112 L Pearce & J Stacey (eds), Romance Revisited (Lawrence & Wishart, London 1995) 13. See also J A 
Radway, Reading the Romance: Women, Patriarchy and Popular Literature, (University of Carolina Press, 
Chapel Hill 1991).
113 C Langhamer, ‘Love and Courtship in Mid-Twentieth-Century England’ (2007) 50 The Historical Journal 196.
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Conclusion
Legally, marriage has moved away from traditional meanings that associated it 
with religion and patriarchy. It is now more loosely considered a relationship 
that can be determined according to the parties themselves, especially when 
there are no children involved. Marriage is now more closely tied to love than 
ever before. This is evident in the social and cultural discourse of marriage, and 
in empirical studies on why people marry. If marriage is tied to love, the next 
important question is: to what extent does this connection impact upon both of 
these institutions? This inquiry must be aware that love has two predominant 
readings, one negative and one positive. We have seen that love is disassociated 
with duty and social boundaries, and is instead associated with ideas of freedom, 
equality, agency, choice and progress. This reading of love says that it represents 
a relationship whose content is negotiated between lovers themselves free of 
any external rules, it is an ‘empty canvass, a subjective and mutual invention’, 
capable of many permutations: a relationship that requires free and autonomous 
beings. It is these features of love that, at least in part, have made it the desirable 
existential goal it has become. But love has another side, it is closely linked with 
patriarchy and, as we will see in later discussion, with heterosexuality. This 
reading claims that the dominant scripts of love are tied up with procreation, 
family, marriage and domesticity, with monogamy and fidelity. As such, for 
women, love too readily translates into becoming a wife and mother.114 This 
reading of love negates the ideas that love is free from rules and barriers, and 
renders it less likely to deliver its promises of freedom and equality. In any 
conversation about love both of these readings must be acknowledged. 
The situation is further complicated by the fact that marriage is also a contested 
idea. There are multiple readings of marriage and multiple reasons people marry. 
Any discussion on the impact that love and marriage have on each other must 
consider these multiple meanings. 
114 This resonates with the queer critique of love, which will be discussed later in the book.
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2. The Diminishing Significance of 
Sexual Intercourse
Damn it, when you get married, you kind of expect you’re 
going to get a little sex .1
Introduction
Traditionally, sexual intercourse was considered central to the legal definition 
of marriage. A marriage could be annulled and legally revoked if it had not 
been consummated. The law also made is clear that upon marriage a husband 
had unlimited sexual access to his wife. Neither of these principles are true any 
longer. This chapter documents the shift in the narrative of the relationship 
between marriage and sex from one of duty and procreation, to one of mutuality 
and pleasure, and in doing so examines the process in order to determine what 
role, if any, romantic love plays in this narrative. 
The legal connection between sex2 and marriage in law is not explicitly stated. 
The association of sex with immorality and licentiousness make it an uneasy 
topic for marriage and law. Courts are careful to avoid language that casts sex 
as a duty and could be interpreted as reducing wives to prostitutes. However 
it would not be accurate, or even desirable, to separate sex from marriage. 
Some old laws of marriage accept that sex is part of marriage, but dance around 
questions of consent, obligation and rights. Others, such as the marital immunity 
against rape, are unequivocal about both its centrality and the husband’s right 
to demand it.3 Modern laws have overturned these principles. The 1991 case 
of R v L,4 asserted that a husband could be found guilty of raping his wife, 
and established that the crime of rape could exist in marriage, that men could 
not demand, and women did not have to submit to sex just because they were 
married. The revolutionary nature of the case cannot be overstated; it redefined 
the relationship between sex and marriage and helped to recreate the meaning 
1 Attributed to Senator Jeremiah Denton, Republican, Alabama 1981 http://marriage.about.com/cs/
maritalrape.htm accessed 8/04/10.
2 There is often slippage in the meaning of the word sex. This is especially so between the meaning of the 
word when used to indicate sexual activity and the word used to identify sexual identification. Where there 
is likely to be confusion, I refer to sexual identity and sexual activity in order to distinguish between the 
two. Otherwise, I follow the conventions of using the word to mean the two different things according to the 
context as is the case in everyday Australian English.
3 R v Clarence (1888) QB 23.
4 R v L (1991) 174 CLR 379.
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of marriage. Some ten years later, the centrality of sex in marriage was further 
eroded with the case of Re Kevin which went on to assert that sex (sexual capacity 
and sexual intercourse) is not the central, defining characteristic of marriage.
Quite a shift has occurred between the old laws and the new laws, but what is 
the role of love within this new narrative? This chapter will demonstrate that 
love has come to be considered more important in the discourse of sex and 
marriage, albeit in a small way. R v L changed the perception that sex was an 
inevitable part of marriage, and instead linked sex with marriage only in the 
context of a mutually consensual and loving environment. Re Kevin also severed 
marriage from sex altogether and left a silence about the meaning of marriage 
which, I argue, can be filled with love. Despite the insinuation of love into sex 
and marriage, and despite the association of love with liberty and progress (as 
discussed in chapter one), sex and sexual access remain a delicate issue, and this 
is especially true in marriage.
The Old Discourse of Sex and Marriage 
The extent to which law once saw sex as part of marriage requires a discussion 
of several different common law principles and legislation. 
Consortium vitae5
According to Thornton, ‘there is no precise legal definition of consortium and 
its elusive nature has permitted the judiciary to place its own gloss on the 
concept from time to time’.6 In so far as we can define it, Crabtree v Crabtree (No 
2) claims that consortium is a raft of things, including sexual intercourse, which 
together unite a husband and wife.7 Consortium is defined as a partnership or 
association that involves a sharing of the good and the bad of the two lives 
involved: ‘In its fullest sense it implies a companionship between each of them, 
entertainment of mutual friends, sexual intercourse — all those elements which 
when combined, justify the old common law dictum that a man and his wife are 
one person.’8 In the Marriage of Todd (No 2), the Court itemised the elements 
that make up consortium as ‘dwelling under the same roof, sexual intercourse, 
mutual society and protection, [and] recognition of the existence of the marriage 
5 Prior to the 1980s, this action was only recognised in common law as belonging to a husband. For a 
discussion of this see M Thornton, ‘Loss of Consortium: Inequality Before the Law’ (1984) 10 The Sydney 
Law Review; A Risely, ‘Sex, Housework and the Law’ (1980–81) 7 Adelaide Law Review 421–456. Since then, 
reform has taken place. The action has been abolished in New South Wales, Tasmania and Western Australia. 
South Australia has kept the action but allows wives to pursue the action equally with husbands.
6 Thornton, ‘Loss of Consortium’ 265.
7 Crabtree v Crabtree (No 2) [1964] ALR 820.
8 Crabtree v Crabtree (No 2) [1964] ALR 820 in Thornton, ‘Loss of Consortium’ 264–65.
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by both spouses in public and private relationships’.9 The Court stated that these 
elements need not all be present in every marriage.10 While sexual intercourse 
is listed as an element of consortium in both Crabtree v Crabtree and in the 
Marriage of Todd (No 2), most of the cases involving loss of consortium tend to 
focus on loss of services in relation to domestic work. However, there has also 
been some discussion on loss of sexual capacity. It is on this issue that I will 
focus my discussion.
In Kealley v Jones11 Justice Samuels described sexual intercourse as a comfort 
of the most material kind (for the husband) but avoided the issue of value by 
saying that you cannot put a replacement/monetary value on something which 
is as unique as a wife’s society. As Thornton puts it, the discomfort shown by 
Samuels J is understandable, as placing a monetary value on sexual services 
would ‘ineluctably lead to the idea of the wife as a prostitute’.12
In Birch v Taubmans Ltd,13 the Court distinguished between losses that were 
of a temporal nature and recoverable, and those losses that were of a spiritual 
nature which were not recoverable. Sexual intercourse was considered to be of 
a temporal nature. This classification was possible, however, because the Court 
discussed sexual intercourse in terms of loss of opportunity to have children 
rather than loss of sexual pleasure. In the end, the principle is carefully outlined. 
The judges said:
We are of the opinion that where, as in this case, the opportunity … [to 
procreate] has been taken away absolutely, such a deprivation transcends 
matters which might well be said to be within the terms of the limitation 
above referred to and is a loss which is temporal rather than spiritual.14
Subsequent cases, however, have acknowledged that the loss can also be 
of sexual pleasure. In Meadows and Meadows v Maloney,15 Judge Walters 
was guided by the High Court’s acceptance of the principle as outlined in 
Birmingham Southern Railway Co v Lintner where CJ McClellan accepted that 
loss of ‘the society of a wife’ and ‘marital companionship’ can be different 
from mere services, and thus can be recoverable. This principle is contained 
in the statement below by CJ McClellan.
The husband, also, of course, has a legal right to the society of the 
wife, involving all the amenities and conjugal incidents of the relation. 
9 In the Marriage of Todd (No 2) (1976) 1 Fam LR 11,188 (Watson J).
10 In the Marriage of Todd (No 2) (1976) 1 Fam LR 11,188 (Watson J).
11 Kealley v Jones [1979] 1 NSWLR 723 cited in Thornton ‘Loss of Consortium’ 266.
12 Thornton, ‘Loss of Consortium’ 268.
13 Birch v Taubmans Ltd  [1956] 57 SR (NSW) 93.
14 A C Risely, ‘Sex, Housework and the Law’ (1980–81) 7 Adelaide Law Review 434–35.
15 Meadows v Maloney [1973] 4 SASR 567.
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This right of society may be invaded by an act which while leaving 
to the husband the presence of the wife, yet incapacitates her for the 
marital companionship and fellowship, and such incapacity may be the 
deprivation of her society differing in degree only from total deprivation 
by her death. For such impairment, so to say, of the wife’s society, of his 
right of consortium, such deprivation of the aid and comfort which the 
wife’s society, as a thing different from mere services, is supposed to 
involve, he is entitled to recover.16
This right to recover for loss of sexual pleasure within an action for loss of 
consortium was also recognised in Hasaganic v Minister for Education.17 In 
this case, the parties were older, already had three children, and there was no 
question of further procreation. The Court accepted that the husband could 
claim for loss of services of his wife in relation to housework and to also claim 
for loss of ability to have sexual intercourse.
Justice Bright in Fisher v Smithson18 welcomed the widening of the concept 
away from services and towards companionship and affection, claiming that this 
was more in keeping with the changing marriage relationship:
[T]he cases seem to me to demonstrate a broadening of the approach, a 
greater emphasis on loss of companionship and affection, a somewhat 
reduced emphasis on loss of ‘services’. If the law is as I hope, moving 
in this direction, it is merely reflecting, in my view, changing attitudes 
towards the matrimonial relationship.19
From this small sample of cases we can say that sexual intercourse is considered 
to be a part of the consortium vitae, but that a wife’s ‘society’ is considered 
unique and is therefore difficult to place a value upon. In so far as courts have 
placed a value upon it, that value has been restricted to seeing sexual intercourse 
as an opportunity to procreate. There is some small evidence from the cases 
of Hasaganic v Minister for Education and Fisher v Smithson that this view is 
shifting, with courts showing a willingness to see sex as not only valuable for 
procreation but for fulfilling other emotional functions.
16 McClellan CJ in Birmingham Southern Railway Co v Lintner (1904) 141 ALA 427 quoted by Walters J in 
Meadows v Maloney [1973] 4 SASR 577–78.
17 Hasaganic v Minister for Education [1973] 5 SARS 554.
18 Fisher v Smithson (1977) 17 SASR 223.
19 Fisher v Smithson (1977) 17 SASR 227 (Bright J).
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Conjugal Rights
Another perspective on the historical picture of the law’s view on the 
relationship between marriage and sex can be gleaned by looking at the old 
action of conjugal rights.
Section 60 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1959 (Cth) enabled a party to the 
marriage to petition the court for a restitution of conjugal rights. In order to 
succeed, a petitioner had to show, among other things, that the respondent’s 
refusal is without just cause and excuse, and that the petitioner sincerely 
desires conjugal rights. Some legal dictionaries include sexual activity as an 
aspect of conjugal rights,20 but it is important to note that the term remains 
largely undefined in either legislation or case law. 
Cases show that sexual intercourse is an irrelevant factor in deciding whether one 
spouse has refused to render conjugal rights. In Fielding v Fielding,21 Salmond J 
categorically asserted that refusal to have sex is not a ground which can be used 
to petition the court for a restitution of conjugal rights, that action being about 
co-habitation and not sexual relations. He stated the principle as follows:
[T]he jurisdiction in restitution of conjugal rights is an old ecclesiastical 
jurisdiction, and is by the law that was in force in the Ecclesiastical 
Courts. Conjugal rights in those courts meant the right of co-habitation 
and nothing more, and that is what it still means.22
Similarly, in Tew v Tew23 and Orme v Orme,24 the Court dismissed a petition for 
restitution of conjugal rights where the applicants relied upon their spouse’s 
refusal to have sexual intercourse.
Other cases, however, have taken an opposite view. Synge v Synge25 was a case 
where the wife agreed to live with her husband only on the condition that 
there was no sexual intercourse between them. The husband, on the other hand, 
agreed to live with her only on the condition that there was. The Court found 
that refusal to have sexual intercourse is not actionable, but a partner to the 
marriage is entitled to leave it if the other does not consent to sexual relations. 
Sir Francis Jeune P said that the law could not condone a situation in which 
the husband is ‘bound continually to expose himself to such mortification and 
20 Webster’s New World Law Dictionary defines conjugal rights as ‘the mutual rights and privileges between 
two individuals that arise from the state of being married. These include, among other things, affection, 
companionship, co-habitation, joint property rights, and sexual gratification.’ (Wiley Publishing, Hoboken 
New Jersey 2010).
21 Fielding v Fielding (1921) NZLR 1069.
22 Fielding v Fielding (1921) NZLR 1071 (Salmond J).
23 Tew v Tew (1921) NZLR 1071.
24 Orme v Orme (1824) 2 Add 382.
25 Synge v Synge [1900–03] All ER Rep 452.
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misery as is necessarily involved’ in such a marriage.26 He went on to say that 
sex was an inevitable part of co-habitation. For Sir Francis Jeune P the two 
could not be distinguished:
The objects of married life are as expressed in the marriage service and 
are not the less true because they are utterances of a more plain spoken 
age than the present, and, while human nature remains what it is, I 
think a husband has a right to decline to submit to a groundless demand 
of his wife that he should live with her as a husband in name only. 
Neither party to a marriage can, I think insist on cohabitation unless she 
or he is willing to perform a marital duty inseparable from it.27
A similar view was held by Justice Hill in Wily v Wily,28 who, clearly referring 
to sex, rejected the view that just because you live in the same house you have 
performed your duty to your spouse. Both Wily and Synge, interestingly, refer 
to sex as a marital duty.
In Bartlett v Bartlett29 Justice Evatt specifically considered whether sex was 
integrated in an action for restitution of conjugal rights and found that there 
was authority to support both sides of the question. He concluded that the 
question of sexual intercourse or ‘mutual society’ cannot be said to be irrelevant 
to the question of conjugal rights:
[I]n the marriage service the woman promises ‘to obey him, and serve 
him, love honour, and keep him in sickness and in health’. The man’s 
promise is to ‘love her comfort her, honour, and keep her in sickness 
and in health’. Revision or elision of some of the promises has been 
attempted, and with or without authority, been made. But the prayer 
book’s third stated purpose for which marriage was ordained — ‘mutual 
society, help and comfort’, is of the essence of the marriage relationship.30
Bartlett thus stands for the proposition that sex is a part of marriage; it is not 
necessarily the most important part, but it is without doubt a part of it. Justice 
Evatt goes on to extend this relationship and, like Justice Brennan in R v L, 
as we will see, threw love into the mix. In deciding the case before him, he 
concluded that the relationship could not be saved: conjugality, including 
sexual relations, cannot be restored. He stated, ‘it is difficult to see how, upon 
26 Synge v Synge [1900–03] All ER Rep 461.
27 Synge v Synge [1900–03] All ER Rep 461.
28 Wily v Wily (1918) P1.
29 Bartlett v Bartlett (1933) 50 CLR 3.
30 Bartlett v Bartlett (1933) 50 CLR 23 (Evatt J).
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the assumption that all love and affection have disappeared this fundamental 
purpose can be carried out’.31 For Evatt J, then, it is not only marriage and sex 
that are connected but marriage, sex and love.
Matrimonial Causes Act (1959)
This Act mirrored the position that English law does not seek to enforce 
matrimonial sexual intercourse, and that the refusal to engage in sexual 
intercourse by either husband or wife does not amount to a matrimonial 
offence.32 However, sex remains an important subtext to the relationship of 
marriage in the Act in a number of ways. For example, section 21 states that a 
marriage may be voidable if one or both parties are incapable of consummating 
the marriage. Furthermore, ‘wilfully and persistently’ refusing to consummate 
the marriage was a ground for divorce under section 28(c), and refusal to 
engage in sex could also be taken as evidence of desertion and thereby give 
rise to desertion as a ground for divorce under section 28(b). 
In the above discussion we have seen all of the ways that sex was ‘supported’ 
as a legal part of marriage. The common law in relation to consortium vitae and 
conjugal rights saw sex as an important part of marriage, but stopped short of 
imposing it as a duty or even elevating it above any other element of marriage. 
In the context of cases seeking damages for loss of consortium vitae we have also 
seen a shift in seeing loss of sexual capacity as a loss measurable only in the 
context of inability to procreate to a widening of the concept to at least allow the 
possibility of counting loss of sexual pleasure.33 This is in keeping with the shift 
that has occurred whereby sex in marriage has come to be seen as being more 
about pleasure than duty. According to Honore,34 the old law points to three 
requirements of the law in relation to sex and marriage: that a husband and a 
wife have a duty to consummate the marriage; that they develop and maintain a 
mutually tolerable sexual relationship; and that they are faithful to each other.35 
But the old laws, in fact, go much further than that and assert that sex is an 
exclusive right of the parties to the marriage, in particular that it is the exclusive 
right of the husband. This position can be argued by looking at laws in relation to 
criminal conversation and adultery, which give parties to a marriage a legal right 
to sue for compensation or for divorce if sex occurs with a third party outside of 
the marriage. The fact that both of these rights were either exclusively available 
to men (criminal conversation) and much more readily available to husbands than 
31 Bartlett v Bartlett (1933) 50 CLR 23 (Evatt J).
32 P E Joske, Joske’s Marriage and Divorce vol 2: Matrimonial Causes, fourth edition (Butterworths, Sydney 
1961) 312.
33 There are no cases that have explicitly recognised this, but there are cases that welcome the widening of 
the concept.
34 T Honore, Sex and Law (Duckworth, London 1978).
35 Honore, Sex and Law 17–34.
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to wives (divorce double standard), supports the argument that exclusive sex 
was a right a husband could demand of his wife. But nothing asserts a husband’s 
right to have sex with his wife more than the immunity that he enjoyed against 
marital rape. In this context, a picture emerges of sex being not only inseparable 
from marriage, but also being a right that a husband enjoyed over his wife. This 
casts marriage as oppressive and exploitative, a picture that justifies the feminist 
critiques of both sex and marriage.
Rape in Marriage
In History of the Pleas of the Crown (1736), Sir Matthew Hale stated that a 
husband cannot be guilty of ‘a rape committed by himself upon his lawful wife, 
for by their mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given herself 
in this kind unto her husband which she cannot retract’.36 This was asserted for 
hundreds of years as the common law of Britain and its colonies. Subsequently, 
both the legitimacy and the legality of this statement have been questioned.37 
Barton, however, argues that what Hale wrote appears to have been a reflection 
of established belief at the time, traceable to the thirteenth century.38 
The idea that a man could not be guilty of raping his wife is founded upon 
three possible theories.39 The first is that which emerges from Mathew Hale’s 
statement, that is, that upon marriage a wife has given her consent to sexual 
relations. This is known as the implied consent theory. Immunity can, however, 
also be justified under the unity of person theory which views marriage as a 
unity of two people, or, more precisely, an incorporation of a woman’s entity 
into that of her husband. In this conception of marriage, a woman ceased to 
be an independent legal entity during marriage and the question of consent 
therefore becomes irrelevant. As noted earlier, this is the view that was voiced 
by Blackstone about marriage in general.40 The third theory is the property 
theory: upon marriage a woman becomes the property of her husband of which 
he can ‘make appropriate use’.41
36 Sir Matthew Hale, History of the Pleas of the Crown 1736 vol 1 629.
37 C Glasman has argued that the marital rape immunity never had any grounding in common law. ‘Women 
Judge the Courts’ (1991) 141 New Law Journal 395. Brennan J in R v L also said it was never part of the common 
law. The High Court of Australia had cause to visit this question in PGA v The Queen (2012) 245 CLR 355. In this 
case, rather controversially, the majority (5:2) held that even if the marital immunity had at some time existed it 
had ceased to do so by 1935 at the latest as a result of state legislation. For a discussion of the implications of this 
case see W Larcombe and M Heath, ‘Case Note Developing the Common Law and Rewriting the History of Rape 
in Marriage in Australia: PGA v The Queen’ (2012) 34 Sydney Law Review 785-–807.
38 J L Barton, ‘The Story of Marital Rape’ (1992) 108 Law Quarterly Review 260–271.
39 For discussion of these three theories see S A Adamo, ‘The Injustice of the Marital Rape Exemption: A 
Survey of Common Law Countries’ (1989) 4 American University Journal of International Law & Policy 555–590.
40 See chapter one.
41 Adamo, ‘The Injustice of the Marital Rape Exemption’ 560.
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The marital rape exemption has over time been justified on the ground that 
rape in marriage would be difficult to prove, could be misused by a vengeful 
wife, and could lead to ‘unrest and discord’ in a marriage.42 It has also been 
argued that it would constitute an intrusion into the privacy of marriage.43 
Regardless of its origins and legitimacy, the view became law and was reiterated 
in academic texts44 and in law cases for over 200 years. It was not until the 
last half of the twentieth century that this legal principle came to be seen as 
insupportable.45 While many countries have now removed the immunity,46 too 
many still have not and, as we will see, in the following discussion, this removal 
was not without its opponents.47
R v Clarence
So entrenched was the view that a husband could not be guilty of raping his 
wife that even when sex resulted in serious harm, the Court was not willing 
to disturb the immunity. R v Clarence48 has been quoted over time as giving 
authority for marital rape immunity. In R v Clarence, the husband had contracted 
venereal disease and was aware of his condition, but did not tell his wife, with 
whom he continued to have sexual intercourse. She subsequently contracted the 
disease and her husband was charged with rape and assault. The wife argued 
that she was raped because she had not consented to having sex with a man who 
was infected. The majority of judges did not agree. While Barton argues that, 
between them, the judges expressed every possible logical opinion, a number of 
them relied on the principle that a husband cannot be guilty of raping his wife, 
pure and simple.49
42 Adamo, ‘The Injustice of the Marital Rape Exemption’ 561.
43 M J Anderson, ‘Lawful Wife, Unlawful Sex: Examining the Effect of the Criminalization of Marital Rape 
in England and The Republic of Ireland’ (1998) 27 Georgia Journal of International & Comparative 148.
44 For example, see P Brett and L Waller, Criminal Law: Text and Cases fourth edition, (Butterworths 
Sydney 1977) 93–94, where the authors argue that the immunity to marital rape should be extended to people 
living in any intimate relationship and not just marriage. This view is not repeated in subsequent editions.
45 T Fus, ‘Criminalizing Marital Rape: A Comparison of Judicial and Legislative Approaches’ (2006) 39 
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 481–517. According to Anderson, as late as the mid-twentieth 
century there was no country that viewed a husband as forcing his wife to have sex with him as a crime. 
Anderson, ‘Lawful Wife, Unlawful Sex’.
46 According to MarriageAbout.com, marital rape is considered a criminal offence in many countries, 
including Argentina, Australia, Austria, Barbados, Belize, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, 
Ecuador, England, the Fiji Islands, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Honduras, Hong Kong, Ireland, Israel, 
Macedonia, Mexico, Namibia, Nepal, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, The Philippines, Poland, South 
Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Taiwan, Trinidad/Tobago, the United States, Uzbekistan, and Zimbabwe. 
(Country Reports on Human Rights Practices released by the US State Department, Bureau of Democracy, 
Human Rights and Labor, were used to determine countries’ legal status of marital rape.) http://marriage.
about.com/cs/maritalrape/f/maritalrape2.htm accessed 29/06/10.
47 J Mertus, ‘Human Rights of Women in Central and Eastern Europe’ (1998) 6 American University Journal 
of Gender & Law 369–484 listed Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Kosovo, Poland, 
Romania, Russia, Serbia and Ukraine as still providing some immunity for husbands.
48 R v Clarence (1888) QB 23.
49 J L Barton, ‘The Story of Marital Rape’ (1992) 108 Law Quarterly Review 260.
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Pollock B, relying on Hale’s dictum, stood firm on the assertion that the marriage 
contract means that the wife has no ‘right or power’ to refuse sex, and that the 
fact of venereal disease was irrelevant:
[T]he husband’s connection with his wife is not only lawful, but it is 
in accordance with the ordinary condition of married life. It is done in 
pursuance of the marital contract and of the status which was created 
by marriage, and the wife as to the connection itself is in a different 
position from any other woman, for she has no right or power to refuse 
her consent.50
Similarly, A L Smith relied on the features of the marriage, and argued that the 
wife consents to sex at the time of marriage. This consent is not confined to 
when the husband is sound in body. Smith affirmed the principle that consent 
to sex stands throughout marriage, and affirmed the existence of the immunity 
in all circumstances:
[U]ntil the consent given at marriage be revoked, how can it be said that 
the husband in exercising his marital right has assaulted his wife? In the 
present case at the time the incriminated act was committed, the consent 
given at marriage stood unrevoked. Then how is it assault? … In my 
judgement in this case, the consent given at marriage still existing and 
unrevoked, the prisoner has not assaulted his wife.51
Even those judges who thought Mr Clarence was guilty of rape did not wish 
to disrupt the marital immunity. They simply argued that his suffering a 
communicable disease created an exception to the rule. Sex was a marital privilege, 
but with some exceptions.52 This view continued. Over the years, before R v L, 
courts showed a general unwillingness to water down the marital exemption. 
Cases show that the presumption that a man cannot be guilty of raping his 
wife could be displaced by a separation order,53 a separation agreement,54 or a 
decree nisi.55 Until very recently, and even in extreme circumstances, cases show 
that courts were more willing to develop exceptions to the rule rather than to 
eliminate the rule altogether. For example, in R v McMinn56 the husband broke 
into his wife’s home and physically and sexually abused her in the presence 
of their small child. Even then, Starke J did not question the existence of the 
50 R v Clarence (1888) QB 63–64 (Pollock B).
51 R v Clarence (1888) QB 37 (Smith AL).
52 R v Clarence (1888) QB 51 (Hawkins J).
53 R v Clarke [1949] 2 All ER 448.
54 R v Miller [1954] 2 QB 282.
55 R v O’Brien [1974] 2 All ER 663.
56 R v McMinn [1982] VR 53.
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rule but instead focussed on the fact that there was a Family Law Court order 
existing at the time which restrained her husband from molesting her, thus 
constituting a revocation of consent to sex by the wife.
The Changing Discourse of Sex and Marriage
As previously discussed, the legal discourse of marriage in Australia has been 
significantly altered by the passing of the FLA. In relation to sexual intercourse, 
this piece of legislation is silent. Some of the ways that sex was present in 
the Matrimonial Causes Act (adultery, refusal to consummate a marriage) 
were removed. The single ground of ‘irretrievable break down’ evidenced 
by a 12-month separation removes questions about the nature of the parties’ 
involvement with each other, sexual or otherwise. Furthermore, the discourse 
of sex in marriage has been significantly altered in Australian common law. This 
can be illustrated by two leading cases. R v L overturned centuries of common 
law that had protected husbands against the crime of raping their wives. Ten 
years later, the case of Re Kevin recognised a transsexual marriage and along 
the way asserted that sex (sexual identity as well as sexual intercourse) was no 
longer a central defining characteristic of marriage. 
R v L and the Removal of the Marital Immunity for 
Rape
In 1991, R v R the UK Court of Appeal said the rule that protected husbands 
against a conviction of raping their wives was ‘anachronistic and offensive’.57 
In R v L in the same year, the High Court of Australia said that the notion ‘was 
out of keeping with the view society now takes of the relationship between the 
parties to a marriage’.58 It is important to note here that, by then, every State 
legislature had passed laws which removed the distinction between married and 
unmarried women in relation to intimate partner rape. 
Amazingly, given the length of time the rule had operated and the tenacity with 
which the courts had enforced it, Justice Brennan questioned the legal validity 
of the principle altogether. He claimed that there was little evidence for it in 
either the law of marriage or any other doctrine of common law:
Hale’s and Hume’s reason for the common law rule that a husband could 
not be guilty as a principal in the first degree of raping his wife was 
57 R v R [1991] 2 WLR 1065.
58 R v L (1991) 174 CLR 390 (Mason CJ, Deane & Toohey JJ).
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extremely dubious … Hale’s reason for the rule is not supported by the 
law of marriage. Nor is that reason supported by any other doctrine of 
common law.59
This question was revived decades later in the 2012 case of PGA v The Queen60 in 
which the majority of the High Court decided that, even if the rule ever existed, 
it no longer did so by the middle of the twentieth century. Nevertheless, the 
idea was certainly entrenched enough that even in the 1990s some were not 
only defending it but calling for its retention. In a two-part article in the New 
Law Journal,61 Professor Glanville Williams argued that if a husband did force 
his wife to have sex with him, this was not rape but rather a sign that the 
relationship was broken. Williams argued that rape is too serious an offence to 
apply to the relationship that exists within marriage: 
We are speaking of a biological activity, strongly baited by nature, 
which is regularly and pleasurably performed on a consensual basis by 
mankind … Occasionally some husband continues to exercise what he 
regards as his when his wife refused him … What is wrong with his 
demand is not so much the act requested but his timing, or the manner 
of his demand. The fearsome stigma of rape is too great a punishment for 
husbands who use their strength in these circumstances.62
A report by UK Criminal Law Revision Committee in 1984 into marital rape 
took a similar view, arguing that marital rape was more of a problem for social 
workers than for the criminal law.63 
In R v L, Justice Brennan argued that the law of marriage is to be found in 
the ecclesiastical courts rather than the common law courts. He claims that a 
review of those relevant cases shows that connubial rights are an essential part 
of marriage but ‘do not exhaust, the legal incidents of marriage’.64 Furthermore, 
he adds that the law has always been that sexual intercourse must be performed 
59  R v L (1991) 174 CLR 401 (Brennan J). See also Glasman, ‘Women Judge Courts’.
60 PGA v The Queen (2012) 245 CLR 355.
61 G Williams, ‘The Problem of Domestic Rape: Part I’ (1991) 141 New Law Journal 205–06; ‘Problem of 
Domestic Rape: Part II’ (1991) 141 New Law Journal 246–247.
62 Williams, ‘The Problem of Domestic Rape: Part I’ 206. It is important to note that Professor Williams has 
argued in other writings that, when it comes to rape, men need the law’s protection more than women. In his 
Textbook of Criminal Law, he talks of consent as a ‘hazy concept’. He says that women are prone to changing 
their minds, ‘enjoy fantasies of being raped’ and therefore welcome a ‘masterful advance while putting up a 
token of resistance’. He goes on to say that girls often lie in relation to sexual consent out of shame or guilt or 
‘for obscure psychological reasons’. G Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law second edition (Stevens and Sons, 
London 1983) 238. These views are by no means unique. Naffine has shown their predominance in a number 
of criminal law textbooks. N Naffine ‘Windows on the Legal Mind: Evocation of Rape in Legal Writings’ 
(1991–1992) Melbourne University Law Review 744–751.
63 UK Report by the Law Reform Commission (law com No 205) CMND 9213 cited in N Naffine, ‘Possession: 
Erotic Love in the Law of Rape’ (1994) 57 Modern Law Review 22.
64 R v L (1991) 174 CLR 392 (Brennan J).
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voluntarily.65 Justice Brennan says that the ecclesiastical approach can be found 
in Sir William Scott’s judgement in Forster v Forster66 which stated that ‘the duty 
of matrimonial intercourse cannot be compelled by this court though matrimonial 
cohabitation may’.67 However, he went on to say that it is not a ‘matter perfectly 
light’ if a spouse has withdrawn themselves ‘from the discharge of duties that 
belong to the very institution of marriage’,68 thus creating some confusion.
Despite this, Justice Brennan argues that to admit that sexual intercourse is 
part of marriage is not the same thing as asserting that a man can never be 
guilty of raping his wife. A wife, he argues, is not upon marriage relegated to 
the status of sexual chattel. To accept Hale’s principle would relegate a married 
woman to the rank of concubine and reduce her to a mere object of desire and 
sexual gratification:
Far from relegating a wife to the position of a sexual chattel, the status 
of wife created by marriage confers on a wife a right … to live with 
her husband, to have him listen and talk to her, to be cherished, to be 
entertained at bed and board and treated with respect. These are not 
rights that can be enforced by decree but they are rights attached to the 
status of husband and wife.69
He goes on to say that ‘marriage is an institution which casts upon a husband an 
obligation to respect a wife’s personal integrity and dignity; it does not give the 
husband a power to violate her personal integrity and destroy her dignity’.70
For Justice Brennan, while sex is part of marriage, it is not the only part of it. 
Moreover, to say that it is part of marriage does not mean that a spouse must 
engage in sex at all times. There is a sense in which there is an obligation upon 
a spouse not to persistently and wilfully refuse sexual intercourse, but this is to 
acknowledge that consent is necessary for sex during marriage and not evidence 
for the view that a general consent is granted upon marriage:
The ecclesiastical courts never embraced the notion of a general consent 
to sexual intercourse given once and for all on marriage by either 
spouse. The doctrine of ecclesiastical courts was quite different, namely, 
that each spouse has a mutual right to sexual intercourse provided the 
right is exercised reasonably, subject to the health of the spouses and the 
65 R v L (1991) 174 CLR 392 (Brennan J).
66 Forster v Forster (1790) 161 ER 505 (Sir Willam Scott).
67 Forster v Forster (1790) 161 ER 508 (Sir Willam Scott).
68 Forster v Forster (1790) 161 ER 508 (Sir Willam Scott).
69 R v L (1991) 174 CLR 396 (Brennan J).
70 R v L (1991) 174 CLR 396 (Brennan J).
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exigencies of family life. It is a right to be exercised by consent. It is a 
right the exercise of which is intended to foster and maintain connubial 
love, not to be the occasion of abuse and degradation.71
Sex in marriage is therefore subject to many factors, consent foremost among 
them. Brennan’s opinion, quoted above, is extremely important because it 
acknowledges that there is a connection between sex and marriage, but it goes 
further and asserts that both are also connected to love. 
In the Shadow of R v L
The decision in R v L cannot, however, be taken as evidence that the connection 
between marriage and sex, and as sex being the right of a husband, has been 
completely severed in legal discourse. Both in England and in Australia, courts 
have shown a tendency to treat ‘relationship rape’ as a less serious offence than 
rape involving strangers. In England, for example, Warner shows that courts 
have developed a principle that a pre-existing sexual relationship between the 
rapist and his victim should operate as a mitigating factor.72 Mustill LJ in the 
leading case of Berry stated that rape of a former sexual partner makes it a less 
serious offence. He justified this principle on the ground that the ‘violation’ and 
‘defilement’ are less of a feature in such cases. He argues that relationship rape 
cases show that ‘in some instances the violation of the person and the defilement 
that are inevitable features where a stranger rapes a woman are not always 
present to the same degree when the offender and the victim had previously 
had a long-standing sexual relationship’.73 
This view exists also in Australia. For example, in R v Spencer, the Court said 
‘[g]enerally I would expect that if the parties were cohabitating at the time of 
the rape, this would go in mitigation of sentence, recognising the very special 
relationship between husband and wife’.74 The special relationship between 
husband and wife would require, it seems, a lower level of consent to sexual 
intercourse than in other relationships. And then there was the now infamous 
‘rougher than usual handling’ case, in which Judge Bollen sitting on the case of 
R v Johns in which a husband was tried for six counts of rape, said:
There is of course, nothing wrong with a husband faced with his wife’s 
initial refusal to engage in intercourse in attempting in an acceptable 
71 R v L (1991) 174 CLR 396 (Brennan J).
72 K Warner, ‘Sentencing in Cases of Marital Rape: Towards Changing the Male Imagination’ (2000) 20(4) 
Legal Studies 593–94.
73 Berry 1988 10 Cr App R (S) 15.
74 R v Spencer Queensland Court of Criminal Appeal CA no 80 unreported 1991.
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way to persuade her to change her mind and that may involve a measure 
of rougher than usual handling. It may be, in the end, that handling and 
persuasion will persuade the wife to agree.75
There also exist other situations where courts have displayed attitudes towards 
the meaning of consensual sex that sound alarm bells. Take, for example, cases 
of mistaken identity which appear to suggest not only that sex is an implied 
part of any intimate relationship but also that it requires a much lower level of 
negotiation and consent than sex in other situations. 
In the case R v George Allan Pryor,76 the victim thought she was having sex with 
her partner but found instead that a stranger had broken into her apartment, 
led her out of bed and had sex with her in the corridor. The victim realised her 
mistake when she reached up to touch his face and realised that the features 
were not those of her partner. She argued that it was rape as she had only 
consented to having sex on the mistaken belief that she was having sex with 
her partner. The man was charged with rape but appealed on the ground that 
she had consented. The Court reviewed a number of old authorities with similar 
facts, notably R v Jackson77 and R v Saunders.78 In both cases, the wife was 
asleep and submitted to advances made by a man that each woman believed 
to be her husband. In both cases, the Court held that it could not be rape as 
the women had consented to the act of sexual penetration. While in R v Allan 
Pryor the appeal against rape was not successful, one of the judges did adhere 
to the authorities above, claiming that rape rests upon the essential enquiry 
of whether there has been consent as to the nature and character of the act of 
sexual intercourse.79
This view is evidence of the assumed ease with which sex is assumed in 
marriage and marriage-like relationships. Consent, in these cases, did not 
need any words. In fact it seems that consciousness itself was not required 
for consent to occur. To accept this state of affairs one must view marriage as 
a relationship where sex occurs often and with little or no negotiation needed 
between the partners. The low threshold of consent that the law requires for 
such cases is questionable, even if it can be argued that it is merely reflecting 
social attitudes when it does so.80 
75 R v Johns South Australia Supreme Court unreported 26 August 1992, quoted in P Easteal, ‘Marital 
Rape Conflicting Constructions of Reality’ (1997) 3 Women Against Violence an Australian Feminist Journal 
26. Judge Bollen’s comments caused significant controversy in Australia, leading to a Senate Committee on 
Gender Bias and the Judiciary. See Graycar & Morgan, Hidden Gender of Law 361–62; Kaspiew, ‘Rape Lore: 
Legal Narrative and Sexual Violence’.
76 R v George Allan Pryor BC200105198 Supreme Court of Queensland unreported Aug 2001.
77 R v Jackson [1822] 8 Car & P 266.
78 R v Saunders [1838] 8 Car & P 266.
79 See Byrne J in R v George Allen Pryor.
80 Empirical studies suggest that a woman who has been forced to have sex with a partner might not see 
herself as a victim of rape with recourse to legal remedies. See N Naffine, ‘Windows on the Legal Mind’ 
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The above discussion makes one careful about how to characterise the law’s 
position in relation to sex in marriage and other intimate relationships. Some 
of the old common law principles (consortium vitae and conjugal rights) danced 
around the issue, while others (rape immunity) were brutally clear that it was 
to be considered as a duty by the wife to have sex with her husband. While R 
v L was a definite statement against this principle, some surrounding principles 
involving sex and relationships (lesser thresholds of consent cases), makes one 
cautious. The case of Re Kevin, however, adds some much needed clarity to the 
relationship between marriage and sex. 
The Case of Re Kevin
The case of Re Kevin saw sexual identity, sexual intercourse and procreation 
rejected as the central defining characteristics of modern marriage.
Kevin was born a female. At birth her gonads, genitalia and chromosomes 
were identified as female, but as far back as she could remember she felt 
herself to be male. Since 1994, she dressed and presented herself as male in 
all situations. In 1995 she began hormone treatment, in 1997 she underwent 
breast removal surgery, and in 1998 she underwent sex reassignment surgery, 
involving a total hysterectomy and a bilateral oophorectomy. In 1996 Kevin 
met her partner Jennifer. Jennifer fully supported Kevin’s transition from 
female to male. In August 1999 Kevin and Jennifer married and in November 
1999 Jennifer, who had become pregnant on an assisted fertility program, 
had a child. In 2003, during the appeal, Jennifer was pregnant with their 
second child. Kevin’s gender identity history was revealed to all official parties 
involved in the marriage and the conception of their child. Kevin applied to 
the Family Court in 2001 to have the marriage between himself and Jennifer 
validated. The Attorney General intervened in the proceedings arguing that 
the marriage could not be valid because it was not a marriage between a man 
741; ‘Possession’; Feminism and Criminology (Polity Press, Cambridge 1997). Patricia Easteal, in an empirical 
study, also found that some married women do not see their husbands wanting to have sex against their will 
as rape. See Easteal, ‘Marital Rape Conflicting Constructions of Reality’. Barton and Painter report that a 
survey conducted in the early 1990s in England, Wales and Scotland designed by the Middlesex Centre for 
Criminology showed that one in seven women thought it was their duty to have sex with their husbands 
even when they did not feel like it. C Barton & K Painter, ‘Rights and Wrongs of Marital Sex’ (1991) 141 
New Law Journal 394. One can certainly find evidence of this view in the press. For example, in March 2009, 
prominent Australian sex therapist Bettina Arndt urged women to say yes more often as a key to keeping 
marriages/relationships alive. In an article entitled ‘Women Need to Say Yes to Sex’, Bettina Arndt advises 
women to ‘just do it’. Apparently suggesting that women need not be bothered about desire when considering 
sex, she says: ‘Once the canoe is in the water, everyone starts happily paddling. For couples to experience 
regular, pleasurable sex and sustain loving relationships women must get over that ideological roadblock of 
assumptions about desire and “just do it”. The results will be both men and women will enjoy more, better 
sex.’ Canberra Times 2/03/09 http://www.canberratimes.com.au/news/opinion/editorial/general/women-
need-to-say-yes-to-sex/1447294.aspx#.
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and a woman. The Family Court ruled that for the purposes of the Marriage 
Act Kevin was a male and his marriage to Jennifer was therefore valid. This 
decision was affirmed on appeal in 2003 before a Full Court of the Family Law 
Court. 
Neither Kevin nor the Court argued against the idea that marriage must be between 
a man and woman. For Kevin, the point to prove was not that love and marriage 
could exist among same-sex couples, but rather that he was a man. The same-sex 
marriage issue was not considered in any way relevant to this case. Parliamentary 
debates on the 2004 amendment to the Marriage Act, however, showed that some 
MPs did read the decision as a threat to the ‘traditional’ definition of marriage as 
being between a man and a woman, and feared that the Court’s liberal reading of 
marriage for the purpose of recognising transgender marriage might be read as a 
sign for a possible liberal attitude toward same-sex marriage.81
The argument for the Court in this case was whether Kevin was a man, but along 
the way much was said about the meaning of marriage in modern Australia. 
While the focus was on sex as sexual identity, the arguments led to discussion 
on the centrality of procreation and sexual intercourse in marriage.
The Legal Arguments and the Decision
 The Attorney General in Re Kevin82 argued the following propositions in relation 
to the meaning of marriage:
• That marriage was to be given the meaning embodied in the Marriage Act of 
1961 which implied that marriage was a union for life between a man and a 
woman. 
• The meaning of marriage was to be given the meaning it held in 1961 when 
the Act was passed, and not, according to current cultural and social factors. 
• That marriage was understood to embody Judeo-Christian teachings and, as 
such, was closely tied with the procreation and care of children. 
Assent to all of these propositions would therefore rule out the recognition of 
the relationship between Kevin and Jennifer as well as the future recognition of 
‘other’ relationships such as same-sex marriages.
The Full Court of the Family Law Court rejected all of the above arguments. In 
relation to the Marriage Act being a code for the meaning of marriage (as well as 
81 Liberal Party Senator, Guy Barnett said that ‘the issue of marriage has been raised in Australia recently 
in a number of ways, including in the Family Court case of Kevin and Jennifer. The Full Court said that the 
words “marriage” and “man” in the Marriage Act have a contemporary everyday meaning. Are we going to 
allow the longstanding definition of marriage to be interpreted out of the context in which it was written?’ 
Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates Senate June 17 2004 (Guy Barnett) http://parlinfoweb.aph.gov.au/
piweb/view_document.aspx?ID=2014889 accessed 15/05/2008.
82 Re Kevin (Validity of Marriage of Transsexual) (No2) [2203] Fam CA 94.
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‘man’ and ‘woman’) the Court said that it could not be so. Given that the terms 
had not been defined in the Act, the Court claimed therefore that it had a duty 
to interpret these terms in relation to ‘contemporary’, ‘normal’ and ‘everyday’ 
meanings. Furthermore, the Court did not see any use in the argument that 
marriage is a concept whose meaning is fixed in time: 
We think it plain that the social and legal institution of marriage as it 
pertains to Australia has undergone transformations that are referable to 
the environment and period in which the particular changes occurred. 
The concept of marriage therefore cannot in our view, be correctly said 
to be one that is ever frozen in time … There is no historical justification 
to support Mr Burnmester’s contention that the meaning of marriage 
should be understood by reference to a particular point in time in the 
past such as 1961. To the contrary, it lends support to the arguments … 
that the meaning of the term should be given its contemporary meaning 
in the context of the Marriage Act.
This argument is further strengthened by an examination of the Court’s approach 
to the interpretation of the constitutional marriage power. The Full Court 
examined the different approaches taken by the High Court in the interpretation 
of the marriage power and found that while there were conservative approaches 
expressed by Brennan J in Fisher v Fisher83 and R v L,84 there were also more 
liberal approaches such as the view of McHugh J in Re Wakin; exparte McNally 
where, quite coincidentally, McHugh J uses the very example of same-sex 
marriage to argue for an expansive approach to the constitutional interpretation 
of the marriage power:
in 1901 ‘marriage’ was seen as meaning a voluntary union of life 
between one man and one woman to the exclusion of all others. If that 
level of abstraction was now accepted, it would deny the parliament of 
the Commonwealth power to legislate for same sex marriages, although 
arguably marriage now means, or in the near future may mean, a 
voluntary union for life between two people to the exclusion of others.85
The Full Court accepted that the constitutional power of marriage should be 
given a broader interpretation:
[I]t seems to us that we should not in this case adopt the narrow 
interpretation of marriage … it seems to be inconsistent with the 
approach of the High Court to the interpretation of other heads of 
Commonwealth power to place marriage in a special category, frozen 
83 Fisher v Fisher (1986) 161 CLR 438.
84 R v L (1991) 174 CLR 379.
85 McHugh in Re Wakin; exparte McNally (1999) 198 CLR 511, Re Kevin no 2 para 96.
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in time to 1901. We therefore approach the matter on the basis that it is 
within the power of parliament to regulate marriages in Australia that 
are outside the monogamistic Christian tradition.86
In the above statement, we see not only approval for a broad legal interpretation 
of what constitutes marriage but also a rejection of the idea that marriage is to 
be considered primarily as a Christian institution. The Court said that, while 
there has been an undoubted relationship between Christianity and marriage, 
the relationship in contemporary law is such that we cannot see marriage only 
in a religious context. The Court points out that it is the role of the State rather 
than the Church that is paramount in the legal regulation of marriage. One 
can get married without the church, for example, but not without the state. 
Furthermore, it is accepted as legitimate that the state regulates marriage in 
ways that have over the years redefined the institution. As discussed elsewhere, 
the status of women in marriage has been radically altered by legal reforms 
such as the recognition of women’s economic capacity and their human rights 
against violence and rape. The state has similarly altered the idea of marriage as 
a life-long relationship by facilitating divorce, and has removed the privileged 
position of marriage by legitimating de facto relationships and children born 
out of wedlock.
The Court also considered and rejected the idea that procreation was the 
underpinning of modern marriage. In the first of the Re Kevin87 cases the trial 
judge accepted that there is a general sense in which marriage is connected to 
the generation of children, but he was prepared to accept the different ways 
that one could do this in a modern society. He was prepared to accept, for 
example, that the generation of children was not limited to the traditional 
model of biological parents conceiving and giving birth without the assistance 
of reproductive technologies, adoption and surrogacy agreements. In fact, 
Jennifer and Kevin were testimony to this fact, as they were bringing up 
children. Justice Chisholm stated:
Given that marriage is a social and legal institution which includes 
people who are infertile or by reason of illness or otherwise are unable to 
engage in genital penetrative intercourse, it seems to me odd, rather than 
self evident, to treat capacity for genital intercourse as ‘the essential’ 
role of a woman (or man) in marriage.88
In Re Kevin No 2 the Full Court said:
We accept as did the trial Judge, that marriage has a particular status. 
Like the trial Judge, we reject the argument that one of the principal 
86 Re Kevin (Validity of Marriage of Transsexual) (No 2) [2203] Fam CA 94 para 99–100.
87 Re Kevin (Validity of Marriage of Transsexual) [2001] Fam CA 1074.
88 Re Kevin (Validity of Marriage of Transsexual) [2001] Fam CA 1074 para 95.
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purposes of marriage is procreation. Many people procreate outside 
of marriage and many people who are married neither procreate, nor 
contemplate doing so. A significant number of married persons cannot 
procreate either at the time of marriage or subsequently — an obvious 
example being a post-menopausal woman. Similarly, it is inappropriate 
and incorrect to suggest that consummation is in any way a requirement 
to the creation of a valid marriage.89
In its argument, the Family Court also considered the English decision of Corbett 
v Corbett90 where a marriage between a male to female transsexual and a male 
did not receive legal validation. Whilst the Corbett case was finally overwritten 
by legislation in the UK in 2004,91 at the time of the Re Kevin decision it was 
still the authoritative case in the UK concerning transsexual marriage and the 
Attorney General in Re Kevin had been adamant that it should be followed here 
in Australia.92 
Justice Ormrod in the Corbett case said that sex is determined at birth according 
to genitalia, gonads and chromosomes. The construction of an artificial vagina 
through surgery and the growth of breasts as a result of hormone treatment 
could not alter one’s ‘true sex’. For Ormrod J, marriage must be dependent 
upon one’s ‘true sex’ because it is only then that the true function of marriage, 
procreation, can be realised. In this way Justice Ormond is not only centralising 
sexual identity in marriage but also heterosexual sexual intercourse, because 
it alone can lead to conception and birth. It is worth quoting his reasoning at 
length to show precisely how he arrives at this position:
[S]ex is clearly an essential determinant of the relationship called 
marriage, because it is and always has been recognised as the union 
of man and woman. It is the institution on which the family is built, 
and in which the capacity for natural heterosexual intercourse is 
an essential element. It has of course, many other characteristics, for 
which companionship and mutual support is an important one, but the 
characteristics which distinguish it from all other relationships can only 
be met by two people of opposite sex … since marriage is essentially a 
relationship between a man and a woman, the validity of the marriage 
in this case depends, in my judgement, on whether the respondent is or 
89 Re Kevin (Validity of Marriage of Transsexual) (No 2) [2203] Fam CA 94 para 153.
90 Corbett v Corbett (otherwise Ashley) [1970] 2 All ER 33.
91 The Corbett case received affirmation in Bellinger v Bellinger [2001] EWCA Civ 1140, however, both cases 
were subsequently overridden by the passing of the Gender Recognition Act UK 2004, which was passed 
as a response to the decision by the European Court of Human Rights in Christine Goodwin and I v United 
Kingdom (28957/1995).
92 Its status in Australian law had up to that point been equivocal. Andrew Neville Sharp has described 
the Corbett decision as an undercurrent in Australian law. ‘The Transsexual Marriage: Law’s Contradictory 
Desires’ (1997) 7 Australasian Gay and Lesbian Law Journal 4.
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is not a woman … the question then becomes what is meant by ‘woman’ 
in the context of a marriage, for I am not concerned to determine the 
‘legal sex’ of the respondent at large. Having regard to the essentially 
heterosexual character of the relationship which is called marriage, 
the criteria must, in my judgement, be biological, for even the most 
extreme degree of transsexualism in a male or the most severe hormonal 
imbalance which can exist in a person with male chromosomes, male 
gonads and male genitalia cannot reproduce a person who is capable of 
performing the essential role of woman in marriage.93
Justice Ormond here not only argues that one’s sex is determined permanently 
at birth, but also that marriage relies upon the heterosexual sex act for its 
legitimacy, as that act alone has the potential to lead to procreation. The Court 
thus spent a considerable period of time establishing whether the couple had had 
sex, and what the nature of the sexual act had been between them. The Court 
was concerned to establish not only whether penetration had occurred but also 
whether there had been orgasm. But the Family Court was not convinced by the 
reasoning in Corbett.
Sex and Marriage and Love
 In both the first and the second Re Kevin cases, the Family Court rejected Corbett 
and its essentialising of sexual identity and the capacity for sexual intercourse 
and procreation. In fact, Justice Chisholm was critical of Justice Ormrod’s 
approach in the case, saying that in his opinion it presents a ‘remarkable focus on 
the mechanics of genital sexual activity’.94 He goes on to question the approach 
more specifically and asks:
‘[W]hat is the essential role of a woman in marriage’? Does it require 
a capacity for sexual activities? If so, precisely which activities? Is a 
woman who is unable to have genital intercourse because of illness or 
disability unable to perform her ‘essential role’? Further, why should it 
be assumed that ‘the essential role of a woman’ in marriage is concerned 
merely with matters of sex and biological sexual constitution?
He quotes with approval Gordon Samuels’s criticism of Justice Ormrod’s approach:
[T]here is no reason to suppose that she could not provide the 
companionship and support which one spouse ordinarily renders to 
the other. She could not conceive and bear children. But it is not the 
law that marriage is not consummated unless children are procreated 
93 Ormond J in Corbett v Corbett (otherwise Ashley) [1970] 2 All ER 33.
94 Re Kevin (Validity of Marriage of Transsexual) [2001] Fam CA 1074 para 94.
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or that procreation of children is the principal end of marriage. Hence 
the female spouse’s ability or willingness to produce children is not a 
necessary incident of a valid marriage.95
Samuels’ reasoning was similarly quoted with approval by the Full Court in 
the second Re Kevin case, where the Court said that it represented the modern 
approach to marriage.96
In rejecting Corbett, the Family Court in Re Kevin argued that procreation and sex 
are only aspects of marriage and are not necessarily the defining characteristics 
of the relationship. The Court claimed that there has been a considerable shift 
in the community away from ‘purely sexual aspects of marriage in the direction 
of defining it in terms of companionship’.97 This is evident in the FLA reforms 
discussed earlier. 
The Full Court also draws upon the R v L decision by the High Court and 
quotes with approval Mason CJ Deane and Toohey JJ’s position which similarly 
disengages marriage from sex:
[W]hatever the scope of the power of the parliament to make laws with 
respect to marriage, it is apparent that the Commonwealth Act does 
not attempt comprehensively to regulate the rights and obligations 
to consent to sexual intercourse by a party to a marriage. Refusal to 
consummate a marriage is no longer a ground for dissolution. In one 
of the early decisions on the Commonwealth Act, the Family Court 
accepted that sexual intercourse between the parties to a marriage may 
have ceased without the marriage having broken down irretrievably.98
Re Kevin therefore represents a significant statement by an Australian court in 
relation to the significance of sexual activity and its (dis)connection to marriage. 
But what does it say about love?
Re Kevin is an important case for the legal recognition of love in marriage, not 
because of its assertions but because of its silences. The case told us that marriage 
does not have to be about procreation and it does not have to be about having sex. 
It told us  that marriage can have multiple meanings. The Court acknowledged 
that marriage varies according to age (menopausal women unable to procreate, 
for example), and to disposition (not wishing to procreate, for example). In all 
of these ways, the Court removed traditional meanings of marriage and left 
a silence around its meaning, a silence which, given the strength of the love 
rhetoric that exists in other discourses of marriage, can be readily implied here.
95 G Samuels, ‘Transsexualism’ (1983) 16 Australian Journal of Forensic Sciences 62.
96 Re Kevin (Validity of Marriage of Transsexual) (No 2) [2203] Fam CA 94 78128.
97 Re Kevin (Validity of Marriage of Transsexual) (No 2) [2203] Fam CA 94 para 38.
98 Mason et al R v L quoted in Re Kevin (Validity of Marriage of Transsexual) (No2) [2203] Fam CA 94 para 294.
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Conclusion
There has been a shift in the law in relation to sex and marriage. Old legal 
principles clearly asserted that sex is an essential part of marriage. In 
describing sex, judges have used phrases such as ‘the society of the wife’99 or, 
more inclusively, ‘mutual society’.100 However, when it comes to describing 
the importance of sex in marriage judges have said that it is a ‘marital duty 
inseparable from it’,101 ‘the essence of the marriage relationship’,102 and a ‘duty 
that belongs to the very institution of marriage’.103 In one instance, a Court 
described a situation where there was no sexual intercourse as a relationship in 
which a husband would be ‘a husband in name only’.104 These decisions imply 
that sexual intercourse not only defines marriage but also the very identity of 
‘husband’. When we take these views alongside the marital rape immunity, the 
only reading of the old law that makes sense is that a husband had an unlimited 
right to have sex with his wife. The law enforced the power of men and the 
subordination of women, and sex was simply one expression of that reality.105
But these principles have been beaten back by more recent cases. The decision of 
R v L unequivocally removed the right of a husband to have sex at his pleasure 
and Re Kevin asserted that neither sex (identity and intercourse), nor procreation 
form the essential part of modern Australian marriage. To some extent, these 
cases reflect the changes that have occurred in society to the institution of sex. 
As discussed in the introduction, sex has come to be seen as a legitimate activity 
engaged in for pleasure. It is disconnected from marriage and from procreation, 
and forms its own distinct narrative.106 But where is the love? So far I have argued 
that there is both a distinction and a connection between love and sex and, in 
turn, marriage. The relationship between love and sex has undergone various 
permutations. In Ancient Greece, sex could be an expression of love, but love 
was primarily seen as the attainment of knowledge and goodness. In contrast, 
Christianity saw sex as largely negative, barely tolerated even in marriage and 
then only for procreation. Courtly love and romantic love legitimated sexual 
pleasure per se, a project that (despite its problems) reached its fruition with 
the sexual revolution of the 1960s. The link between marriage and procreation 
inevitably makes sex an essential part of marriage. This connection is still 
99 Birmingham Southern Railway Co v Lintner (1904) 141 ALA 420.
100 Bartlett v Bartlett (1933) 50 CLR 23.
101 Synge v Synge [1900–03] All ER Rep 461.
102 Bartlett v Bartlett (1933) 50 CLR 23.
103 Forster v Forster (1790) 1 Hag Con 144.
104 Synge v Synge [1900–03] All ER Rep 461.
105 See Kathryn MacKinnon, discussed earlier.
106 It can also be argued that, as a result of the sexual revolution and the gay liberation movements, sex has 
become disconnected from gender and sexuality.
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strong,107 but, as we have seen in legal judgements considered in this chapter, 
mutual sexual pleasure, rather than the mere act of copulation has come, over 
time, to be seen as an essential feature of a successful marriage. Sex has been 
transformed from a duty of marriage undergone for the sake of procreation and 
as a service of the wife to the husband, to something which is negotiated and 
consensual, at the heart of which lies, to use Justice Brennan’s words, ‘connubial 
love’.108 These cases are not enough to assert that sex is no longer a part of 
marriage, but rather that it alone cannot be so central. Sex can be linked to 
procreation, to consent, to personal satisfaction, but Justice Brennan also links 
it to love, and this is important for the central argument of the book. 
Love is reflected in the new discourse of sex and marriage in a number of 
explicit and implicit ways. Above we saw that love is explicitly mentioned in 
the two cases of R v L and Bartlett v Bartlett. These cases reflect the romantic 
discourse that sex is an expression of love; as love is a mutual feeling so too must 
sex be mutual and consensual and pleasurable. It can be argued that love also 
emerges implicitly in the Re Kevin case. By rejecting some traditional meanings 
of marriage this case left a silence about the meaning of marriage. Given the 
strength of the rhetoric of romantic love in the popular discourse of marriage 
documented earlier in the book, it is a legitimate conclusion that Re Kevin left 
open the idea that marriage is about love more than anything else.
The introduction of love to both marriage and sex would suggest that a 
liberating and more equal relationship between men and women is now the 
model of marriage before us. However, more legal evidence is needed before we 
can say that sex in marriage has become imbued with the ideology of love and is 
seen as an expression of love, delivering mutual satisfaction, negotiated under 
equal conditions. The two cases of R v L and Re Kevin discussed in this chapter 
certainly come close to asserting this to be the case. Their history and context, 
however, make one cautious. Before jumping to this conclusion one must also 
remember the feminist critique of love and the oppressive reading of love that 
emerges from it. We need to be cognisant of the fact that the removal of sex and 
insertion of love in the legal discourse of marriage might not necessarily have 
the desired effect, it may simply be a new form of oppression. 
107 This is especially the case in the same-sex marriage debates.
108 R v L (1991) 174 CLR 396 (Brennan J).
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3. The Continuing Importance of 
Economic Factors
I see you are open for business so let’s to church1
Introduction
In the previous chapter, I analysed the legal discourse of marriage in relation 
to what has been one of its most fundamental defining aspects — sexual 
intercourse — and argued that there has been a very significant change in 
the discourse of marriage, with love beginning to be insinuated. This chapter 
will turn to the equally important association of marriage with economic and 
financial considerations. Marriage has traditionally been connected to wealth, 
property and economic welfare, and has represented the economic union of 
two parties. This chapter asks what role love plays in the law when we consider 
it alongside the economic, commercial and financial aspects of marriage, and 
shows that, despite the acknowledgement of romantic love in this discourse, 
traditional meanings remain strong.
Despite the many obvious economic, financial and business aspects of marriage, 
the law is careful to retain a distinction between the market place and the home. 
The economic exchanges that occur between intimates can neither be completely 
commercialised nor completely ignored. This chapter examines the case of 
Garcia v the National Australia Bank, which is much discussed in Australian 
legal literature. This case represents the struggle that the law can face in this 
context. The case reaffirmed a principle, established in Yerkey v Jones,2 that a 
married woman who had signed a guarantee for her husband’s business and who 
did not know its full effect at the time, could avoid the guarantee. In reaffirming 
the principle, the majority of the full Court of the High Court of Australia 
rejected calls to remove an ‘archaic’ and ‘discriminatory’ principle in favour of 
what they saw as protecting a married woman who found herself in a position 
of disadvantage because she had placed ‘trust and confidence’ in her husband.
The case received much attention for the ways in which it changed banking 
practices, extended the principle of unconscionability in Australian law, and 
affirmed the role of Equity in commercial law, as well as the extent to which 
it replicated an outdated mode of gender relations in a modern Australian 
1  John Madden, Shakespeare in Love (Universal Studios, 2004).
2 Yerkey v Jones (1939) 63 CLR 649.
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marriage.3 It is this final point that makes this case central to the analysis in this 
book. Discussion here will focus on the case’s representation of marriage, and 
will question the role it affords to love within marriage. While the case does 
not mention love specifically, I will argue that love forms part of the meaning of 
marriage via the elements of trust and confidence which were considered crucial 
to marriage by the Court in the case.
The rhetoric of modern romantic love and marriage, as discussed in chapter one, 
is rarely associated with practical considerations such as compatibility due to 
economic circumstances, class and education. Indeed, as previously discussed, 
romantic love is conceived as a liberation from such considerations.4 The extent 
to which this represents reality is debatable.5 Nevertheless, the rhetoric is 
that love is above all such considerations. The case of Garcia represents more 
than a recognition that marriage is of economic consequence, it also represents 
an example of how economic and business dealings become entangled with 
emotional issues in a marriage; how incompatible they can be with each other, 
and what disadvantage they can cause. In this way, the case recognises both of 
the faces of love that I identified earlier: the liberating and the oppressive. 
The Economic Discourse of Marriage and the 
Law
Marriage needs to be understood within an economic paradigm. Stone6 argues 
that the legal requirement that marriage should be registered and performed 
publicly was initially motivated by a desire by wealthy families to prevent their 
children from making unsuitable matches with members of the lower classes, 
3  Among the 60 or more articles written on Garcia, see G Williams, ‘Equitable Principles for the Protection 
of Vulnerable Guarantors: Is the Principle in Yerkey v Jones Still Needed?’ (1994) 8 Journal of Contract Law 
67–83; B Fehlberg, ‘The Husband, the Bank, the Wife and her Signature’ (1994) 57 Modern Law Review 467–75 
and ‘The Husband, the Bank, the Wife and her Signature the Sequel’ (1996) 59 Modern Law Review 675–694; 
B Collier, ‘The Rule in Yerkey v Jones: Fundamental Principles and Fundamental Problems’ (1996) 4 Australian 
Property Law Journal 181–222; Su-King Hii, ‘From Yerkey to Garcia: 60 years on and Still as Confused as 
Ever!’ (1997) 7 Australian Property Law Journal 47–75; K Green & H Lim, ‘Weaving Along the Borders: Public 
and Private, Women and Banks’ in S Scott-Hunt & H Lim (eds), Feminist Perspectives on Equity and Trusts 
(Cavendish, London 2001) 85–109; E Stone, ‘Infants, Lunatics and Married Women: Equitable Protection in 
Garcia v National Australia Bank’ (1999) 62 Modern Law Review 604–613; R Haigh & S Hepburn, ‘Bank 
Manager Always Rings Twice: Stereotyping in Equity After Garcia’ (2000) 26 Monash University Law Review 
275–311; K Dunn, ‘Yakking Giants’: Equality Discourse in the High Court’ (2000) 24 Melbourne University 
Law Review 427–461; J Pascoe, ‘Women Who Guarantee Company Debts: Wife or Director?’ (2003) 8 Deakin 
Law Review 13–48; T Wright, ‘The Special Wives’ Equity and the Struggle for Women’s Equality’ (2006) 31(2) 
Alternative Law Journal 66– 69, 87.
4 See discussion on the meaning of love in the introduction. 
5 See Illouz, Consuming the Romantic Utopia: Love and the Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism (University 
of California Press, Berkeley 1997), Bix, ‘Bargaining in the Shadow of Love: The Enforcement of Premarital 
Agreements and How We Think About Marriage’ (1998–1999) 40 William & Mary Law Review 145–208.
6 See L Stone, Uncertain Unions: Marriage in England, 1660–1753 (Oxford University Press, Oxford 1992).
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thus diminishing the economic value of the family’s accumulated wealth.7 
Economic considerations remain a large part of making marriage decisions. Bix 
argues, that despite the rhetoric, economic security is still a factor in people’s 
decision of who to marry, even if it is framed in terms of who to fall in love with 
rather than who to marry. He suggests that whether acknowledged or not, most 
marriages have elements of both love and economic utility: ‘that a partner can 
offer security may be part of his or her romantic allure’.8
Eva Illouz makes a similar argument, drawing from empirical studies in America. 
She shows that marriage is still considered to be a strategy of investment, 
embodying issues of economics and class:9 
Under capitalism, social relations are characterized by class stratification and 
individual competition; marriage bonds are formed in this context and sustain 
rather than disrupt it … Marriage is often still a search for a partner with 
the ‘best available assets’, and the affectionate marriage has paradoxically 
enough instituted a ‘market point of view’ in romantic relationships.10
There are many obvious examples, both historical and current, where the 
courts are forced to confront the economic value of marriage. In the past, courts 
placed a monetary value on marriage in cases of loss of consortium and breach 
of promise to marry.11 Furthermore, the economic value of marriage is implied 
in many other less visible ways; for example, in the ‘marriage discount’ used to 
calculate damages in tort cases based on the chance of a woman remarrying.12 
The increasing recognition of prenuptial agreements is a further example of the 
‘economic thinking’ that takes place between prospective marriage partners. 
Yet, despite these many examples, the dominant approach in law is to retain a 
distinction between the market and the home. The most illustrative example of 
this is the contract law presumption of intention against the legality of agreements 
arising in the domestic social sphere, which is still quoted with authority 
almost 100 years after it received its first judicial utterance. The case of Balfour 
v Balfour13 established a presumption that promises made between husbands 
and wives, even when they pertain to the economic arrangements between 
them, have no legal weight as they are promises made only in consideration 
of love. The leading judgement of Lord Justice Aitken relies on the arguments 
that a contract cannot exist between a husband and a wife because there is no 
7 Stone, Uncertain Unions 32–34. See also Coontz, Marriage: A History 177–178.
8 Bix, ‘Bargaining in the Shadow of Love’ 162.
9 See P Johnson & S Lawler, ‘Coming Home to Love and Class’ Sociological Research Online (2005) 10(3) 
www.socresonline.org.uk/10/3/johnson.html accessed 16/10/2009.
10  Illouz, Consuming the Romantic Utopia 197.
11 M Thornton has looked at these issues in ‘Loss of Consortium’. See also M Thornton, ‘Historicising 
Citizenship: Remembering Broken Promises’ (1995–1996) 20 Melbourne University Law Review 1072–1086.
12  See M Thornton, ‘Rapunzel and the Lure of Equal Citizenship’ (2004) 8 Law Text Culture 231–262.
13  Balfour v Balfour [1919] 2 KB 571.
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intention between the parties to be legally bound.14 He argued that it was not 
within the parties’ contemplation to have their agreement litigated because of 
the nature of their relationship. He said that the common law ‘does not regulate 
the form of agreements between spouses. Their promises are not sealed with 
seals and wax. The consideration that really obtains for them is that natural 
love and affection which counts so little in these cold courts.’15 This distinction 
is justified on the ground that behaviour in the home is motivated by different 
values than behaviour in the market. The philosophical underpinnings of 
commercial activity, and therefore commercial law, can be found in a number of 
principles that emphasise self-interest. Peason and Fisher, for example, list the 
following as the principles of commercial law: party autonomy, predictability, 
flexibility, good faith, the encouragement of self-help, the facilitation of security 
interests, and the protection of vested interests. The protection of vulnerable 
parties is also listed, but as an equitable principle rather than a common law 
one.16 These are in turn visible in more specific guiding legal principles such 
as the ‘freedom to contract’ principle that assumes that contracting individuals 
are free and rational, and motivated only by a wish to maximise their interest. 
Another is the principle ‘caveat emptor’ (buyer beware), which imposes upon 
buyers a responsibility to look after their own interest. Another is the principle 
that the law will not interfere in cases of mistake, generally letting the loss lay 
where it falls.17
All of these principles are generally considered to be out of place in an intimate 
family relationship. Frances Olsen, for example, argues that marriage and 
family are founded upon an ethic of altruism. ‘Neither husband nor wife are 
expected to pursue selfish interests over the other’.18 Sharing and self-sacrifice 
are considered appropriate behaviour. That this is, in reality, what happens has 
been well documented by Belinda Fehlberg, who found that, overwhelmingly, 
women in family businesses saw themselves as playing a support role, and that 
the justification for that role came from the love and affection they felt for their 
husbands. A typical articulation of this was from one subject in the Fehlberg 
study, Ms Fenwick, who said ‘when you love someone, you just do what they 
14 Ironically, at the same time as arguing that married couples never contemplate litigation to enforce 
agreements between them, the second reason for denying the existence of a contract is the floodgates 
argument. Aitken LJ argued that without such a presumption the number of small courts in the country 
would have to be ‘multiplied by one hundredfold’, thus appearing to contradict his first argument. The final 
argument Aitken relies on for the presumption is the old private sphere chestnut. As he famously stated, ‘each 
house is a domain into which the King’s writ does not seek to run, into which his officers do not seek to be 
admitted’. Balfour v Balfour 579.
15  Balfour v Balfour [1919] 2 KB 579 (Aitken LJ).
16 G Pearson and S Fisher, Commercial Law: Commentary and Material (LawBook Company, NSW 2009) 7–14.
17 See non est factum case Gallie v Lee [1971] AC 1004 and unilateral mistake case Taylor v Johnson (1983) 
151 CLR 422.
18 F Olsen, ‘The Family and the Market a Study of Ideology and Legal Reform’ (1983) 96 Harvard Law 
Review 131.
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ask you to do’,19 adding that ‘loyalty is the main thing, isn’t it? … it would 
be totally disloyal not to [sign]’.20 Other wives in the study were motivated 
by a desire to sustain the family, avoid conflict, and demonstrate loyalty and 
trust.21 For some women this requirement was so strong that they did not see 
themselves as having any choice but to defer to their husband’s requests. Mrs 
Elliot, for example, said that ‘you have a choice whether you’re going to stay 
married or not, and that’s really what you’re down to, isn’t it?’22
There is nothing problematic per se in a discourse of economic union and altruistic 
behaviour, were it not for the fact that it is inextricably linked to traditional 
gender roles patriarchy and unequal power, and thus ends up disadvantaging 
women. The fact of the matter is that the dominant marriage model places 
women at home and men at work.23 The work that they perform is seen as part 
of the bargain of love and has no political and economic value. Men’s work, on 
the other hand, might just as equally be done for love but it has the added value 
of bestowing upon the giver economic and political value. As Thornton puts 
it, ‘nurturing and housework have conventionally been perceived as a natural 
part of cohabitation and the conceptualisation of what women do in the home 
is deemed to be of no value in economic terms’.24 To redress this imbalance, 
feminists have been arguing for a re-evaluation of the ‘caring’ work that women 
do,25 including agitating for placing a dollar value on all of the work done in 
the ‘home’ mostly by women, including placing a value on sexual intercourse.26 
This creates some interesting reflections for the approach law should take in 
acknowledging and regulating the economic and the emotional aspects of 
19 Fehlberg, Sexually Transmitted Debt 148.
20 Fehlberg, Sexually Transmitted Debt 182.
21 Fehlberg, Sexually Transmitted Debt 174, 187.
22 Felbergh, Sexually Transmitted Debt 182.
23  This model is still mostly true. Even if women participate in the workforce they are still more likely 
than men to be part-time workers and are more likely than men to spend periods of time away from work 
while at home caring for children. According to Australian Bureau of Statistics figures published on a 
NSW government website, in 1966 women made up 31 per cent of the NSW workforce, while in 1995 they 
constituted just under 43 per cent of the workforce. (ABS Catalogue No. 4107.1) In August 1995, 52.1 per cent 
of all women in NSW aged over 15 years were participating in the labour force (the national female average was 
54 per cent). This was significantly lower than the equivalent male participation rate, which was 72.7 per cent 
(ABS Catalogue No. 6201.1). Women’s levels of participation in the labour market vary during their working 
lives. The participation rate of married women is lower during the childbearing age range of 25–34 years (ABS 
Catalogue No. 4107.1). In 1995, just below 40 per cent of employed women in NSW worked on a part-time 
basis. Women made up about 75 per cent of all part-time employees in NSW (ABS Catalogue No 6201.1). http://
www.industrialrelations.nsw.gov.au/About_NSW_IR/Issues_and_policy/Archive/Pay_equity_inquiry/
Womens_pay_and_employment_patterns.html accessed 27/07/10.
24 Thornton, ‘Intention to Contract Public Act or Private Sentiment’ in N Naffine R Owens J Williams (eds), 
Intention in Law and Philosophy (Ashgate, Aldershot 2001) 231.
25  See C Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development (Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge Massachusetts 1982); N Noddings, Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral 
Education (New York Teachers College Press, Berkely 1984); M A Fineman, The Neutered Mother: The Sexual 
Family and Other Twentieth Century Tragedies (Routledge, New York 1995).
26 See L R Hirshman & J E Larson, Hard Bargains: The Politics of Sex (Oxford University Press, New York 1999). 
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intimacy in general, and marriage specifically.27 Elaine Hasday points to two 
traditions within the legal system, the first and more prominent is what she 
terms an anti-commodification stance, which deems that economic exchange 
between intimates is inappropriate and therefore should not be enforced. This 
view that is in keeping with the contract law presumptions against contracts 
entered into between intimates. The second position is termed a ‘pro-market’ 
position, which sees the super-imposition of an economic model upon an 
intimate relationship as a way for law to achieve a more equal relationship 
between people. Hasday argues that both of these positions underestimate the 
extent to which law already regulates economic exchanges. In marriage, while 
careful not to reduce the institution to a corporation, legal precedent tends to 
recognise agreements that fulfil certain characteristics: those that recognise the 
joint interests of husband and wife rather than their individual interests, and 
those that do not take a direct specific exchange model.28 Hasday claims that 
in this way the law recognises that intimate relationships are neither wholly 
spontaneous nor completely free of bargaining.29 An example of the law’s task 
in this area is the Case of Garcia. 
The Case of Garcia
Jean Garcia was married to Fabio Garcia in 1970. They had two children. Jean 
Garcia had a diploma in physiotherapy and ran her own practice. Fabio Garcia 
had a Master of Business Administration from Harvard University and during 
their marriage ran a range of companies involved in foreign exchange and gold 
import and export. By the time the case came to Court, the Garcias had divorced. 
The dispute involved some guarantees and a mortgage over the family home that 
Jean Garcia had signed with the National Bank of Australia to guarantee some 
loans for her husband’s company, ‘Citizen Gold’.
Economic Relationship
Jean and Fabio each conducted their own businesses. While it appears that 
Fabio had little to do with Jean’s physiotherapy practice, Jean was named as 
a second director in some of Fabio’s companies to fulfil formal company law 
requirements,30 and was therefore required to have a formal involvement in 
27 See Viviana Zelizer, ‘The Purchase of Intimacy’ (2000) 25 Law and Social Inquiry 817–848; ‘Payments and 
Social Ties’ (1996) 11 Sociological Forum 481–495.
28 J E Hasday, ‘Intimacy and Economic Exchange’ (2005) 119 Harvard Law Review 491–530.
29 Hasday, ‘Intimacy and Economic Exchange’ 459.
30 Corporation laws in the 1990s required companies to have more than one director, in fact, two or three 
were required depending on the type of company in question. Many small family companies fulfilled this legal 
requirement by naming a spouse as a director. Corporations Law 1990 s221 (1). This was reformed in the First 
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Fabio’s affairs, this involvement consisting primarily of signing documents, 
which she mostly did without discussion. In fact, evidence showed that she was 
so little aware of what she was signing that her signature was forged from time 
to time, with her knowledge, by Fabio.
In 1984, upon the liquidation of one of Fabio’s companies, Jean appeared before 
the Registrar of the Supreme Court of NSW, who accepted that Jean had little 
knowledge of, or actual role, in the affairs of her husband’s company and 
cautioned her against signing documents without knowing what they were about 
in the future. Subsequently, Jean began to take more notice but would still mostly 
follow her husbands’ requests to simply sign documents. Often Fabio asked her 
to sign documents when she was in a hurry rushing out of the door to meet 
an appointment with a client and making it difficult for her to make necessary 
inquiries. On the occasions that Jean tried to ask questions about Fabio’s business 
matters, he would reply that she understood little about how business and markets 
worked and that she should leave business decisions to him.
Earnings from Fabio’s businesses fluctuated. The nature of the business meant 
that the bank account could be in credit by six figures one day and in debit by 
a similar amount shortly after. When business was going well, as in 1985, Fabio 
would contribute more to the family income and expenditure, paying school 
fees and depositing money into their joint account, but this was not a constant 
state of affairs. In short, the evidence presented showed that Fabio’s companies 
were the total creation, and in his total control. Fabio and Jean owned a family 
home. This home was built by the couple on some land that Jean bought in 1971 
with the help of her father. Jean transferred half of the interest in the land to 
Fabio in order to have his name on the title for borrowing purposes, but he paid 
nothing for this interest. They jointly borrowed the money to build the house 
upon that land.
Emotional Relationship
The emotional relationship between Fabio and Jean was not close. He would 
often come home late and eat his dinner while watching television. Fabio seemed 
moody and was often unkind to Jean, suggesting that she was unsophisticated 
and ignorant of business affairs. Evidence showed that Fabio had been having 
an affair for a number of years and he eventually left Jean to live with his lover.
The relationship between husband and wife had been quite strained immediately 
prior to the signing of the 1987 guarantee that this case hinged upon. Jean had 
been away on an overseas trip. Upon her return, her husband had been in a 
rage and hardly spoke to her. Then, quite suddenly, Fabio began to be more 
Corporate Law Simplification Act 1995.
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attentive, coming home early and taking his wife and children out to dinner. 
On one of these occasions he told her he wanted to increase the overdraft to his 
business account. She indicated that she was nervous about this course of action 
but he assured her that there was nothing to worry about because, if the money 
was not there then the gold would be, and that there was no risk involved. 
He ‘reassured’ her by telling her ‘[y]ou are so conservative just like the rest 
of your family. One of these days I won’t be around and you can be boring 
all by yourself.’31 When Jean agreed to go to the bank and sign the necessary 
documents, Fabio told her to do it that week.
The Legal Argument
In Garcia v National Australia Bank Ltd,32 Justice Young found that Mrs Garcia 
could avoid her financial responsibilities for the guarantee over her husband’s 
business by relying on a principle which has been termed the ‘special equity of 
wives’. This principle is found in the 1939 High Court case of Yerkey v Jones.33 
Dixon J’s judgement in this case is taken to be the definitive statement of this 
rule. Dixon J said that while no presumption of undue influence emerges 
between husband and wife, there is an equitable presumption of an invalidating 
tendency where a wife bestows her separate property upon a third party for the 
benefit of her husband. The rule was stated thus:
If a married woman’s consent to become a surety for her husband’s debt 
is procured by the husband and without understanding its effect in 
essential respects she executes an instrument of suretyship which the 
creditor accepts without dealing directly with her personally, she has a 
prima facie right to have it set aside.34
Yerkey v Jones actually dealt with two circumstances involving a wife as surety 
for a husband, the first being where there is actual undue influence by a husband 
over a wife, and the second where there is a failure to explain adequately and 
accurately the suretyship transaction which the husband seeks to have the wife 
enter for the immediate economic benefit of the husband.
Justice Young said that he did not see why the second circumstance in the Yerkey 
v Jones principle did not apply to Mrs Garcia. Mrs Garcia presented herself as an 
intelligent woman but she did not take an active part in her husband’s business, 
31 Garcia v National Australia Bank Ltd BC 9301944 Supreme Court of NSW Equity Division 1993, 26 
(Young J).
32 Garcia v National Australia Bank Ltd BC 9301944 Supreme Court of NSW Equity Division 1993.
33 Yerkey v Jones (1939) 63 CLR 649 (Dixon J).
34 Yerkey v Jones (1939) 63 CLR 683 (Dixon J).
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trusting Mr Garcia to make the necessary decisions. For Justice Young, there 
was nothing unusual in the fact that Mrs Garcia trusted her husband and left 
business decisions to him:
Mrs Garcia presented herself as a capable and presentable professional. 
What she said was in general inherently believable. Despite women’s 
liberation, there are still in the community a large number of women who, 
especially when their husband is a Master of Business Administration 
from Harvard and their talents lie in another field, still do trust their 
husbands to carry out the business from which the family will receive 
benefit in the way in which the husband thinks best. Furthermore they 
will act as directors and sign pieces of paper on request … the general 
picture of the relationship between FBG and the plaintiff was one where 
she did trust him to organize business, she did in general what he 
wanted her to do.35
This finding was successfully appealed in National Australia Bank v Garcia36 
where the Court said that, while in the past it might have been appropriate to 
infer or accept that a married woman could not form a sound judgement of a 
business transaction or that she would be unduly influenced by her husband, this 
inference could not be made in Australia in the late 1990s. Mahoney P said that:
[I]n the past, the matrimonial relationship and the experience of married 
women may have been such that it was proper to infer such matters as 
facts or even to accept that in principle such was the case. To infer such 
matters now would so often be contrary to experience that it is wrong to 
accept them to be so, in principle or as a presumption of fact.37
Sheller JA quoted with approval a statement made in 1985 by Justice Rogers, 
over 10 years earlier, which described the decision in Yerkey v Jones as not only 
out dated but as insulting to married women.38 In European Asian of Australia 
Limited v Kurland Justice Rogers had criticised Yerkey v Jones:
I feel compelled to say that in the year 1985 it seems anachronistic to be 
told that being a female and a wife is, by itself, a sufficient qualification 
35 Garcia v National Australia Bank Ltd BC 9301944 Supreme Court of NSW Equity Division 1993, 22 
(Young J).
36 National Australia Bank v Garcia [1996] NSWSC 253 (Mahoney P) http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/
nsw/NSWSC/1996/253.html accessed 1/09/2008.
37 National Australia Bank v Garcia [1996] NSWSC 253 (Mahoney P) http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/
nsw/NSWSC/1996/253.html accessed 1/09/2008.
38 National Australia Bank v Garcia [1996] NSWSC 253 (Sheller JA) http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/
nsw/NSWSC/1996/253.html accessed 1/09/2008.
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to enrol in the class of persons suffering a special disadvantage … that 
being a female spouse should place a person shoulder to shoulder with 
the sick, the ignorant and the impaired is not to be tolerated.39
For Sheller JA this was even truer in 1996 than it had been in 1985.
The two decisions used different approaches. The focus for Mahoney P, Sheller 
and Meagher JJA, was on Mrs Garcia’s capabilities to form sound judgement 
in her husband’s business, whereas for Justice Young the focus had been on 
whether she was justified in not taking an interest in her husband’s business 
affairs. This is an important distinction that has often been overlooked in 
commentaries on this case and I will return to the point later in this chapter.
The decision was successfully appealed in the High Court,40 where the majority 
upheld Yerkey v Jones and successfully applied it to Mrs Garcia. The majority 
did not accept that Yerkey v Jones no longer had any application, rather they 
argued that it formed part of general equitable principles which have as much 
application in contemporary Australia as in the 1930s. They argued that while 
much has changed in Australian society  particularly the role of women both 
in marriage and in general, ‘some things remain unchanged’. The majority still 
thought there are ‘a significant number of women in Australia in relationships 
which are, for many and varied reasons, marked by disparities of economic and 
other power between the parties’.41
The first point made by the High Court majority was that, despite the many 
changes to the position of married women, protection was still needed, as many 
married women were still believed to be in a vulnerable economic position. 
However, the majority argued that this vulnerability does not stem from women 
being inferior to men, or from marriage being a disadvantage, but rather because 
a marriage relationship is based upon trust and confidence which implies 
that each partner to the marriage leaves the other to make decisions without 
necessarily needing to discuss them.
The second major point made by the majority was that the vulnerability in 
which married women find themselves stems from the assumption that, once 
married, some women will leave most if not all business decisions to their 
husbands because they trust them and have confidence in them to do it well:
[T]he marriage relationship is such that one, often the woman, may 
well leave many, perhaps all, business judgements to the other spouse. 
In that kind of relationship, business decisions may be made with 
little consultation between the parties and with the most abbreviated 
39 European Asian of Australia Limited v Kurland (1985) 8 NSWLR 200 (Rogers J).
40 Garcia v National Australia Bank Ltd [1998] CLR 395.
41 Garcia v National Australia Bank [1998] CLR 403–404 (Gaudron, McHugh & Hayne JJ).
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explanations of their purport or effect. Sometimes with not the slightest 
hint of bad faith, the explanation of a particular transaction being 
given by one to the other will be imperfect and incomplete, if not 
simply wrong. That that is so is not always attributable to the intended 
deception, to any imbalance of power between the parties, or, even, the 
vulnerability of one to exploitation because of emotional involvement. 
It is, at its core, often a reflection of no more or less than the trust and 
confidence each has in the other.42
In this statement, the majority of the Court made trust and confidence central to 
the relationship of marriage.
Justice Kirby dissented from the view of the majority.43 While he favoured 
protection for vulnerable people in a disadvantageous transaction, he did not 
support this protection as formulated by Yerkey v Jones because it targeted married 
women and, as such, he saw it as ‘anachronistic’, ‘discriminatory and outmoded’:
[W]hy should undergoing the ceremony of marriage make only a female 
partner to the relationship more needful of protection from equity than 
an unmarried female partner? … to select marriage as a criterion of 
vulnerability also appears inappropriate at this stage of the evolution 
of personal relationships in this country. Rather than choose the fact of 
marriage and sex of one party to it as objective indication of vulnerability 
for legal purposes, it would seem more rational to look at all of the facts 
of the relationship between the surety and the borrower. So long as 
married women, as such, are treated as necessarily vulnerable, whatever 
the facts of their relationships, the focus of the law will remain upon a 
consideration which, in most cases, is simply irrelevant.44
He went on to say that, while the Yerkey principle provides protection to vulnerable 
people, it is expressed in a way that is unacceptable in contemporary Australia.45
Justice Kirby asked why married women should need the protection of the 
law more than anyone else. Why should marriage be seen as a disadvantage for 
women? What the majority found, however, was that it may well be that the 
principle applied to all people in publicly declared relationships, but they chose 
42 Garcia v National Australia Bank [1998] CLR 404 (Gaudron, McHugh & Hayne JJ).
43 This was not surprising given that he had been highly critical of the Yerkey v Jones decision when he was 
on the NSW Court of Appeal. See, for example, Warburton v Whitely (1989) 5 BPR 97388.
44 Garcia v National Australia Bank [1998] CLR 425 (Kirby J).
45 Garcia v National Australia Bank [1998] CLR 428 (Kirby J). Many commentators had made the same 
comment. Su-King Hii, ‘From Yerkey to Garcia: 60 Years On and Still as Confused as Ever!’; G Williams, 
‘Equitable Principles for the Protection of Vulnerable Guarantors: Is the Principle in Yerkey v Jones Still 
Needed?’; B Collier, ‘The Rule in Yerkey v Jones: Fundamental Principles and Fundamental Problems’.
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to avoid laying down any principle of law which may incorporate them. Instead 
they retained the gender and marriage specific principle as outlined in Yerkey 
v Jones:
It may be that the principles applied in Yerkey v Jones will find 
application to other relationships more common now than was the case 
in 1939 — to long term and publicly declared relationships short of 
marriage between members of the same or opposite sex — but that is 
not a question that falls for decision in this case. It may be that those 
principles will find application where the husband acts as a surety for 
the wife but again that is not a problem that falls for decision here.46
Subsequent application of Garcia has not successfully extended the principle 
to non-married women. In Liu v Adamson47 Macready M argued that Garcia did 
apply to a de facto wife if the creditor was aware of the relationship. In that case, 
however, the de facto wife failed to show that she did not gain a benefit from the 
guarantee. There are also a number of cases where the possibility of a husband 
using the Garcia defence has been discussed,48 but to date no actual case with 
such facts has arisen for determination.
Justice Kirby favoured a principle of protection that was not specific to wives or 
women only. He saw this as being possible via the adoption of a principle based 
on the UK case of Barclays Bank Plc v O’Brien.49 Justice Kirby’s proposed approach 
was to rely on a principle which focussed on wrong doing by the principle debtor 
in the form of undue influence or misrepresentation, and on an approach which 
focussed on reasonable steps being taken by the credit provider to ensure that 
wrongdoing had not occurred. The merit of Justice Kirby’s approach is threefold: 
firstly, it is expressed in non-discriminatory terms; secondly, it addresses the real 
causes of vulnerability; and thirdly, it recognises the credit provider’s power to 
insist on guarantors seeking independent legal advice.50
Another aspect of the O’Brien approach that appealed to Justice Kirby was that 
it retains the economic usability of the family home in business affairs. Kirby J 
wanted to ensure that the law did not develop in such a way as to render the family 
home economically sterile. This view was also expressed by Justice Callinan. Both 
judges quoted with approval the statement of this principle in O’Brien:
Wealth is now more widely spread. Moreover a high proportion of 
privately owned wealth is invested in the matrimonial home. Because of 
the recognition by society of the equality of the sexes, the majority of 
46 Garcia v National Australia Bank [1998] CLR 404 (Gaudron, McHugh and Hayne JJ).
47 Liu v Adamson [2003] NSWSC 74.
48 See Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Allregal Enterprises Pty Ltd [1999] WASC 186.
49 Barclays Bank Plc v O’Brien and another [1194] 1 AC 180.
50 Garcia v National Australia Bank [1998] CLR 431 (Kirby J).
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matrimonial homes are now in the joint names of both spouses. Therefore 
in order to raise finance for the business enterprises of one or other of 
the spouses … [there] is a need to ensure that the wealth currently tied 
up in the matrimonial home does not become economically sterile … it 
is therefore essential that a law designed to protect the vulnerable does 
not render the matrimonial home unacceptable as security to financial 
institutions.51
This focus on the family home as a measure of economic value is one way in 
which the case endorses the economic aspects of the marriage relationship. 
Others are discussed below.
Impact of the Decision
The Garcia case sparked much discussion among legal commentators, with some of 
this discussion uncharacteristically moving away from the legal principles at stake 
and towards the social and normative implications that emerged from the decision.
Discussion of the case focussed on the decision’s implications for women, with 
many commentators taking Justice Kirby’s view that the decision represented 
a step back for women’s equality before the law. This view is founded upon the 
argument that married women in modern Australia are not, and should not be 
seen to be, ignorant of the business decisions of their husbands. For many, the 
decision represents a view of marriage which is founded upon inequality and 
dependence of a wife upon her husband, and thus represents a denial of the 
many advances that women have made in the decades since the Yerkey v Jones 
decision. Berna Collier is one of many people who strongly argued against the 
decision along these lines, stating:
The advance in the status and education of women, the increasing role 
of women (including wives) in business and commercial affairs and the 
variety of personal relationships today all make a principle fashioned 
in terms of a wife’s disadvantageous position vis-à-vis her husband, 
unsafe when stated as a general rule of universal application. Even as 
a statement of a prima facie position the statement is now unsound and 
objectionable in principle. It is also of dubious accuracy in practice.52
In many ways the decision is perplexing. On the one hand, it says that modern 
marriage is no longer an institution that oppresses women. However, the majority 
of judges wanted to retain protection for those women who are in need of it. The 
Court did not want to remove the special features of that protection that are so 
51 Barclays Bank Plc v O’Brien [1994] 1 AC 188 (Browne-Wilkinson LJ).
52 Collier, ‘The Rule in Yerkey v Jones’ 79–80.
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uniquely applicable to married women. The Court did recognise that the special 
disadvantage can occur equally for husbands, partners in de facto and same-sex 
relationships, but they were unwilling to subsume the protection into a broader 
legal principle such as unconscionability or the principle as stated by O’Brien. 
Why is this so?
I believe that  the answer can be found by looking at the decision from a different 
angle. The majority of the High Court in the Garcia case was not interested in a 
discussion about how much marriage had changed, nor to what extent married 
women engaged in economic decision making in a modern Australian marriage. 
Instead, the decision makes more sense if we see it as being foremost about the 
meaning of marriage. There are three main features of marriage which the Garcia 
decision reinforces: first, that marriage is an economic as well as emotional union; 
second, that once married a couple’s economic interests become united; third, 
and most obviously, that wives and husbands should have trust and confidence 
in each other. 
What is Marriage According to Garcia?
Garcia represents an explicit recognition in law that marriage is as much 
a relationship about economics and money as it is about anything else. The 
relationship is presented as inevitably involving business decisions and 
entanglements. Despite the fact that the Garcias had separate businesses, Mrs 
Garcia was called upon to assist in the business affairs of her husband in different 
ways. The Court does not examine these actions through the lens of business 
dealings but, rather, as the economic aspects of a marriage relationship. This 
implies different values from those we usually associate with economic activity/
interest that occurs in the marketplace. In a marriage this ‘work’ is associated 
with the ethics of altruism, care and love.
An explicit recognition of the economics of marriage in the case can be found 
in its discussion of the family home. The family home,53 while imbued with so 
much emotional significance, is recognised as an economic asset that must be 
protected. Justices Kirby and Callinan in Garcia, and Lord Browne-Wilkinson 
in O’Brien,54 were concerned that a decision based on the special equity of 
53  D N Benjamin, The Home: Words, Interpretations, Meanings and Environments (Avery, Aldershot 1995); L 
Fox, Conceptualising Home (Hart, Oxford 2007); S Bright & J Dewar (eds), Land Law Themes and Perspectives 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford 1998).
54  Barclays Bank PLC v O’Brien and another [1994] 1 AC 180.
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wives would jeopardise the economic utility of the family home. However, 
the economic discourse of marriage in Garcia goes further. It is more than a 
recognition, it is an economic unification of a married couple’s interests.55
The Garcia case reinforces the idea that, once married, a couple’s economic 
interests become unified. As we saw previously, what this actually meant in the 
past was that, upon marriage, women ceased to have an independent economic/
commercial existence.56 While this is no longer the law, the unity of economic 
interests between a husband and a wife remains.
In Garcia we saw that the wife played an important role in assisting her husband 
fulfil formal business requirements, with the family home used to assist in his 
business requirements. The judgement takes this as a perfectly normal state of 
affairs. There was nothing wrong with a woman supporting her husband in his 
business affairs without necessarily having any direct involvement, knowledge 
or authority in those affairs.
In all three Garcia cases, there is no suggestion that a wife should not help her 
husband out in his business and financial affairs, even when she knows nothing 
about them. There is amazing tolerance for the fact that she was completely 
unaware of the business dealings of the companies of which she was a director. 
There is also tolerance for the fact that her husband forged her signature. The 
fact that she was passively involved was not seen as a problem. As Janine 
Pascoe puts it, the special equity cases do not require wives to act with care 
and diligence. It requires them not to act at all.57 Garcia is not concerned with 
changing this, focussing instead on how to protect a wife when the trust she 
has placed in her husband turns out to be illusory. Garcia assumes economic 
unification in marriage such that self-interest, usually considered to be the 
necessary driver for economic activity in the marketplace, is suspended when 
considering economic activity in marriage.
The other aspect of marriage that emerges from Garcia is the idea that marriage 
embodies trust and confidence between a husband and wife. The Court never 
explained what trust and confidence meant, but it is my view that these can 
be read as love, or at the very least, as elements of love. Trust and confidence 
can of course exist in relationships other than romantic ones. One can speak 
of trusting a business partner or an advisor, for example. Similarly, one can 
have confidence in another person’s ability without loving them. However, 
can there be love without trust and confidence? While this is arguable, we can 
say with more certainty that trust and confidence may constitute elements of 
55  This has limits. For example, when it comes to property division under the Family Law Act there is no 
assumption that all assets are equally owned.
56 See chapter one’s discussion on coverture.
57 J Pascoe, ‘Women Who Guarantee Company Debts: Wife or Director?’ [2003] 2 Deakin Law Review 12.
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love.58 A telling point is the fact there have not been any cases where trust and 
confidence outside of a romantic relationship have been successful in giving rise 
to the defence in Garcia.59
A plausible interpretation of the majority in the High Court decision of Garcia 
is that, once you are married, you have to trust your husband/wife and have 
confidence that the economic decisions they are making are right. What the 
majority want to enforce is the idea that it is not outmoded for a woman to 
trust her husband and leave him to conduct business matters if that is what 
she chooses. Laws should not erode this principle of trust and confidence in 
marriage but rather protect it by supporting those (more commonly women) 
who find themselves disadvantaged when that trust and confidence has been 
abused. Garcia avoids any legal development that places a married woman in a 
position where she must distrust her husband, where marriage is seen, to use 
Justice Kirby’s phrase, as a ‘suspect relationship’.60
Despite his dissent, Justice Kirby actually has a similar argument, although 
he arrives at it in a slightly different way. He rejects any suggestion that we 
should interpret marriage in any way that entrenches it as anything less than 
an embodiment of trust and confidence. In arguing against seeing marriage as 
giving rise to undue influence, he asks, ‘Is that what marriage has come to in 
this day and age, that from being a relationship of complete trust and devotion, 
it has become a suspect relationship?’61 In his judgement, Justice Kirby, like the 
majority, was interested in preserving marriage as a special ‘space’. Kirby J fails 
to see that the majority had the same objective.
That Garcia did not want to deny or minimise trust and confidence (or love) in 
the marriage relationship is a point recognised by Elizabeth Stone,62 who has 
argued that the distinctiveness of the Garcia principle lies in its recognition of 
the unique feature of the marriage relationship. She says, ‘the High Court has 
taken judicial notice of a feature of the marital relationship which is highly 
unusual: a fully competent adult may choose to remain ignorant of her legal 
affairs without being careless, and this fact is notorious’.63
58 Trust is discussed as an element of romantic love for another purpose in Delaney, ‘Love and Loving 
Commitment’ 342.
59  To date the defence has been very limited, although it has been applied to a child-parent relationship in 
State Bank of NSW v Layoun [2001] NSWSC 113; Higgins CJ in Watt v State Bank of New South Wales [2003] 
ACTCA 7 was very strong in his opinion that it should not apply to parent child relationships.
60  Transcript of Proceedings Garcia v National Australia Bank (High Court of Australia S18/1997 March 
1998) (Kirby J).
61 Transcript of Proceedings Garcia v National Australia Bank (High Court of Australia S18/1997 March 
1998) (Kirby J).
62  E Stone, ‘The Distinctiveness of Garcia’ (2006) 22 Journal of Contract Law 170–193.
63 Stone, ‘The Distinctiveness of Garcia’ 178.
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To be successfully applied, therefore, Garcia requires a fact situation which 
‘hinges not on wrongdoing but on excusable ignorance’ and where that 
excusable ignorance is a ‘notorious feature of the relationship’,64 a ‘normal and 
unremarkable incident’65 of the relationship. Stone says that to succeed using 
Garcia ‘it must be established that it [the relationship] is of such unusual trust 
and confidence that ignorance of one’s own affairs is an outcome both likely and 
defensible’.66 This, she claims, can only be found in marriage, maybe in de facto 
relationships, and possibly in same-sex relationships, but further than this it is 
unlikely to go. She says it is simply not ‘a normal feature of other relationships 
to cede total control of one’s affairs’:67
Garcia should be limited to circumstances where a choice to remain 
ignorant of one’s own financial and legal affairs is not merely possible 
but normal; not merely understandable but excusable. Beyond marriage, 
de jure or de facto, such relationships are unlikely to be found.68
Recognising this aspect of the relationship explains why the decision has been 
limited in its application in subsequent cases. It also makes sense of a decision 
that otherwise appears to be at odds with other central legal principles which 
apply in commercial dealings. The Garcia approach makes sense if we return 
to the interpretation that the High Court wanted to retain marriage first and 
foremost as an emotional relationship:
[T]he fact that protection is given in such circumstances must be 
understood to be quite anomalous. It is submitted that the protection 
extended to mistaken wives is justified, but that the intimacy of the 
relationship and the social desirability of encouraging such intimacy, 
which provide the justification for that protection are unique.69
In Garcia the High Court was recognising that there is a conflict between having 
love — as manifested in trust and confidence — and economic dependence in 
a relationship, and that this situation may lead one to a disadvantaged position. 
The Court was mindful of the fact that the disadvantage was more often than not 
experienced by wives and therefore wanted to highlight that special protection 
for them. This reading of the case implies that the High Court’s view is in harmony 
with the feminist critiques of both love and marriage, and the Garcia decision 
can be read as an attempt to accommodate those critiques. The Court was also, 
however, attempting to reconcile the conflicting paradigms of economics and 
love, of the market and the home. The decision is an indication of the conflict 
64 Stone, ‘The Distinctiveness of Garcia’ 178.
65 Stone, ‘The Distinctiveness of Garcia’ 186.
66 Stone, ‘The Distinctiveness of Garcia’ 180.
67 Stone, ‘The Distinctiveness of Garcia’ 180.
68 Stone, ‘The Distinctiveness of Garcia’ 188.
69 Stone, ‘The Distinctiveness of Garcia’ 180.
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(discussed earlier) that law faces between giving voice to people’s economic 
rights and interests that coincide with their personal intimate relationships, of 
retaining the distinctiveness of marriage and marriage like relationships while 
enforcing their economic and commercial rights. 
Conclusion
The Garcia case incorporates an economic as well as a romantic discourse of 
marriage. The romantic discourse of marriage emerges from the High Court’s 
focus on marriage as a relationship of trust and confidence, which I have argued 
can be read as elements of love. As well as reflecting these two discourses in 
their judgement, the High Court in Garcia goes further and recognises that they 
may be the cause of conflict and disadvantage. The Court’s reasoning reflects the 
idea that loving someone, acting altruistically, and trusting their spouse totally, 
including in business affairs, may leave one of the partners to a marriage at a 
disadvantage. Even in modern Australia, with its many social changes to gender 
roles and the institution of marriage, the Court believed this was more likely to 
impact upon a wife than upon a husband. In recognising this, the judgement of 
the majority could be interpreted as reflecting the feminist critiques of love and 
marriage outlined earlier: that patriarchy renders women vulnerable in love. By 
continuing the Yerkey v Jones principle in Garcia, the Court is accommodating 
this critique but is not disrupting the established discourse of love and marriage.
The romantic discourse that remains, and is even nurtured after Garcia, is that 
upon marriage a couple should trust and have confidence in each other, and be 
free to act altruistically rather than self-interestedly. Married couples should not 
be suspicious of each other’s motives. Such behaviour would be at odds with 
the emotional aspects of the marriage relationship. Whether we use the word 
love or not, this is a message that emerges unmistakeably from the case. Trust 
and confidence (or love) are part of marriage and should be part of marriage. 
This ought to be not only recognised but also nurtured and dealt with when it 
creates problems. Nevertheless, despite the acknowledgement of the emotional 
aspects of marriage, the reality is that, as evidenced in the Garcia case, economic 
and romantic discourses can conflict with each other. The case, therefore, 
represents the dilemma discussed at the beginning of this chapter, of how to 
reconcile romantic love with the economic and financial aspects of the marriage 
relationship. The rules of love and the rules of business and economics are not 
the same. The Garcia case attempts to reconcile this by alleviating against the 
economic disadvantages that can arise when love and marriage fail.
The importance of this case for this book lies with what it claims about love 
and marriage. When read in this context, Garcia establishes that marriage 
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in modern Australia cannot be read independently of economic or romantic 
discourses, and that while these can conflict they are both to be accommodated 
rather than eroded by legal principles. The case shows the difficulty that the 
law has had in reconciling the economic realities of an intimate relationship. 
The law has wanted to retain the distinctiveness of the marriage relationship, 
and has not wanted to reduce marriage to a business — wives to housemaids 
and sex workers, and men to financial providers — and therefore selectively 
chooses which economic aspects of the relationship to honour. In Garcia, the 
Court focussed on the economic value of the home. This is in keeping with the 
Hasday’s argument that the law only acknowledges those aspects that fit into 
a paradigm of a unified set of interests, the family home more than any other 
property is loaded with emotional meaning. Whether this selective honouring 
of economic agreements reflects the modern understanding of marriage as a 
relationship based on love which lasts for as long as the love does, is debatable. 
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4. The Foregrounding of Love in the 
Same-Sex Marriage Debate
Love Does not Discriminate1
Introduction
Previous chapters have outlined a number of legal challenges to the traditional 
meanings of marriage. In relation to the connection between marriage, sex and 
procreation, Re Kevin asserted that sexual intercourse and procreation alone 
do not define marriage. In relation to the idea that marriage is about economic 
unity and support, Garcia reasserted this connection and continued the law’s 
attempt at balancing the tensions between the home and the market that are 
so clearly manifest in the marriage relationship. In previous chapters, the small 
ways in which love is explicit and implicit in the legal discourse of marriage 
have been shown. When we turn to consider the same-sex marriage debate, 
however, love takes centre stage. This debate has specifically demanded that 
marriage be understood as a relationship ruled by love and that the law be 
altered to reflect this. 
This argument can be traced by examining two key legal episodes in the 
same-sex marriage debate in Australia: the changes made to the Marriage Act 
in 2004, and the passing and subsequent disallowance of the Civil Union Act 
in the Australian Capital Territory in 2006. In examining these two episodes, 
this chapter shows how the debate became one about whether we understand 
marriage to be about procreation or love, as well as demonstrating how 
the connection between marriage and procreation is flawed and Christian 
underpinnings of this connection are open to debate. Finally, the chapter turns 
to the question of what the same-sex marriage debate will do, not only for the 
meaning of marriage, but also for the meaning of love. We know that marriage is 
a conservative institution fighting to break free from its oppressive past. What 
is less well understood is that love also can be read conservatively. As we have 
seen from some feminist critiques of love, it is closely connected to patriarchy 
and traditional gender roles, and, as we will see from the queer critique in this 
chapter, it replicates heteronormativity. The recognition of same-sex marriage, 
however, has the potential to imbue both institutions with a more progressive 
and radical meaning. 
1 Slogan on placard at protest march in Canberra to support marriage for same-sex, intersex and transgender 
couples. 2/08/2009 Sunday Canberra Times 4.
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The Same-Sex Marriage Debate
Support for same-sex marriage is not universal in the Australian gay and lesbian 
community. The gay marriage debate is often depicted as a struggle between the 
LGBTI2 community and political progressives against right wing conservatives 
and the Christian right. However, there is also considerable opposition to gay 
marriage from within the LGBTI and progressive traditions. This opposition 
stems from a number of inter-related factors. Marriage is too ‘loaded’ an 
institution, its association with patriarchy and the oppression of women make 
it an unviable institution for many progressively minded people, regardless of 
their sexuality. Judith Butler’s view of gay marriage is indicative of this position:
For a progressive sexual movement, even one that may want to produce 
marriage as an option for non heterosexuals, the proposition that 
marriage should become the only way to sanction or legitimate sexuality 
is unacceptably conservative … What does this do to the community 
of the non married, the single, the divorced, the uninterested, the non 
monogamous, and how does the sexual field become reduced, in its very 
legibility, once we extend marriage as a norm?3
Furthermore, the acceptance of marriage as a form for same-sex relationships is 
seen as a risky strategy. Michael Warner argues that agitating for same-sex marriage 
replicates and privileges heterosexuality and ‘authorizes the state to make one 
form of life — already normative — even more privileged’.4 This may lead to those 
relationships being erased because they don’t fit the legal model of marriage.5 
Opposing gay marriage is not the same as stating that equality of rights between 
heterosexual and same-sex relationships is not desirable. However, it is argued 
2 Lesbian, Gay, Bi-sexual, Transsexual and Intersex. I have used the term LGBTI to be as inclusive as 
possible, but this inclusivity at times can appear to be insensitive to the diversities that exist between the 
groups these initials denote. In particular, when it comes to marriage, it must be made clear that the issues 
facing transsexual people are quite different from those facing same-sex couples. I only discuss them together 
because a liberal reading of transsexual marriage in the case of Re Kevin was understood by many as implying 
a liberal attitude towards same-sex marriage.
3 J Butler, ‘Is Kinship Always Already Heterosexual?’ (2002) 13 Differences 21–44. See also N D Polikoff, 
‘We Will Get What We Ask For: Why Legalising Gay and Lesbian Marriage Will Not “Dismantle the Legal 
Structure of Gender in Every Marriage”’ (1993) 79 Virginia Law Review 1535–1875. This article articulates 
very clearly the argument against the idea that same-sex marriage will transform the institution of marriage 
for the better.
4 M Warner, The Trouble With Normal: Sex, Politics, and the Ethics of Queer Life (Free Press, New York 1999) 112.
5 For example, Katherine Franke’s comparison of the campaign for gay marriage with the campaign for 
the right to marry for African-Americans following their emancipation as slaves leads her to worry that it 
might have some of the same outcomes. She shows how the right to marry was used as a weapon to ‘civilise’ 
African Americans and get them to adopt the domestic patterns of elite white Americans. She argues that, in 
that period, a right to marry collapsed into an obligation to do so, a negation of other relationships they once 
enjoyed, and a punitive approach toward those who broke the rules and duties of marriage. She warns that 
these same outcomes could emerge from the legal recognition of same-sex marriage. K Franke, ‘The Curious 
Relationship of Marriage and Freedom’ in Garrison & Scott (eds), Marriage at the Crossroads 87–106.
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by some that, in so far as marriage itself is capable of delivering such a goal,6 it 
is not the only way to achieve it. Jenni Millbank has argued that marriage ought 
not to be the only ‘yardstick for legal equality’,7 that reform should proceed 
according to what is needed to remove discrimination in specific contexts rather 
than the ‘one-stop comprehensive’ formal equality that would be achieved 
through marriage. She says, ‘relationship recognition for lesbian and gay families 
should proceed on the basis of what is needed by such families rather than by 
simply assuming that formal equality is the only, or most desirable goal’.8
Despite opposition to gay marriage within the community, the amendments to 
the Marriage Act to legislate the meaning of marriage as a union between one man 
and one woman forced many to take a more entrenched position than otherwise 
would have been the case,9 and, within a short space of time, same-sex marriage 
increasingly came to be seen as an important ‘equality goal’ in Australia. Surveys 
show that support for gay marriage doubled between 2001 and 2005,10 but its 
popularity cannot be reduced simply to a capricious stand against conservatism. 
Marriage remains a goal because it is a means by which legal rights and status 
are allocated to people in society, and the state’s denial of this to one group is 
seen as a means of reinforcing inequality. In large part, therefore, the arguments 
for same-sex marriage are articulated in the language of liberalism, with a focus 
on rights, justice and equality.11 As Tamara Metz puts, it while the institution 
of marriage is problematic, the fact is that, ‘a commitment to equal treatment 
before the law demands it. Period.’12 But even more than this, the debate has 
shown us that what we thought was becoming an obsolete institution, in fact, 
still carries with it a meaning many crave. Marriage ‘elicits ethical recognition’,13 
provides ‘moral approval’ and embodies the ‘complex normative account of the 
6 Many argue that it isn’t. See J Josephson, ‘Romantic Weddings, Diverse Families’ (2010) 6(1) Politics and 
Gender 130.
7 J Millbank, ‘Recognition of Lesbian and Gay Families in Australian Law: Part One — Couples’ (2006) 34(1) 
Federal Law Review 9.
8 Millbank, ‘Recognition of Lesbian and Gay Families in Australian Law: Part One — Couples’ 8–9; R 
Graycar & J Millbank, ‘From Functional Family to Spinster Sisters: Australia’s Distinctive Path to Relationship 
Recognition’ (2007) 24 Journal of Law and Policy 122.
9 Nicola Roxon MP claimed that ‘it was not until this bill was proposed by the government that calls 
were made more widely for marriage to be broadened to encompass same-sex couples’. Commonwealth, 
Parliamentary Debates House of Representatives June 16 2004 (Nicola Roxon) http://parlinfoweb.aph.gov.
au/piweb/view_document.aspx?ID=2262589 accessed 13/05/2008. The same point is made by Graycar & 
Millbank, ‘From Functional Family to Spinster Sisters’ 161.
10 Graycar & Millbank, ‘From Functional Family to Spinster Sisters’ 161. See also Pink News ‘Australian 
Territory Legalises Gay Civil Partnership Ceremonies’ http://www.pinknews.co.uk/2009/11/11/australian-
territory-legalises-gay-civil-partnership-ceremonies/ accessed 13/11/2009. Carol Smart, in her studies on 
same-sex weddings, found that the political nature of choosing same-sex marriage is well understood by those 
couples that are getting married. See C Smart, ‘Can I Be Bridesmaid?: Combining the Personal and Political in 
Same-Sex Weddings’ (2008) 11(6) Sexualities 763-–778.
11 A Wilson, ‘Feminism and Same-Sex Marriage: Who Cares?’ (2010) 6(1) Politics and Gender 134.
12 T Metz, ‘Demands of Care and Dilemmas of Freedom: What We Really Ought to be Worried About’ (2010) 
6(1) Politics and Gender 120.
13 Metz, ‘Demands of Care and Dilemmas of Freedom’ 123.
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relationship it names’.14 It is an ‘idealised’ rite of passage for couples, signifying 
the ‘successful transition into adulthood’, responsibility and social legitimacy.15 
As such, it is desired by ‘couples who have long been outside the boundaries 
of legitimacy’.16 For example, see how the following comment from a prominent 
sex advice columnist makes the connection between marriage, respectability 
and ‘real love’:
Once our relationships were only respected if we had remained together 
for a long, long time. Only longevity earned us some modicum of respect. 
Straight couples could always rush that validity by getting married. Now 
… some gay kids, desperate to have their gay love taken seriously, will 
wield their new marriage licenses and say: ‘See how real our love is? … 
You better respect us now!’17
It appears that despite the very many legal changes to the institution which, 
many have argued, have moved the relationship away from one of status, and 
despite the many negative associations especially for women, marriage retains 
a significant degree of status and respectability. The continuing popularity of 
marriage as a goal can be explained by its legal and social meanings, and by the 
practical benefits it bestows on couples. Where it continues to be popular, some 
of this popularity must also be attributed to its connection with romantic love.
Legal Episodes in the Debate 
Amending the Marriage Act (1961)
In May 2004, then Attorney General Phillip Ruddock presented the Marriage 
Legislation Amendment Bill 2004 to the Federal Parliament. In the second 
reading speech, the Attorney General explained that the Bill was needed because 
there was considerable community concern about the erosion of the institution 
of marriage. He explained that
the government has consistently reiterated the fundamental importance 
of the place of marriage in our society … It is a central and fundamental 
14 Metz, ‘Demands of Care and Dilemmas of Freedom’ 123.
15 Diduck & Kaganas, Family Law, Gender and The State 34.
16 L J Marso, ‘Marriage and Bourgeois Respectability’ (2010) 6(1) Politics and Gender 152.
17 Dan Savage, sex advice quoted in ‘Young, Gay & Married (And Divorced)’ Out Now Global http://
joemygod.blogspot.com/2008/04/young-gay-married-and-divorced.html accessed 10/06/2010.
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institution. It is vital to the stability of our society and provides the best 
environment for the raising of children. The government has taken steps 
to reinforce the basis of this fundamental institution.18
The Bill did three things: firstly, it provided a definition of marriage as a voluntary 
union between a man and a woman; secondly, it prevented Australian courts 
from recognising same-sex marriages that had taken place in other countries; 
thirdly, it prevented same-sex couples from adopting children from overseas.
On the issue of definition, while the 1961 Marriage Act did not provide a 
definition of marriage, section 46 required a marriage celebrant to state that 
‘marriage according to Australian law, is the union of a man and a woman to 
the exclusion of others, voluntarily entered into for life’.19 Significantly, during 
the passing of the original Marriage Act, a proposed amendment to specifically 
define marriage had been defeated in the Senate. It had then been argued by 
Liberal Senator John Gorton (who later became Prime Minister from 1968–1971) 
that the definition of marriage was best left to the common law.20
The Howard government’s desire to legislate the definition was motivated by 
significant concern among some Liberal MPs that the courts were moving away 
from a traditional meaning of marriage. The decision to validate a transsexual 
marriage in Re Kevin was clearly a matter of concern for some MPs, as were 
comments made out of court by members of the judiciary which showed a 
leaning towards a ‘contemporary meaning’ of marriage.21 These concerns led 
to a delegation of 30 members of parliament concerned about the recognition 
of same-sex relationships in overseas jurisdictions and the impact that this was 
likely to have on Australia approaching the Prime Minister, John Howard. Alby 
Shultz later identified himself as one of these MPs and openly disclosed the role 
that religious organisations played in the debate:
it is my belief that moving away from the traditional definition of 
marriage would be to the detriment of our society. Marriage provides 
18 Second Reading Speech, Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates House of Representatives May 27 
2004 (Phillip Ruddock) http://parlinfoweb.aph.gov.au/piweb/view_document.aspx?ID=2259205 accessed 
14/04/2008.
19 Marriage Act (1961) section 46. The definition of marriage in section 46 derives from the UK case of Hyde 
v Hyde and Woodmansee [1861–1873] All ER Rep 175. For an analysis of this definition and its relevance for a 
modern society see S Poulter, ‘The Definition of Marriage in English Law’ (1979) 42(4) The Modern Law Review 
409–429. The article was written in the 1970s and makes some interesting comments about same-sex marriage 
being accepted in the future.
20 Sen John Gorton in the Senate debates on the passing of the original Marriage Act (1961) quoted 
in Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates House of Representatives June 16 2004 (Arch Bevis) http://
parlinfoweb.aph.gov.au/piweb/view_document.aspx?ID=2262773 accessed 13/05/2008.
21 See, for example, comments made by Sen Guy Barnett, Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates Senate 
June 17 2004 (Guy Barnett) http://parlinfoweb.aph.gov.au/piweb/view_document.aspx?ID=2014889 accessed 
15/05/2008.
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stability and is a solidly-built roof under which children can grow and 
be nurtured. The Australian Family Association has strongly supported 
this view, as has the Australian Christian Lobby.22
It is also worth noting that 2004 was a big year for the meaning of marriage in 
the US. The US House of Representatives passed the Marriage Protection Act, 
and many states held referenda to consider amendments to the Constitution 
concerning the definition of marriage.23 This activity reverberated in Australia.
It was suggested by Graycar and Millbank, however, that the definition 
of marriage was seized upon as a cynical political exercise by the Howard 
government, designed to act as a wedge issue leading up to an election.24 Its 
effect, according to Graycar and Millbank, was to reaffirm the ‘special-ness of 
marriage’ and to single out ‘lesbians and gay men as objects of exclusion’.25 It 
was indeed the case that gay marriage did become, and still is, a wedge issue in 
Australian politics. This aspect of the debate is illustrated most clearly by the 
Australian Capital Territory’s thwarted attempts to pass legislation that came 
closer than ever before to legislating gay marriage.
Civil Union Bill ACT (2006)
When the ACT Government began consulting with the LGBTI community in 
Canberra on the best model to adopt in the ACT for the recognition of same-
sex relationships, the community favoured a model which closely resembled a 
marriage.26 As such, on 28 March 2006, then Labor Chief Minister, Jon Stanhope, 
introduced into the ACT legislative assembly the Civil Union Bill 2006. He 
explained the content of the Bill in the following way:
A civil union will be treated in the same way as marriage under territory 
law. A civil union is not a marriage but, will, so far as the law of the ACT 
is concerned, to be treated in the same way. The government is of the 
view that this is preferable to providing an alternative form of marriage 
that would not have equal recognition to commonwealth marriage. The 
22 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates House of Representatives June 17 2004 (Alby Shultz) http://
parlinfoweb.aph.gov.au/piweb/view_document.aspx?ID=2263265 accessed 13/05/2008.
23 A Bernstein, ‘Questioning Marriage’ in A Bernstein (ed), Marriage Proposals Questioning a Legal Status 
(New York University Press, New York 2006) 1–29.
24 Graycar & Millbank, ‘From Functional Family to Spinster Sisters’ 160–61.
25 Graycar & Millbank, ‘From Functional Family to Spinster Sisters’ 160.
26 ‘Our consultation made it very clear that the community would prefer the legislation include a formal 
ceremony and that that was important to couples both personally and more broadly in tackling discrimination 
against same-sex couples.’ Heidi Yates, representative for gay lobby group Good Process, in Ross Peake, 
‘Angry Corbell Abandons Gay Plan’ 5/5/2008 Canberra Timeshttp://www.canberra.yourguide.com.au/
printerFreindlypage.asp?story_id+1237202 accessed 5/05/2008.
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civil union is a new concept that can be used by anybody, regardless of 
gender. It will give couples functional equality under the ACT law with 
married couples but does not replace or duplicate marriage.27
This Bill was quickly met with opposition. On May 3 2006, the Liberal leader, 
Bill Stephaniak, introduced into parliament an alternative Bill based on the 
Tasmanian registration model, the Registration of Relationships Bill 2006, 
which, he argued, did not undermine the values of marriage. Just over one week 
later Stephaniak tabled in parliament a petition gathered by the Australian 
Christian Lobby and signed by 1,710 people who opposed the Civil Union Bill. 
The petitioners said: ‘We the undersigned believe that this creates a marriage 
like relationship which so mimics marriage as to confuse and diminish it.’28
Extensive debate followed regarding the extent to which a civil union under this 
legislation mimicked marriage. Zanghellini explains that under the Bill a civil 
union resembled marriage because ‘a ceremony was required for it to be brought 
into existence and because a validly contracted civil union was to be treated 
like marriage for the purposes of all ACT laws’.29 However, civil unions were 
different to marriage not only in name but also because they would always be 
regarded differently to marriage in other jurisdictions, including the federal one.
The Federal Liberal Government was vehemently opposed to the Bill for two 
main reasons. They argued firstly that the ACT Government did not have the 
constitutional power to legislate for marriage, and secondly that marriage as an 
institution should be preserved as a union between one man and one woman. 
The ACT Civil Unions Bill was seen to be creating a relationship between same-
sex couples which was too close to that marriage model, and therefore eroded 
the idea that it takes a man and woman to have a marriage.
The Civil Union Bill became the Civil Union Act (2006) (ACT) but it never came 
into effect. On 13 June 2006, Governor-General Michael Jeffery, on the advice 
of the Federal Government, disallowed the Civil Union Act (2006) under section 
35 of the Australian Capital Territory (Self-Government) Act (1988). The Federal 
Government disallowance was described as ‘autocratic’30 as ‘very unusual’,31 
and, by one Greens Senator, as ‘homophobia dressed up as an argument about 
state rights’.32
27 Australian Capital Territory, Parliamentary Debates Legislative Assembly 28 March 2006, 657 (Jon Stanhope). 
28 Australian Capital Territory, Parliamentary Debates Legislative Assembly May 11 2006, 1519 (Bill 
Stephaniak).
29 A Zanghellini ‘Marriage and Civil Union: Legal and Moral Questions’ (2007) 35(2) Federal Law Review 265.
30 Australian Capital Territory, Parliamentary Debates Legislative Assembly Dec 12 2006, 3953 (Simon Corbell).
31 George Williams described the act as ‘very unusual’ in Farah Farouque, ‘Why or Why Can’t I Have a 
Civil Union’ 10/06/2006 The Agehttp://wwwtheage.com.au/news/in-depth/why-oh-why-cant-I-have-a-civil-
union/2006 accessed 22/05/2008.
32 Sen Rachel Siewart Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates Senate June 15 2006 http://parlinfoweb.aph.
gov.au/piweb/view_document.aspx?ID=2345461 accessed 13/05/2008.
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The ACT Government persevered. On 12 December 2006 the ACT Government 
presented into the ACT Parliament the Civil Partnership Bill 2006. This new 
Bill made the following changes in the hope of addressing the concerns of the 
federal government:
• The new Bill did not use the word ‘union’. This would remove any confusion, 
as the word is more closely associated with marriage because it is used to 
describe marriage in the Marriage Act 1961;
• The new Bill did not specify that a civil partnership is to be treated like a 
marriage;
• A civil partnership could be entered into by any two people whether they 
were same-sex or not; and
• The ceremony associated with a civil partnership would not be performed 
by marriage celebrants, but rather by civil partnership notaries.
The new Bill was still not considered acceptable to the Federal Government 
and the Federal Attorney-General announced that his government would not 
rule out again using the Governor-General’s disallowance power to override 
the Act.33 The ACT government left the Bill on the books, but waited until 
after the coming federal election to stage their next move. In November 2007, 
the Rudd Labor Government was elected and the ACT announced it would 
revive the legislation.34 By now, however, the Federal Labor Party and its 
socially conservative Christian leader, Kevin Rudd, had eagerly succumbed 
to conservative pressure and declared its own commitment to the principle 
that marriage is between a man and a woman. Negotiations between the ACT 
Government and the Federal Government came to a conclusion in May 2008 with 
a clear understanding that the Federal Government would not allow the ACT to 
pass legislation which in any way mimics marriage. An angry ACT Government 
had no choice but to scrap all previous plans and introduce legislation that 
instead mimics the Tasmanian registration model.35
On 11 November 2009, the ACT legislature once again opened up the issue by 
passing the Civil Partnerships Amendment Bill 2009. This Bill, introduced by 
the ACT Greens and supported by the ACT Labor Party, introduced the right of 
parties to declare their relationship before a civil partnership notary, and thus 
introduced the much sought after ceremony that had been attempted by past 
33 Phillip Ruddock MP Attorney-General ‘ACT Civil Partnerships Bill Does Not Remove Concerns’ (Press 
Release, 6 Feb 2007).
34 Cathy Alexander, ‘Corbell to Revive Gay Union Act’ 30/11/2007 Canberra Timeshttp://canberra.
yourguide.com.au/news/local/news/general/corbell-to-revive-gay-union accessed 13/05/2008.
35 Ross Peake, ‘Angry Corbell Abandons Gay Plan’ 5/5/2008 Canberra Timeshttp://www.canberra.
yourguide.com.au/printerFreindlypage.asp?story_id+1237202 accessed 5/05/2008.
4 . The Foregrounding of Love in the Same-Sex Marriage Debate
91
versions of the legislation.36 The first ‘partnership’ under the new law took place 
on 25 November 2009.37 After initial concerns that the Federal Government 
would override this amendment, it has remained untouched. However, the issue 
of gay marriage has not gone away. In 2013, three countries — Uruguay, New 
Zealand and France — passed legislation that legalises gay marriage, bringing 
the total of countries to do so to 14.38 A Bill recognising gay marriage has passed 
the House of Commons in England,39 and US President Obama is now supporting 
gay marriage and has stated:
Our journey is not complete until our gay brothers and sisters are treated 
like anyone else under the law — for if we are truly created equal, then 
surely the love we commit to one another must be equal as well.40 
In Australia too there is a shift in the mood. Kevin Rudd recently announced 
that he had changed his position on the issue and was now a supporter of gay 
marriage and the Lobor Party has agreed to allow a conscience vote in parliament 
on the issue. 
Sensing a possible change of mood, the ACT once more introduced legislation. 
The Marriage Equality (Same Sex) Act 2013 passed the legislative assembly in 
October 2013, but its fate was short lived. The Act was successfully challenged 
in the High Court on the constitutional ground of inconsistency with a federal 
law (section 109). The ACT therefore remains without gay marriage legislation 
and the rest of Australia spasmodically argues the issue. 
The Struggle for the Meaning of Marriage
Procreation v Love
In large part, the same-sex marriage debate in the ACT became an argument 
about whether we understand marriage as an institution whose raison d’etre 
is procreation or love. For Labor and the Greens, the goal became not only to 
recognise same-sex relationships but also to recognise them as love relationships. 
36 The Bill also facilitates the creation of civil partnership notaries and the recognition of civil partnerships 
made in other jurisdictions. It avoids the issue of mimicking marriage by being for the exclusive use of same-
sex couples.
37 http://actgay.e-p.net.au/news/280-first-ceremony-takes-place-in-canberra accessed 2/12/09.
38 B Miller, ‘Joy, Anger as France Legalises Same-Sex Marriage’ http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-04-24/
joy-anger-as-france-legalises-same-sex-marriage Accessed 24/04/2013. 
39 ‘Gay Marriage Bill Passes Britain’s House of Commons’ http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-05-22/britains-
gay-marriage-bill-passes-major-hurdle/4704878 accessed 14/06/2013.
40 ‘Obama’s Evolution On Gay Marriage’ http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/obamas-evolution-gay-marriage/
story?id=19150614 accessed 14/06/2013.
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Love had been raised in the federal parliamentary debates around the changing 
of the Marriage Act,41 but it became more central in debates about the ACT’s 
Civil Unions Bill. Andrew Barr MLA said that the Civil Union Bill is about,
supporting loving, caring relationships regardless of the sexuality of those 
involved. … Saying no to civil unions is to say that some relationships 
are more legitimate than others; that some loving, committed long-term 
relationships are; for some inexplicable reason, of lesser value.42
Jon Stanhope said that ‘[t]hose of us who enjoy rich and enduring marriages 
might ask ourselves how we would feel if we were to be suddenly and rudely 
informed that our love was a lesser love’.43
In the Senate, Greens Senator Kerry Nettle told a story of a lesbian couple in the 
ACT who had been planning their civil union when the legislation was struck 
down. When the news had reached their daughter that her mothers could no 
longer have a civil union she had declared that it was not the Prime Minister’s 
business who can fall in love. Senator Nettle went on to say:
I reckon that the 12-year-old has a better handle on what this debate is 
about than a lot of parliamentarians do. She understands that this debate 
is about love. It is about who can love each other and who can have their 
relationship recognised.44
Senator Bob Brown also thought it was a debate about love: ‘What is it about 
these gentlemen that they cannot recognise thousands of Australia’s loving 
relationships’.45 Senator Christine Milne also saw the debate as being about love, 
arguing that: ‘it is about recognising love and commitment — and isn’t that the 
very definition of the marital ideal, of what marriage, of what civil union is 
fundamentally about; love and commitment?’46
The fact that, for many, the argument for same-sex marriage is about the recognition 
of same-sex love is also evident in the way the struggle is being conceived by 
41 Arch Bevis, in the debate about the changes to the Marriage Act, said that ‘the thing that establishes … 
loving relationships is not gender and is not sexuality. Love, respect and tolerance for one another and honesty 
with one another are keys to that lasting loving partnership. I know a number of people, people I have worked 
with and people who are friends of mine, who are gays and lesbians in longstanding relationships who I 
believe have that same love and respect and tolerance and open honesty with one another that I identify in 
my relationship with my wife.’ Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates House of Representatives June 16 2004 
(Arch Bevis) http://parlinfoweb.aph.gov.au/piweb/view_document.aspx?ID=2262773 accessed 13/05/2008.
42 Australian Capital Territory, Parliamentary Debates Legislative Assembly May 11 2006, 1602 (Andrew Barr).
43 Australian Capital Territory, Parliamentary Debates Legislative Assembly May 11 2006, 1623 (Jon Stanhope).
44 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates Senate June 15 2006 (Kerry Nettle) http://parlinfoweb.aph.gov.
au/piweb/view_document.aspx?ID=2345413 accessed 13/05/2008.
45 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates Senate June 15 2006 (Bob Brown) http://parlinfoweb.aph.gov.au/
piweb/view_document.aspx?ID=2345425 accessed 13/05/2008.
46 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates Senate June 15 2006 (Christine Milne) http://parlinfoweb.aph.
gov.au/piweb/view_document.aspx?ID=2345449 accessed 13/05/2008.
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activists. For example, the Victorian Gay and Lesbian Rights Lobby's campaign 
for relationship recognition is called ‘Equal Love’.47 Recently the Mayor of the 
NSW town of Byron Bay moved a motion to recognise gay marriage and establish 
a ‘Love Park’ in town as a symbol of recognition and acceptance of gay and lesbian 
relationships. That this is a love park rather than a ‘tolerance’, ‘acceptance’, 
‘inclusion’, ‘justice’, ‘equality’ or ‘rights’ park, is telling. 
The same-sex marriage debate is very much about making romantic love visible 
outside of heterosexual relationships. It is quantitatively about breaking down 
the disassociation that exists between same-sex couples and love, because love 
as much as marriage carries with it the badges of legitimacy and respectability. 
In Senator Milne’s speech, however, we get to the crux of the matter. What we 
are seeing here is a debate not just about who can love, but also about whether 
love and marriage go together. What we see in this debate is the argument that, 
on the one hand, marriage is about love and nothing else — this being the 
modern romantic love rhetoric of marriage —, and, on the other, the argument 
that marriage is not only about love, but also about procreation. The central 
debate and issue is very clearly stated by ACT Liberal MLA, Vicki Dunne, in the 
following lengthy quotation. Here she argues that heterosexual relationships are 
different to homosexual ones because they are ‘ordered towards reproduction, 
towards having children’and, as such, she argues, are fundamentally different 
and more valuable to society than homosexual relationships:
Heterosexual relationships, particularly marriage, have the potential 
to produce a material benefit to society in the form of new members, 
something separate from and external to the relationship. Homosexual 
relationships on the other hand, are simply not like that. The partners 
might be just as affectionate and they may be just as sincere as those in a 
heterosexual relationship, but that does not alter the simple fact … that 
their relationship is formed for a different purpose … The fundamental 
raison d’etre for society’s recognition of heterosexual relationships through 
the legal institution of marriage is not the recognition of the love and 
affection … Love and affection are enormously important qualities but 
ultimately they are the ones which are superimposed on the fundamental 
rationale for the legal institution of marriage which is reproduction.48
47 See http://www.vglrl.org.au/campaigns/equal-love/index.php.
48 Australian Capital Territory, Parliamentary Debates Legislative Assembly May 11 2006, 1619 (Vicki 
Dunne). See also Senator Stephen Fielding (Family First): ‘The major difference between marriages and same-
sex relationships is that marriages can produce children’ Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates Senate 
June 15 2006 http://parlinfoweb.aph.gov.au/piweb/view_document.aspx?ID=2345445 accessed 13/05/2008; 
Patrick Farmer (LP): ‘The institution of marriage remains the principal basis of our social foundation. We 
need to promote this view of marriage for what it truly is — a pillar of our society — and it should not 
be altered.’ Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates House of Representatives June 16 2004 (Patrick Farmer) 
http://parlinfoweb.aph.gov.au/piweb/view_document.aspx?ID=2263233 accessed 13/05/2008.
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This position, that marriage is more about procreation than anything else, relies 
on another often made argument: that a heterosexual family is the best model 
for society. This view is typified by the following statement by Peter Jensen, 
Anglican Archbishop of Sydney:
We are better off generally speaking, living in families founded by a man 
and a woman who have made their initial public promises of lifelong 
fidelity. It is the family so constituted that is the primary source for 
the love and care without which we cannot survive. It is this family 
that best meets our relationship needs. It is this family that provides 
children with the experience of the interaction of human maleness and 
femaleness. It is children of this family who we may expect will look 
after their aged, lonely and sick.49
The same argument was rehearsed in almost identical terms in the debate on the 
same-sex adoption Bill introduced into the NSW Parliament in August 2010. 
Debate on this Bill consisted of, on the one hand, the NSW Council of Churches 
asserting the importance of a heterosexual relationship in bringing up children, 
while, on the other hand, supporters of the Bill arguing that the sexuality of 
parents makes little difference to their ability to provide a loving and secure 
environment for children to grow up in.50
Indeed, the whole debate around same-sex marriage and same-sex families 
forms part of a much wider debate about how we understand family and 
relationships and whether such concepts must be constructed around sex, 
gender and traditional heterosexual forms. The concept of family is problematic 
for same-sex couples because it has been understood as being framed within 
these factors. While outward signs point to a change in these perceptions, the 
understanding of family via biology and nature continue to exercise influence. 
Many have challenged this understanding. Judith Butler, for example, is one of 
many who point to the success of non-traditional family forms not only in same-
sex families but also in other cultures; African American families in the US and 
49 Peter Jensen, Anglican Archbishop of Sydney, ‘Unique Union’ The Australian May 8, 2008 http://www.
theaustralian.com.au/news/unique-union/story-e6frg73o-1111116275570 accessed 25/07/10. See also Alby 
Shultz (LP): ‘it is in the best interest of children to have a mother and a father’ Commonwealth, Parliamentary 
Debates House of Representatives June 17 2004 (Alby Schultz) http://parlinfoweb.aph.gov.au/piweb/view_
document.aspx?ID=2263265 accessed 13/05/2008. See also comments during the 2010 federal election campaign 
by Family First candidate Wendy Francis, who was quoted as saying: ‘Children in homosexual relationships 
are subject to emotional abuse. Legitimating gay marriage is like legalising child abuse.’ Wendy Francis, Family 
First candidate for 2010 federal election, cited in C Glennie, ‘Family First candidate sparks outrage over gay 
marriage’ ABC PM 09/07/2010 http://www.abc.net.au/pm/content/2010/s2977960.htm accessed 10/08/2010. 
Recently, the Australian Christian Lobby released a media alert warning that legalising same-sex marriage 
would create a ‘new stolen generation’ because it would be robbing children from their biological parents. See 
‘Mr Rudd’s Change On Marriage Sets Up a New Stolen Generation’ ACL media release 21/05/2013 http://www.
acl.orf.au/2013/05/mr-rudd%E2%80%99s-change-on-marriage-sets-up-a-new… accessed 1/06/2013. 
50 J Macey, ‘Same-Sex Adoption bill in NSW Parliament’ ABC PM 31/08/2010 http://www.abc.net.au/pm/
content/2010/s2998784.htm accessed 1/09/2010.
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Na families in China, for example.51 But a more sustained change needs to occur. 
John Borneman has called for a general re-evaluation, from seeing descent 
and affinity as part of marriage and procreation and heterosexuality toward a 
recognition of the diversity of ‘forms of intimacy and sociality’ that have existed 
over time and in different places, and which have fulfilled the essential function 
of caring and being cared for.52 
In the meantime, in relation to the same-sex debate, two fallacies must be 
challenged; first, that procreation can only occur as a result of sex and 
heterosexuality; and second, that it is this context that creates the best 
environment to bring up children. The reality is that children are born to couples 
via a variety of means, such as artificial insemination, donors and surrogacy 
agreements. The reality, we also know, is that many people marry without ever 
intending to have children, because they already have them, because they are 
infertile, or simply because they do not want to. All of these points were made 
in Re Kevin. In relation to heterosexual parents being the best parenting model, 
as Labor MP Anthony Albanese suggested, it might be the case that same-
sex couples actually make better parents. He argued: ‘I have seen a lot of bad 
parents. I have not seen bad same-sex parents. I do not know very many, but 
every same-sex couple I know really wants their child and loves their child. 
That should be respected’.53 Furthermore, leaving aside the parents, empirical 
studies consistently show that growing up in a same-sex family either has a 
neutral or a positive effect on raising children.54 
Christianity and Marriage
The persistence of the marriage for procreation argument can be attributed to the 
influence of Christianity on the discourse of marriage. Take for, example, Liberal 
Party MP Robert Baldwin’s position: ‘what I am seeking to do is ensure that the 
Christian values of marriage — being an institution between a man and a woman 
for the purpose of procreation — remain as the cornerstone of the foundation 
51 Butler, ‘Is Kinship Always Already Heterosexual?’ 15–16.
52 J Borneman, ‘Caring and Being Cared For: Displacing Marriage, Kinship, Gender, and Sexuality’ in J D 
Faubon (ed), The Ethics of Kinship Ethnographic Inquiries (Rowan & Little Field Publishers, Boston 2001) 30, 43.
53 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates House of Representatives June 16 2004 (Anthony Albanese) 
htpp://parlinfoweb.aph.gov.au/piweb/view_document.aspx?ID+2263289 accessed 13/05/2008.
54 Charlotte Patterson’s study on gay and lesbian families for the American Psychological Association found 
no study that concluded that a parent’s sexuality had a negative psychological impact upon the development 
of their children. Charlotte J Patterson, Lesbian and Gay Parenting American Psychological Association 1995 
cited in T A Salzman & M G Lawler, ‘New Natural Law Theory and Foundational Sexual Ethical Principles: A 
Critique and a Proposal’ (2006) 47 The Heythrop Journal 191. Joan Laird in her study found that children of 
gay and lesbian parents were more tolerant and empathetic than children brought up in heterosexual families. 
Joan Laird, ‘Lesbian and Gay Families’ in F Walsh (ed), Normal Family Processes, second edition (Guilford 
Press, New York 1993). See L Nicholson, ‘The Myth of The Traditional Family’ In H Nelson (ed), Feminism and 
Families (Routledge, New York 1997) 27–42.
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of our society’.55 Leaving aside the question of whether we are to understand 
marriage in a modern secular society such as ours as a religious institution, it 
is important to note, without wishing to overstate the case, that one can find 
support within Christianity for the proposition that marriage is for love. Within 
the Catholic tradition, Acquinas said that marriage was an institution that relies 
upon ‘societas/amicitia’ a kind of friendship and companionship as well as upon 
procreation.56 Erasmus too saw love as part of marriage and in fact goes further 
in defining love as both sensual and spiritual.57 Edmund Leites argues, however, 
that the idea that marriage is about love within Christian theology finds its most 
prominent expression in Puritan theories of marriage. By looking at the works 
of leading theologians of the seventeenth century, such as William Gouge, 
Richard Baxter, Daniel Rogers and Jeremy Taylor, Leites argues that the Puritans 
saw love as one of the greatest goods in life, as being central to marriage, and 
as one of the duties of married of life. He says that, according to these writers, 
‘love is not simply permitted, given the existence of a higher, holier, “spiritual” 
relation between man and wife, nor is it allowed only to forward the other 
purposes of marriage, it is required as a constituent and intrinsic element of a 
good marriage’.58
The connection between marriage and love in Christian theology, however, should 
not be overstated. That marriage is for procreation is still a central view within 
Christian faith and, even when love is admitted as a part of marriage, it is still the 
case that the meaning of love itself converges around the heterosexual procreative 
act. Take, for example, the views of the prominent Catholic and natural law 
theorist John Finnis. Finnis agrees with Acquinas’s conception of marriage as 
being for both procreation and amicitia, however, he says that amicitia is a bond 
that occurs between couples only as a result of a particular sexual act, that is, 
penile-vaginal penetration. This sexual act, and only this sexual act, is capable 
of creating unity between two people. This view is reiterated by many: Lee and 
George say that while oral sex and anal sex constitute body parts coming together, 
it is not the same thing as penile-vaginal sex because only then is there a biological 
unification between two people.59 Germain Grisez says that every animal, whether 
male or female, is incomplete in relation to reproduction, that each animal is only 
a potential part of a mated pair. He suggests that ‘[t]his is true also of men and 
women: as maters who engage in sexual intercourse suited to initiate new life, they 
55 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates House of Representatives June 17 2004 (Robert Baldwin) http://
parlinfoweb.aph.gov.au/piweb/view_document.aspx?ID=2263225 accessed 13/05/2008.
56 J Finnis, ‘Law, Morality and “Sexual Orientation”’ (1995) 9 Notre Dame Journal of Law Ethics and Public 
Policy 28–29.
57 See Leites, ‘The Duty to Desire: Love, Friendship, and Sexuality in Some Puritan Theories of Marriage’ 
(1982) 15 Journal of Social History 385–86.
58 Leites, ‘The Duty to Desire’ 388–89.
59 P Lee & R P George, ‘What Sex Can Be: Self Alienation, Illusion or One-Flesh Union’ (1997) 42 American 
Journal of Jurisprudence 146.
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complete each other and become an organic unit. In doing so, it is literally true 
that they become one flesh’.60 In order to realise the good that is in marriage (either 
procreation and/or love) the couple must achieve unity and complementarity ‘so 
really and so completely that they are two in one flesh’. ‘One flesh reality’, is 
achieved via ‘marital consent’ and ‘bodily communion’.61 Conjugal sex is required 
to achieve this heightened state of togetherness. But not any sexual contact will 
do, only the union of the reproductive organs is capable of achieving the required 
complementarity. 
This reliance on the reproductive act for love is not the same as equating 
marriage with procreation. This is too crude an interpretation. Having children 
is not required for a marriage to be valid.62 Having a child is an extrinsic act to 
marriage and cannot therefore define marriage. Marriage is to be defined by its 
intrinsic value and this value is to be found in friendship (love) and parenthood. 
For Finnis then, ‘the moral importance of the marital act … is determined by 
its intrinsic procreative and unitive meanings, not by any instrumental, that is 
extrinsic meaning’,63 such as procreation. 
The Struggle for the Meaning of Love
What emerges from the new natural law view of marriage and love is the centrality 
of the idea of complementarity. In the new natural law view, complementarity 
is understood in different ways: it can be biological, genital, reproductive, 
parental and affective.64 Central to it is the idea that there are certain ‘realities 
that belong together in the created order and that together produce a whole 
which neither produces alone’.65
The idea of complementarity to an understanding of love is not unique to new 
natural law theory. Returning briefly to Plato’s Symposium, here we find the 
expression par excellence that love is the unification of two halves, the creation 
of a full being. Aristophanes’ myth tells that, long ago, human beings were 
physically very different. They had four hands, four legs, two heads and two 
sets of genitalia. They could move forwards and backwards and would move 
very quickly by cart-wheeling on all eight limbs. In this powerful form, humans 
were a great threat to the gods and for this reason Zeus decided to cut them 
60 G Grisez, The Way of the Lord Jesus vol 2: Living a Christian Life (Franciscan Press, Quincy University 
1993) 146.
61 Grisez, The Way of the Lord Jesus 586.
62 Although there is an argument implied here that sex is required.
63 Salzman & Lawler, ‘New Natural Law Theory’ 185.
64 Salzman & Lawler, ‘New Natural Law Theory’ 185.
65 Salzman & Lawler, ‘New Natural Law Theory’ 186.
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in half. Humans were miserable in their reduced state and spent their whole 
time searching for their ‘other half’. When they found each other they stayed 
together, foregoing all other activity in fear of losing each other again.66
The history of romantic love continued to build upon this idea of merging. 
The courtly tradition, known for ennobling love, also saw love as an intense 
and passionate relationship that established a ‘oneness’ between the lovers. This 
idea progressed even further during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
with the idea that love could involve, to borrow Singer’s words, a ‘oneness with 
an alter ego, one’s self, a man or woman who would make up one’s deficiencies, 
respond to one’s deepest inclinations, and serve as possibly the only person 
with whom one could communicate fully’.67 Robert Nozick claimed that the 
central idea of romantic love is a desire to ‘constitute a new entity in the world, 
what might be called a we’.68 Delaney says that ‘perhaps the most important 
thing people associate with the ideal of romantic love, is this desire to unite 
with another person in profound psychological and physical ways’.69 By the end 
of the twentieth century, Marilyn Friedman described love as having become 
‘merger mania’.70
The idea of a merger does not have to be between a man and a woman per se, 
Aristophanes certainly did not specify that the two halves were of opposing 
sex. In fact, he specifically said that some would be of the same-sex. The idea 
has, however, continued to be understood as a man and a woman coming 
together. Branden, for example, describes romantic love as fulfilling our 
need to ‘encounter, unite with, and live out vicariously our opposite-gender 
possibilities: The need, in males, to find an embodiment in the world of the 
internal feminine: The need in females, to find an embodiment in the world of 
the internal masculine.’71
The idea of the male and female coming together to form a unity is a popular 
idea that we can find expressed in other places. Zanghellini points out that it 
is a common message in popular culture, evolutionary psychology and can be 
found also in unexpected places such as the discourse of difference that exists 
in some strands of feminist theory.72 Complementarity and merger are, in turn, 
66 The idea can also be found in other traditions that have nothing to do with love. For example, the 
concepts of Ying and Yang in Chinese philosophy. See Aristophanes’ myth in Plato Symposium.
67 Singer, The Nature of Love vols 3 & 4.
68 R Norzik, Examined Life: Philosophical Meditations (Simon and Shuster, New York 1989) 70.
69 Delaney N, ‘Love and Loving Commitment: Articulating a Modern Ideal’ (1996) 33(4) American 
Philosophical Quarterly 340.
70 Friedman, Autonomy, Gender, Politics (Oxford University Press, New York 2003) chapter 6; ‘Romantic Love 
and Personal Autonomy’ 115–139. She is critical of this in relation to the impact it has on women’s autonomy.
71 Zanghellini, ‘Marriage and Civil Union’ 225.
72 Zanghellini, ‘Marriage and Civil Union’ 290–91.
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easily understood within the concepts of nature and procreation that are central 
tropes in both marriage and love. These elements are evident in the same-sex 
marriage debate. However, as discussed, romantic love is a contested idea. 
In contemporary society, romantic love is considered a radical power capable of 
breaking down the most entrenched of social cultural and religious barriers. It 
is associated with freedom, individual satisfaction and equality. Theorists such 
as Giddens have equated it with the democratisation of the private sphere. It is 
these features that make it threatening to traditional institutions. At the same 
time, perhaps paradoxically, romantic love is considered quite conservative and 
it has been linked with the replication of both patriarchy and heteronormativity. 
The Heteronormativity of Law and Love (The Queer 
Critique of Love)
In The Straight Mind Monique Wittig says that to ‘live in society is to live in 
heterosexuality … heterosexuality is always already there within all the mental 
categories. It has sneaked into dialectical thought (or thought of differences) as 
its main category.’73 It is not surprising, therefore, to find profound heterosexual 
assumptions at work in our understanding of romantic love.
In the long running 1979 Harvey Fierstein play, Torch Song Trilogy, Arnold’s 
mother is shocked when Arnold compares the loss of his gay partner, who has 
been murdered in a homophobic attack, to his mother’s loss of her husband. 
Arnold responds to his mother’s admonishment by saying:
Cause everybody knows that queers don’t feel nothin’ …
Cause everybody knows that queers don’t matter! Queers don’t love!74
What Arnold exclaims here is the silence of homosexual love within romantic love.75 
Cheshire Calhoun has argued that romantic love is constructed in our society 
in a way that excludes ‘non-heterosexual’ love.76 Calhoun argues that romantic 
love, like other emotions, is dependent upon a society’s emotional scripts. Such 
scripts have the function of teaching us those emotions, the proper object of 
73 M Wittig, The Straight Mind (Harvester Wheatsheaf, New York 1992) 40–43.
74 Harvey Fierstein, Torch Song Trilogy (Villard Books, New York 1983 c 1979) 144–46.
75 Incidentally, he is also pointing out the silence that exists around homosexual death.
76 C Calhoun, Feminism, the Family, and the Politics of the Closet: Lesbian and Gay Displacement (Oxford 
University Press, New York 2000); ‘Sexuality Injustice’ (1995) 9 Notre Dame Journal of Law Ethics & Public 
Policy 241–274; ‘Making Up Emotional People: The Case of Romantic Love’ in Bandes (ed), The Passions of 
Law (New York University Press, New York 1999) 217–240; ‘Family’s Outlaws: Rethinking the Connections 
Between Feminism, Lesbianism and the Family’ in H Nelson (ed), Feminism and Families (Routledge, New 
York 1997) 131–150.
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them, how to assess their authenticity and how to perform them.77 The problem 
in relation to homosexual and lesbian love is that there are no paradigm scenarios 
or emotional scripts to follow. Even more importantly, there are actual barriers 
to the performance of romantic love for gay and lesbian couples, such as the 
prohibition to marry and to have a family.78
Paul Johnson79 has argued that the heterosexual construction of love is maintained 
by its association with traditional scripts of marriage and domesticity, (as well 
as its connection with nature).80 The link between love and traditional scripts 
of relationships, domesticity and procreation are so pervasive that they find 
expression in the gay and lesbian community itself. Sean Slavin’s study of 
sexual practice among gay men found that the men struggled to make sense of 
their sexual and romantic lives through the binaries of sex and love, and sex 
and relationships.81 Slavin found that the men to some extent accepted these 
traditional binaries, but at the same time were frustrated by the attempt to make 
sense of their relationships in these ways.82 As Lauren Berlant has put it, when 
there is only one plot, and that plot counts as life, then ‘those who don’t or can’t 
find their way in that story — the queers, the single, the something else — can 
become so easily unimaginable, even often to themselves’.83 
Slavin has argued that gay men have to fight for the recognition of the relationships 
they actually have. Open relationships, casual sex with regular partners, multiple 
sex partners, can all represent love and must not be categorised as only sex.84 
This view has been voiced by others. Bell and Binnie have argued that love must 
move away from the couple and include non-monogamy, polyamory and episodic 
sexuality.85 The recognition of ‘other’ relationships is central to the breakdown of 
the heteronormativity of love. They argue that one of the positive contributions 
that gay liberation has made is the blurring of the distinction between sex and 
love, between the categories of friend, lover and partner. This blurring has 
77 Calhoun, ‘Making Up Emotional People’ 222.
78 Calhoun, ‘Making Up Emotional People’ 222.
79 Johnson, Love, Heterosexuality and Society.
80 Johnson, Love, Heterosexuality and Society 40.
81 S Slavin, ‘Instinctively, I’m Not Just a Sexual Beast: The Complexity of Intimacy Among Australian Gay 
Men’ (2009) 12 Sexualities 79–96.
82 Slavin, ‘Instinctively, I’m Not Just a Sexual Beast’ 93.
83 L Berlant (ed), Intimacy (University of Chicago Press, Chicago 2000) 6. The same point is made by Judith 
Butler who says ‘[i]f you’re not real, it can be hard to sustain yourself over time’. J Butler, ‘Is Kinship Always 
Already Heterosexual?’ (2002) 13 Differences 25.
84 Slavin, ‘Instinctively, I’m Not Just a Sexual Beast’ 93.
85 D Bell and J Binnie, The Sexual Citizen: Queer Politics and Beyond (Polity Press, Cambridge 2000) 128.
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introduced an ethic to casual sex that includes ‘affection, care, respect, consent 
and playfulness.’86 This contribution can be extended to love itself, love can be 
played out in different kinds of relationships based on new scripts.87 
The importance of replicating heterosexual love scripts (monogamy, family, 
parenthood, domesticity)88 has proven to be important for success in legal 
disputes in a number of different contexts. In the case of Re Kevin, for example, 
a case can be made that a large part of the success that that couple had in 
having their relationship recognised as marriage was the extent to which they 
so successfully replicated the scripts of domesticity and family. Kevin and 
Jennifer presented themselves very much as the model of a heterosexual couple 
committed to each other and committed to the romantic ideal. They were in a 
long-term relationship, had one child and were expecting another. In evidence 
before the Court, Kevin was described repeatedly as a loving husband and father. 
Friends gave evidence the couple was, ‘[j]ust another married couple living their 
lives with their son’89 and ‘your average mum and dad with a much loved little 
boy’,90 and described Kevin as ‘a fine husband and father to Quentin’.91 Justice 
Chisolm described Kevin and Jennifer and their child as a family in ‘every sense 
of the word.’92  
Contrast these facts with the UK Corbett v Corbett case.93 The couple in Corbett 
could not be more different to the couple in Re Kevin, they fitted more readily 
in the stereotypical bohemian and sexually deviant LGBTI life/sex scripts. 
April Ashley was a male-to-female transsexual. She worked as an entertainer 
in the South of France with a well-known troupe of ‘transvestites’94 at the 
Hotel Carousel. She also worked as a model and had become a minor celebrity 
following a series of articles in the News of the World. 
Arthur Corbett was divorced and had four children. He was interested in 
‘transvestism’. He enjoyed dressing as a woman and had had homosexual 
experiences with several men. The Court described him as someone who had 
86 Bell & Binnie, The Sexual Citizen 134. See also J Weeks, Invented Moralities: Sexual Values in an Age 
of Uncertainty (Polity Press, Cambridge 1995); S Seidman, Romantic Longings: Love in America, 1830–1980 
(Routledge New York 1991).
87 F Manalansaniv, ‘Queer Love in the Time of War and Shopping’ in G E Haggerty & M McGarry (eds), A 
Companion to Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Queer Studies (Blackwell Publishing, MA 2007) 77–86.
88 See Johnson, Love, Heterosexuality and Society.
89 Re Kevin 170 (Chisholm J).
90 Re Kevin 170 (Chisholm J).
91 Re Kevin 170 (Chisholm J).
92 Re Kevin 168 (Chisholm J).
93 Corbett v Corbett (otherwise Ashley) [1970] 2 All ER 33.
94 The language used in the original case is ‘transvestite’ and ‘transvestism’.
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become ‘more and more involved in the society of sexual deviants, and interested 
in sexual deviations of all kinds … He is a man who is extremely prone to all 
kinds of sexual fantasies and practices.’95 
Arthur Corbett had sought a meeting with April because he was fascinated by 
her success as a female; April had gained some fame in ‘transvestite’ circles. 
Following their meeting, however, Arthur claimed that he developed an interest 
in her as ‘a man would for a woman’. In other words, he fell in love with her, 
although such language was not used in the case.
Despite their turbulent relationship, and despite the fact that April found Arthur 
to be a ‘difficult and perplexing person’,96 April eventually agreed to marry him. 
The marriage lasted only 12 days. The Court could not establish the extent to 
which the relationship had been sexual, but it was clear that this relationship 
was not conventional. Their love for each other was not displayed by the couple 
living together, having sex together, sharing daily life and so on. Unlike Jennifer 
and Kevin, they did not adhere to the traditional heterosexual scripts of love, 
relationships and domesticity. The Court described Arthur’s feelings for April as 
an obsession, and described him as living ‘in the grip of his fantasies’.97 Words 
such as ‘commitment’, ‘affection’, ‘desire’ or ‘love’ are never used to describe 
this relationship, and both April and Arthur were judged incapable of such 
emotions. Instead of love, they were described as feeling ‘obsession’;98 instead 
of desire they were ‘prone to sexual fantasies and practices’.99 Justice Ormond 
puts it as plainly as can be:
Listening to each party describing this strange relationship, my 
principal impression was that it had little or nothing in common with 
any heterosexual relationship which I could recall hearing about in a 
fairly extensive experience of this court.100 
Their fate was sealed, their marriage would never receive the legal recognition 
April wanted. How could it? Unlike Kevin and Jennifer, their relationship had 
‘little or nothing in common’ with the heterosexual ideal of romantic love.
The heteronormativity of both marriage and love makes many cautious, but 
while the legal recognition of same-sex marriage has the potential to reinforce 
the heteronormativity of marriage and of love, it is also capable of strengthening 
the radical rhetoric of love and has the potential to radicalise marriage.
95 Corbett v Corbett 37–38 (Ormrod J).
96 Corbett v Corbett 38 (Ormrod J).
97 Corbett v Corbett 39 (Ormrod J).
98 Corbett v Corbett 38 (Ormrod J).
99 Corbett v Corbett 38 (Ormrod J).
100 Corbett v Corbett 38 (Ormrod J).
4 . The Foregrounding of Love in the Same-Sex Marriage Debate
103
Feminists and Queer theorists are right to say that accepting marriage into their 
political frameworks can be read as a watering down of the radical nature of 
their love, but it can be equally argued that it will have the opposite effect. 
The recognition that love can be played out in different kinds of relationships, 
based on new scripts, is central to the breakdown of the heteronormativity of 
love and central to a positive reading of love. This could be read as an aspect of 
queering love. 
Just as there are positive feminist readings of love, so too are there positive 
queer readings of love. Berlant, for example, argues that love is ultimately a 
site of optimism, change and transformation: ‘love approximates a space to 
which people can return, becoming as different as they can be from themselves 
without being traumatically shattered; it is a scene of optimism for change, 
for transformational environment’.101 Johnson claims that ‘whilst romantic love 
may create the hell of mutual alienation it also retains its primacy as an anti-
alienating potential because it offers a way of expressing forms of pleasurable 
subjective transformation’.102 To be able to achieve this, however, love must 
be seen as being connected rather than disconnected to agency, as being 
connected to but not subordinate to desire, and, importantly, it must be seen 
as something that exists outside of heterosexual scripts. Berlant says that when 
queer thought enters the discourse of love, it must not teach ‘that we are all 
alike and compelled to repeat our alikeness intelligibly, but by teaching some of 
what we’ve learned about love, under the surface, across the lines, around the 
scenes, informally’.103 Queering love for Berlant is achieved when it lives up to 
its promises of existing outside of established institutions, when it challenges 
all rules connected with it which presume to establish principles for living.104 
In other words, when love delivers what it promises, intimate relationships that 
are free of oppressive and traditional forms and rejects established rules and 
barriers. The project then is to break down a number of associations that define 
love: to break down the binary of love and sex and see them instead as existing 
in more fluid combinations; to break down the connection that now exists with, 
on the one hand, same-sex relationships and sex, and on the other, heterosexual 
relationships and love;105 and to break down the connection between love and 
marriage, family and procreation. Same-sex marriage can assist this project. 
Recognition of same-sex marriage does not have to be a recognition of the 
oppressive and heteronormative love that feminists and queer theorists have 
warned us against, rather it can be a recognition of the radical and optimistic 
101 L Berlant, ‘Love: A Queer Feeling’ in T Dean & C Lane (eds), Psychoanalysis and Homosexuality (Chicago 
University Press, Chicago 2000) 448.
102 Johnson, Love, Heterosexuality and Society 83.
103 Berlant, ‘Love: A Queer Feeling’ 448.
104 Berlant, ‘Love: A Queer Feeling’ 443.
105 Same-sex relationships are seen as either sexual or platonic but rarely as loving in the romantic sense.
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love that breaks down barriers of culture, religion, class and sexuality and values 
and creates equality. It will recognise a love that is closer to Giddens’ idea of a 
democratic and inclusive love. It will not achieve the broad recognition of all 
loving relationships that exist in society that many queer theorists want, but it 
will expand the recognition beyond the narrow heterosexual model and progress 
us along the road to making love even more radical than we now think it is. 
Conclusion
The legal debate over same-sex marriage has exploded not only the meaning 
of marriage but also of love. In the legal episodes previously discussed, while 
traditional meanings of marriage were being discarded, little was said about how 
we are to interpret modern marriage This void can be filled by romantic love. 
In the same-sex marriage debate, this has become an explicit argument. Here, 
the argument comes down to whether marriage is about procreation or love. The 
view that has so far appeared to dominate is that marriage is about procreation. 
Deconstructing the debate, however, shows that for a significant number of 
participants in the debate, marriage can also be about love. Just when we appear 
to have broken down the connection between marriage and procreation, which 
is considered to be the barrier, we discover that the barrier is also love itself. 
Framing the debate as one in which procreation and love compete for the central 
place is, in fact, not very helpful at all, because the two institutions appear to 
be grounded in the same ideas. The central tropes in both marriage and love are 
biology, nature and procreation.
A less understood aspect of the debate is how we understand love. The idea of 
love that appears to dominate the debate is one embedded in love as merger and 
complementarity. Christianity and new natural law see this as being achieved 
only via the sexual merger of a male and female body. This is not unique to the 
Christian view of love, however. It has permeated our understanding of love since 
classical times and has retained currency throughout the history of the western 
idea of love. Viewing the same-sex marriage debate through this lens, it is difficult 
not to conclude that the orthodox idea of love does not serve us well. In particular, 
it makes the idea that romantic love is liberating sound hollow. The way we 
conceive of romantic love does not mean that ‘love does not discriminate’.106 It is 
not the great leveller in society that Solomon and others107 insist it is. Cinderella 
might have got her prince and all that came with it, but no matter how much she 
loved, she would not have got her prize if she had been a he.
106 Quote on a placard at a rally in support of same-sex marriage in the ACT in 2009.
107 See the discussion on romantic love.
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This is a pessimistic view of the idea of love that emerges from the debate, 
and ignores another, more optimistic, reading. The same-sex marriage debate 
can also be read as enforcing the idealistic ideas of love which many see as 
revolutionary and capable of breaking down entrenched barriers. Agitating 
for same-sex marriage on the ground that marriage is about love rather than 
procreation challenges not only the heteronormativity of marriage but also of 
love. Two readings of love can come out of the legal recognition of same-sex 
marriage. One of those readings is that love is indeed steeped in both patriarchy 
and heterosexuality; the other is that it is a radical and liberating force. I think 
that the latter reading has more force. Feminism and queer theory have come 
too far to agitate for the recognition of the rights of women and LGBTI to now 
enter an institution and simply get subsumed into its dark past. The more likely 
outcome is that the institution of marriage will change to reflect these new 
modes of loving and help to reflect the radical reading of romantic love and 
obscure the other. 
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5. Conclusion: Law, Love and 
Marriage
Despite sustained criticism, love has remained a central discourse in western 
societies. Marriage, despite looking at times like becoming obsolete, has proven 
itself to be an entrenched and powerful social institution. This book has tested 
the extent to which these two concepts interact with each other within the 
ambit of a third powerful institution: law. In the process, this book has said 
something about law, about love, and about marriage.
Law
This book challenges the understanding we have of law. Thinking about law and 
love has important consequences for thinking about the relationship between 
reason and emotion in public life, and, in turn, thinking about the role that 
emotion plays in law. Law and emotion scholarship asserts that emotions are 
important for public life and for law, informing both theory and practice. This 
book has adopted this position and tested it in relation to the legal discourse of 
marriage, showing how such an analysis can lead to a better understanding of 
the legal institution of marriage. 
The dominant paradigm of law stems from positivism. Positivism removes 
emotion from law in rejecting morality and rights as irrelevant, embracing a 
scientific paradigm and exalting and striving for objectivity above all else. 
However, positivism’s view of law has been challenged by critical approaches 
which have made ‘space’ for emotion as a result of a number of central assertions 
about law.
Critical jurisprudence has insinuated emotion in law through a number of 
challenges. Critical jurisprudence scholarship has challenged the idea that law 
is and can be objective by claiming instead that law is political (CLS), sexist 
(feminism), racist (CRT), and heteronormative (queer). Critical jurisprudence 
has challenged the idea that objectivity is required for the legitimacy of law 
and has argued instead that objectivity is the law’s downfall (CLS). Critical 
jurisprudence has also legitimated emotion by arguing against the public and 
private divide (feminism) and by legitimating the subject of law and storytelling 
(feminism, CRT, queer and post-modern). Finally, emotion is legitimated by 
critical jurisprudence via its rejection of a unitary and metaphysical paradigm 
of law (postmodernism, CLS). Despite the achievements of critical jurisprudence 
and law and emotion scholarship, law is still considered to be separate from 
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emotions generally, and from love even more so. This view impoverishes 
our understanding of law in general and its specific enterprises, such as the 
regulation and construction of marriage. 
Love
The idea of love has existed at least since classical times. Its importance in 
everyday life grew under the influence of Christianity, during the courtly period, 
and the romantic period. Christianity raised the idea of love to something divine. 
The courtly tradition began a process of equating it with freedom, personal 
happiness and sexual satisfaction. These ideas were spread to the masses during 
the romantic period, and today we can speak of love as being a reason for life 
itself. Equality, freedom, agency, progress, enlightenment and humanism are all 
words used in this book in association with love. Love has come to symbolise 
the opposite of power and control; a society based on love is assumed to be a 
more free and humane one. These features of love make it an interesting partner 
for marriage, which has more often had the opposite associations. However, love 
is not without its critics. While many have sung love’s praises, it has also been 
described as a ‘modern monster’ which ‘fails to satisfy’ and ‘easily turns into a 
destructive force’.1 Moreover, the assumption that love will make our society a 
more humane one is disputed.
Feminists have seen love as oppressive, a vehicle by which women are enslaved 
in relationships of domesticity and dependence.2 Love’s problem lies in the 
extrinsic environment in which it is played out: the institution of marriage, 
patriarchy, the private and public division, and its association with sex all 
contribute to make love a ‘curse’ for women.3 However, to acknowledge these 
extrinsic factors is not to let love itself off the hook. Intrinsically love’s own logic 
of self-satisfaction and self-government are destructive. Its ideology is circular, 
chaotic and unruly:4 love itself is therefore a problem.
For queer theorists, love’s extrinsic ‘problem’ is heterosexuality. Love is 
understood as embodying heterosexual rituals and scripts of domesticity and, as 
such, excludes same-sex relationships.5 In this way, queer theorists are challenging 
the rhetoric of romantic love which claims that love breaks down barriers. In 
fact, their critique is that love is not romantic enough because it excludes ‘non-
heterosexual’ love. Furthermore, love itself is mostly understood as a physical and 
1 Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, cited by C Smart, Personal Life (Polity Press, Cambridge 2007) 62.
2 See the arguments made by De Beauvoir, Firestone, Smart, Freidman and Langford discussed earlier.
3 De Beauvoir, The Second Sex trans H M Parshley (Alfred A Knopf, New York 1953) 669.
4 See W. Langford, Revolutions of the Heart: Gender, Power and the Delusions of Love (Routledge, London 1999).
5 See Calhoun and Johnson, discussed earlier.
5 . Conclusion: Law, Love and Marriage
109
natural feeling, as a ‘merging’ with another, our other half,6 as a means to attain 
goodness, or a supernatural, mythical feeling. In these ways it is understood as 
being embedded in discourses of merger and of nature. This discourse inevitably 
becomes linked to stereotypical gender roles and to heterosexuality.
The following four statements can be made in relation to our contemporary 
understanding of romantic love:
• Love has become an existential goal, a means to happiness and fulfilment. It 
is the central paradigm for ordering intimate relationships between people, 
including sex and marriage;
• The rhetoric of love asserts that it is above all other social rules, and 
trumps social, cultural, traditional, economic, family, religious, and, class 
conventions and expectations. It is its own law;
• The context in which love is played out is oppressive to women and to same-
sex couples. These contexts are patriarchy, the private-public division, and 
heterosexuality; and
• Love is embedded in concepts of nature that inevitably link back to 
stereotypical gender roles and heterosexuality.
Marriage
Love has become a dominant idea in modern society and has come to dominate 
much of our social thinking, including how we think about the institution of 
marriage. This is true despite the fact that, for many, the traditional, religious 
and patriarchal meanings of marriage remain. For an overwhelming majority, 
when all other reasons for marrying have largely evaporated, the one that 
remains is love. While love can exist without marriage, marriage is considered 
the ultimate expression of two people’s love. It is this connection with love that 
has strengthened the institution of marriage. Despite the various challenges to 
marriage thrown down in the latter part of the twentieth century, it remains 
a central goal for many people, and is widely regarded as a good in society.7 
Once marriage became disconnected from economic need, religious and family 
obligation, realigning itself with romantic love, it found a new audience. Not 
only has it remained popular for heterosexuals, but, as we have seen, it has 
become a goal for same-sex couples.
6 This view can be traced all the way back to the myth of Aristophanes, discussed earlier.
7 See Finnis, discussed in chapter four. There is also a discernable pro-marriage movement which has 
emerged arguing that marriage makes people ‘happier, healthier and wealthier’, protects the wellbeing of 
children, and that the whole of society and should therefore be protected and upheld by governments. See, 
for example, ‘The Marriage Movement’s Statement of Principles’ at http://www.americanvalues.org/pdfs/
marriagemovement.pdf  accessed 28/10/2010. See also L C McClain, ‘What Place for Marriage (E)quality in 
Marriage Promotion?’ in Bernstein (ed), Marriage Proposals 106–144.
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The cases of Garcia, Re Kevin, and the same-sex marriage debate have revealed 
a number of significant themes in relation to the legal discourse of marriage. 
Marriage is to be understood in conjunction with sexual identity and sexual 
intercourse, gender and sexuality, procreation and family, and, not least, in 
conjunction with business, economic and commercial interests. 
Historically, sex has been seen as central to marriage. To be valid, a marriage had 
to be consummated, and procreation was considered its central purpose. With 
the rise of the romantic marriage, sex has come to be connected with mutual 
satisfaction and expression of love. This shifting narrative has been shown via 
analysis of the marital immunity of rape. The narrative came to a decisive point 
with the case of Re Kevin, where the Family Court unequivocally said that sexual 
intercourse was not a defining feature of marriage. However, I have argued that, 
given Re Kevin’s facts and its heteronormative reading of marriage, it must be 
read cautiously.
To say that sex is no longer relevant in the modern legal discourse of marriage 
would be misleading. The shadow of the law that stated that a man could never 
be guilty of raping his wife faintly remains. Courts have continued to see a pre-
existing relationship as relevant to the question of consent. Cases continue to 
show that there is a nexus between being married (or being in a relationship) 
and a lower threshold of consent. Empirical studies suggest that on this issue the 
law is merely reflecting a significant social attitude that still connects marriage 
with a man’s right to have sex.
Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that law has shifted ground considerably 
in relation to sex and marriage. It has gone from saying that a valid marriage 
requires consummation, and from saying that a husband can never be guilty 
of raping his wife, to saying that sexual intercourse is irrelevant to the legal 
status of a marriage either way. Sex is part of marriage only as a result of mutual 
consent. Justice Brennan in R v L alludes to love as the means by which sex is 
negotiated between a married couple.
Garcia considered the relationship between marriage, business and economics. 
The economic aspects of marriage have a history as dark as that relating to sex. In 
the past, marriage reduced women to non-economic actors, incapable of owning 
and controlling property and, indeed, being seen as property themselves coming 
completely under the control of their husbands. The Garcia case resonated with 
the bad old days of marriage in the sense that, on the surface, the Court was 
endorsing the idea that a woman does not and should not necessarily have an 
informed involvement in her husband’s or the family’s business affairs.
Critics argued that the Court’s decision did not reflect the new narrative of 
marriage where the wife was a free, autonomous individual capable and willing to 
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act independently of her husband, not only in general ways, but also specifically 
in the spheres of business and economics. The majority of the judges did not 
dispute this narrative of marriage but argued that it was incomplete. The majority 
decision maintained that marriage is an economic union and, importantly, that 
upon marriage a husband and wife’s economic interests are united. However, 
the judgement also endorses the idea that marriage is an emotional union based 
on trust and confidence, and the existence of these factors means that marriage 
justifiably leads to people acting ‘ignorantly’ as opposed to ‘self-interestedly’. 
While love was never mentioned in the case, I have argued that ‘trust and 
confidence’ can be interpreted as aspects of love. The Court refused to create a 
situation where the trust and confidence that usually exists in a marriage would 
be replaced with suspicion and self-interest, which would be tantamount to 
pulling down a central pillar of marriage. In centralising trust and confidence 
in marriage, the Court in Garcia acknowledged both the good and the bad about 
love. People such as Mrs Garcia do everything for their husbands, for love — 
people do that, women do that, and when it goes wrong the law will help. 
But that help was not to be at the expense of eroding the romantic aspects of 
marriage. The aspects that translate into people behaving in ‘non-rational’ non 
‘self-interested’ ways. Relief could only be given under the ‘special equity of 
wives’ because this principle alone retained and nurtured the special features 
of marriage as a relationship of trust and confidence as avatars of love. Garcia 
also points to a broader issue in relation to marriage and economic interests. The 
law selectively honours individual economic interest in marriage. If marriage is 
a life-long union then there is some sense in seeing it as an economic union. But 
if marriage is a love union which only lasts as long as the love does, then the law 
must learn to acknowledge, measure and allocate individual economic interest. 
If Garcia alluded to love via trust and confidence, Re Kevin can be interpreted as 
further building the case for love in marriage. Re Kevin challenged some central 
assertions about the meaning of marriage. It refuted that the central reason for 
the relationship is procreation and asserted that sexual capacity and sexual 
intercourse are not central to marriage. As such, the decision went further than 
law had before towards constructing marriage as a love relationship. The decision 
can be understood as an affirmation of the importance of love in marriage. If the 
decision in Re Kevin looked like liberalising marriage, the federal legislative 
response against it was swift. In amending the Marriage Act and in overriding 
the ACT’s Civil Union Act the federal government reasserted that marriage is 
more about procreation than anything else, and, as such, must be between a 
man and a woman, and cannot be between same-sex couples. Love is important, 
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but not the most important thing in marriage. However, proponents of same-sex 
marriage are now using love to break down the legal door barring their entrance 
to marriage.8
In the light of the discussion in this book, to what extent can we say that love is 
part of the legal discourse of modern Australian marriage? We have seen that the 
popular rhetoric of love has colonised marriage. Even in the most conservative 
of institutions, such as the monarchy, marriage needs to be presented within 
the romantic love discourse in order to fulfil social conventions.9 As such, one 
would expect to find love within the legal discourse, but it is barely visible 
there. The legal discourse of modern Australian marriage presented in this 
book shows that marriage is still understood according to some of its traditional 
associations: that marriage is, and should be, between a man and a woman 
(Re Kevin, same-sex marriage debate), and that, upon marriage, economic 
and business/commercial interests become united (Garcia). However, some 
traditional links have also been broken: sexual intercourse and procreation 
are not the defining characteristics of marriage (R v L, Re Kevin), and sexual 
intercourse in marriage is subject to mutual consent (R v L). As we have 
seen, love is explicitly visible in this discourse in the context of the same-sex 
marriage debate, where it is pitted against procreation as the central defining 
characteristic of the institution, and it is explicitly visible as a means by which 
sexual relations are negotiated (R v L). At the same time, love can be inferred 
in the discourse via the assertion that trust and confidence are elements of love 
(Garcia). Moreover, when the legal discourse rejects all traditional meanings 
of marriage, the silence left behind can implicitly be filled by romantic love 
(Re Kevin). The impact that the presence of love has on marriage is debatable. 
While its rhetoric of freedom, liberty, equality and agency all inevitably leave a 
mark, love has not shown itself to completely displace the traditional meanings 
of marriage.
Over the years covered by the legal episodes explored in this book, the legal 
discourse of marriage has clearly shifted. There are many reasons for this shift, 
including the entry of love into the discourse. Given the progressive nature of 
romantic love, this leads to hope for a redefinition of the institution of marriage 
along more progressive lines. However, before one can gauge the significance 
that love might have on the institution of marriage, something needs to be said 
about the discourse of love that emerges from the analysis in this book.
8 For example, one of the major groups agitating for same-sex marriage in Australia is called ‘Equal Love’. 
The emphasis on the idea of love has been evident during the 2010 federal election campaign in Australia. A 
hypothetical advertisement made for the Greens clearly states that if you are a supporter of same-sex marriage, 
then you believe that marriage is about love. ABC Gruen Nation episode 3, 10/07/2010 ‘The Pitch: Republic of 
Everyone’ http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O4jI1atQwp4 accessed 23/08/2010.
9 We saw the impact love had on the royal wedding of Prince Charles and Lady Diana. It was also the only 
discourse that justified their divorce. The thing that saved Prince Charles from total unpopularity was that he 
did it all for his love for Camilla.
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Love Again
In Re Kevin the Family Court of Australia rejected some traditional notions of 
marriage. The Court rejected the idea that marriage required sexual activity and 
capacity to be valid, and it rejected procreation as the central defining reason for 
marriage. In rejecting these traditional aspects of marriage, the case came closer 
than any other legal act to insinuating love as a reason for marriage. However, 
the case can also be read as sustaining the traditional association of marriage 
with heterosexuality, asserting that marriage is fundamentally a heterosexual 
institution and, even if love is part of it, that love itself is also understood as 
heterosexual. Kevin and Jennifer were accepted as legally married because 
they loved each other, and because their love closely replicated normative 
heterosexual love. The scripts of this love are procreation, family, domesticity 
and marriage.
The same dynamics are evident in the same-sex marriage debate. The argument 
over same-sex marriage has become an argument over whether marriage is about 
procreation or love. Proponents of same-sex marriage believe that a win for love 
marriage is a win for same-sex marriage, but this denies the heteronormativity 
of romantic love. The predominant way of understanding romantic love in our 
society and culture is primarily as a union between two people, a merger of two 
soul mates, which, as such, is embedded in nature and inevitably heterosexuality.
Re Kevin and the same-sex marriage debate contest the notion that marriage 
is grounded in biology and procreation, but do not disturb those very same 
notions where they exist in our understanding of love. There is therefore a great 
circularity that occurs in the argument that always comes back to heterosexuality 
as the basis for both marriage and love. The analysis in this book points to an 
important failure in the way we understand romantic love which goes to the 
heart of its philosophy and renders it incapable of delivering the great progress, 
freedom and equality which it promises. As long as the notion of merger 
continues to be dominant in our understanding of love, love cannot separate 
itself from nature and therefore from scripts of reproduction, sex difference and 
heterosexuality. We have seen how this is disadvantageous to same-sex love, 
which is accepted only when it reproduces the scripts of heterosexuality. Even 
in the context of trans-sexuality, something more than a physical change in 
sexual identity is required: domesticity, family, parenthood and marriage are all 
important aspects in the construction of a loving couple.
While feminist critiques of love have focussed mainly on patriarchy and 
the private and public divide, a nature paradigm is also significant for their 
critique. Freeman showed clearly how the merger paradigm of love works 
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against women.10 If love is to deliver the promises that Solomon and others claim 
it makes, then it seems that it must reconceptualise itself away from the idea of 
merger. In this way, it can once and for all sever the connection with nature, 
biology, reproduction and parenthood. In this way, both heterosexuality and 
gender roles, which have been so damaging to women and to LGBTI couples, 
can be disrupted.
The features of love evident in the legal discourse do not match love’s rhetoric of 
liberty, equality and progress. In the legal discourse love is constructed within 
other constructs such as nature, family, gender and sexuality. Furthermore, 
romantic love appears to be embedded in a discourse of complementarity 
and merger that inevitably are tied up with power. For ‘non-heterosexuals’, 
therefore, love is yet another barrier that can only be overcome to the extent 
that one can fool nature and ‘act’ the part.
Given these conclusions about the meaning of love, we can either work to 
reduce its hold over the modern imagination or work towards redefining it to 
accommodate these criticisms. Despite the critiques of love, few are willing to 
jettison it. Its connection with individual freedom and autonomy makes it a hard 
idea to reject. Love is part of who we are, and we cannot go back to a time before 
it. As Langford says, it is neither possible nor desirable to return to a time when 
personal relationships were not seen within the paradigm of romantic love. ‘No 
remedy’, she argues ‘is to be found in a reactive return to the regulation of 
love along traditional lines. Justice and humanity cannot thrive through the 
imposition of a repressive moral order and the institutionalisation of oppressive 
practices.’11 Also, as Illouz argues, we must not forget that the dominance of love 
has directly correlated with a decline in men’s power over women and with an 
increase in equality between men and women.12 The many legal changes that 
have occurred in the laws of marriage have coincided with the period of history 
where intimate relationships have been influenced by the liberalising egalitarian 
and radical ideology of love. The answer must therefore lie in reconceptualising 
love. For Illouz and Langford, the answer lies in a love which reflects women’s 
experiences and desires as much as men’s, and a love which embodies a more 
ethical ideology. For queer theorists, what is needed is a love that moves away 
from heterosexuality. For both feminists and queer theorists, moving love away 
from the discourses of nature and biology are beneficial.
10 As stated earlier, Freeman says that merger represents a significant reduction in personal autonomy, 
this impacts much more on women than on men because of the social context that love is played out in. M 
Freeman, ‘Romantic Love and Personal Autonomy’ in French P A & H K Wettstein (eds), Midwest Studies in 
Philosophy, XXII (1998): The Philosophy of Emotion (University of Notre Dame Press, Indiana 1998) 169–178.
11 Langford, Revolutions of the Heart 151.
12 E Illouz, Why Love Hurts: A Sociological Explanation (Polity, Cambridge 2012) 5.
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Earlier, I alluded to the possibility that the formulation of love offered by 
Giddens might help to fulfil some of these promises. Giddens has formulated 
love as an emotional tie that can be independent of extrinsic factors, including 
sexuality. This is a love that is entered into and structured along individual 
lines, disconnected from marriage or even monogamy. This formulation of love 
moves away from nature and is democratic and inclusive. However, it also leaves 
itself wide open to the criticism that it is potentially exploitative and unethical. 
In the discourse we have seen, it appears to be difficult therefore to reconcile a 
freer and open love with a more caring and ethical one, and yet this seems to be 
what is needed. 
Feminism and queer critique have identified many problems with love, but 
they have also provided insights that will help to recover and fulfil its radical 
and liberating potential. Feminists have identified the liberating potential of 
romantic love. Illouz, Radway, Pearce, Stacey and Langhamer, among others, 
have shown how women use love exactly to achieve what Solomon and Giddens 
have argued can be the case. Love provides a means by which women can 
subvert patriarchy. 
Queer theorists who have retained love at the same time as opposing its 
heteronormativity are also a big part of this project. Warner, Berlant, Johnson, 
Slavin, Binnie and Bell, all cited in this book, have argued that relationships, 
described by Berlant as being on the ‘edges’, can all be described as love.
It might well be that law can also help to create this new discourse of love. 
Garcia, for example, reflected a view of marriage that was built upon love and 
mutuality, and which nurtured both. Garcia accepted that love is anarchical 
but refused to either jettison it or to leave its wounded victims unprotected. Re 
Kevin must also be part of this re-reading of love. While I have argued that the 
social construction of love as heterosexual — embedded in concepts of family 
and domesticity — are paramount in the reading of this case, it must not be 
forgotten that the case breaks the connection between love and nature. Kevin 
‘becomes’ a man, is not ‘born’ one, he falls in love and marries and defies the 
‘nature’ connection that exists in both love and marriage.
The eventual recognition of same-sex marriage could also achieve this aim, and 
can be read as a decisive breaking down of marriage as a heterosexual institution. 
Same-sex couples will bring to the institution an understanding of love that is 
not necessarily steeped in scripts of family, procreation and domesticity. Indeed, 
they will join heterosexual couples who are also interested in breaking down 
these connections. There are feminists (both men and women) who marry, 
there are people who do not have children who marry, there are couples who 
Looking for Love in the Legal Discourse of Marriage
116
reject and act against gender stereotypes who marry. Same-sex married couples 
and non-traditional heterosexual couples will join forces to reflect a different 
meaning to love and marriage.
The way we read Re Kevin and the legal recognition of same-sex marriage is crucial. 
According to the reading that they replicate heterosexual scripts, love’s radical 
potential is diminished; but if we read them as validations of ‘other’, less traditional 
expressions of love then they recover and reinforce love’s radical meaning. 
Love and Marriage
Considering the relationship between love and marriage is not an easy task. 
At first, it would appear that the two are opposites: love is freedom, marriage 
is oppression; love is anarchical, marriage is ordered and rule bound; love 
is individualistic, marriage is a unity of a man and a woman; love is selfish, 
marriage is altruistic; love is about pursuing personal satisfaction, marriage is 
about giving and caring for others; love lasts for as long as it does, marriage is a 
life-long institution.
But this is too simplistic a reading of both institutions. Neither love nor marriage 
are static concepts. This book has shown that there are at least two readings of 
both love and of marriage. Love, we have seen, is a discourse of both freedom 
and of oppression. One breaks down social barriers while the other reinforces 
them. Marriage can be read both according to its traditional, patriarchal, 
religious and — we need to acknowledge — old common law meanings, as well 
as along its more modern feminist and queer equality/difference meanings. The 
influence that love has on marriage depends upon the readings we take for both 
of the institutions. 
If we take the radical reading of love, then its association with marriage can 
be a sign of the marriage institution also becoming radicalised, more equal, 
more able to deliver satisfaction to each of its parties, more open to individual 
negotiation, less embedded in rules and expectations, more free, less tied to 
gender stereotypes, less focussed on biological and natural readings, less 
heterosexual, less family, less monogamous.
If we take the oppressive reading of love, that it simply mirrors heterosexuality, 
and in turn domesticity and family, that it is structured along conservative 
views of ‘nature’ gender and sexuality, and that it is still largely religious 
and patriarchal, then the connection of love and marriage does very little to 
change the traditional meanings of marriage. Love simply reinforces marriage 
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as a life-long union, whose primary role is procreation, the reinforcement of 
the heterosexual family, the economic union of two people, and arguably the 
reinforcement of stereotypical gender roles and of patriarchy.
The same question must also be asked in reverse: what does marriage do for love? 
Again, the question depends on the interpretation of marriage. Staying with the 
traditional meanings, if we connect marriage to love, it diminishes its radical 
potential. This is the very concern that has been shown by feminists and queer 
scholars who have opposed same-sex marriage. Marriage is too conservative an 
institution, its past is too dark and too oppressive for those who have a radical 
outlook and radical aspirations in their own love lives to be aligned to it. What 
this suggests is that the radical potential of love will be lost when it is aligned 
to marriage. But what if we see marriage in the modern guise many want it 
to assume, as an equal relationship where personal freedom and satisfaction 
are obtainable? In this model, marriage and love simply reinforce each other’s 
radical potential.
The legal analysis undertaken in this book reflects the careful manouvering 
that is occurring in society in relation to the meaning of marriage. The law 
has stomped on some of the worst aspects of the legal effect of marriage (sex, 
marital rape), but it tiptoes around others (same-sex marriage). It also reflects 
the tensions that exist in relation to the meaning of love. Yes, love is great, yes 
we all can have it (Re Kevin), but it can have consequences that are not so great 
(Garcia and same-sex marriage). This might mean that love is not all we need to 
make marriage a progressive institution.
Law Again
Going back to our starting point, and knowing what we know about the 
dominance of the positivist rhetoric of law, it would have been surprising to find 
a more open discussion of love in the legal discourse of marriage. For the courts 
to have engaged openly with love would have been to depart from ‘objective’ 
reasoning and application of law. Critical jurisprudence has done quite a good 
job of challenging the positivist view of law which excludes emotion. What 
remains is for that work to penetrate the many layers of law more deeply and 
more convincingly.
If we are serious about fostering an engagement between law and emotion, we 
must also consider how that engagement can take place. Returning to the law 
and emotion scholarship with which this book began, we can identify several 
trends. We see scholarship that describes emotions that exist in different legal 
processes. We also see scholarship that calls for the inclusion of emotion in legal 
processes such as judging. Very little is said in these works about how this could 
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actually occur. We see methodologies of law, such as therapeutic jurisprudence 
and restorative justice, that attempt to use emotions to achieve justice as an 
alternative to the adversarial system. Finally, we see work that takes the lens 
of love to challenge not what law does but how law thinks. This has been the 
approach taken here.
Law that is understood in an emotional vacuum is the poorer for it. Law as 
a social discourse needs to be viewed through an emotional lens as much as 
any other. This book has shown the dynamic that exists in the legal discourse 
between love and marriage, arguing that the impact of love on marriage can 
help to move the institution away from its oppressive nature and help to create 
a more equal relationship based upon mutual needs and wants. Love can be 
associated with mutuality rather than individuality. When it comes to same-sex 
marriage, an analysis of the issue through the lens of romantic love helped to 
show a side which has hitherto been little discussed, and has helped to clarify 
aspects of the argument. To show the role love plays in defining marriage, and to 
show the features of that love, will make a contribution to the same-sex marriage 
debate. Such an insight will enable law reformers to more clearly articulate 
their demands, and their opponents to more clearly frame their opposition. The 
debate is thus enriched by the inclusion of emotional analysis.
We have come to accept that political, historical, sociological, and philosophical 
perspectives are all important to law. We need to add emotions to that perspective. 
To show why it is so, and to indicate something of how it can be done, has 
been the contribution of this book. Thinking about law within an emotional 
framework makes law more engaged with the community it serves and, as such, 
better able to understand it, and deliver it justice. Understanding the emotions 
involved in human institutions such as marriage enables law-makers and law 
reformers to more clearly articulate their claims and demands. Understanding 
legal issues through an emotional paradigm increases understanding of the issues 
themselves, and consequently leads to better legal decision-making at all levels. 
Including emotion in law dramatically changes for the better the perception we 
have of law. To believe that emotions can be divorced from law isolates it from 
an essential aspect of human behaviour; to remarry law and emotion returns law 
to where it belongs, back to its humanity. 
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